

Everyone should get the same, but we should get more: Group entitlement and intergroup moral double standard

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Abstract

Double standard—that is, employing a separate set of norms according to the actor’s and observer’s identity—is common in various contexts, but has not been given much empirical attention in the context of violent conflicts. We introduce group entitlement as a predictor of moral double standard in intergroup conflict. Three studies were conducted to test our research hypothesis. In Study 1, (Jewish Israelis) group entitlement predicted more lenient punishment for ingroup transgressors compared with unspecified outgroup transgressors. In Study 2, (Jewish Israelis) group entitlement predicted lower support for basic human rights for outgroup members compared with ingroup members. Study 3 replicated the results of Study 2 in the context of White Americans and African Americans, and showed that when presented with false feedback indicating substantial double standard among White Americans, high-group-entitlement participants experienced lower levels of moral emotions regarding the purported gap and were less willing to amend their responses compared with low-group-entitlement respondents. Implications of group entitlement in various contexts, its relation to existing constructs, and potential implications are discussed.

Keywords

discrimination, double standard, group entitlement, intergroup relations

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He slapped the cuffs on me and threw me in the back of the police cruiser. I was sitting there, terrified, watching my car get impounded. And as we’re driving down to the station, I’m pleading with him, asking him why—why he is arresting me, why he is not just giving me a ticket.

(Scharfenberg, 2016, p. 4)

for a routine traffic violation and then arrested when the police officer spotted a small amount of marijuana in her purse. Although there are no differences in marijuana use between Black and White Americans (Keyes et al., 2015), Blacks are over 3

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This is how Shanel Lindsay, a Black lawyer and legalization advocate, described being pulled over

times more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession (Bunting, Garcia, & Edwards, 2013), and legalization in several states has done little to diminish the racial gap in marijuana-related arrests (Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 2016).

This example, itself an illustration of the broader race-related justice disparities in the American criminal justice system (e.g., Burch, 2015; Cole, 1999; Mears, Cochran, & Lindsey, 2016), demonstrates that often norms, rights, and even rules can be applied or granted to a different degree depending on the group affiliation of those involved. Such disparate conduct can be described as a form of *moral double standard*, in which people employ a separate set of norms to judge the same (mis)behavior or to determine an appropriate response, according to the actor's identity. The most well-known form of double standard has been defined and studied in the context of gender relations: heterosexual men receive social rewards and praise for being sexually active, whereas sexually active women are condemned and called promiscuous (e.g., Fasula, Carry, & Miller, 2014; Millhausen & Herold, 2002). Another example of double standard is judging a transgression more leniently when committed by leaders compared with regular group members (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013).

The present research has two major goals: (a) propose a new construct and measure of group entitlement and (b) examine the role of group entitlement in moral double standard. The concept of group entitlement is derived from the concept of personal entitlement, and in three studies we examined its role in predicting moral double standard, particularly in the context of conflictual and potentially violent real-world intergroup relations, and its contribution beyond other, relevant constructs. As far as we know, this is the first time this concept is being tested as a psychological phenomenon and in the context of intergroup conflict.

Moral Double Standard in the Context of Intergroup Relations

Moral double standard has been found in the context of intergroup relations using minimal groups,

when unfair acts committed by outgroup members were judged more strictly than those committed by ingroup members (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). Responses to immoral behaviors committed by fellow ingroup members are guided to a considerable extent by a positive bias toward the ingroup (e.g., Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2006; Jordan, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 2014; Schiller, Baumgartner, & Knoch, 2014). This bias manifests in judging an ingroup member's transgression more leniently than the same action by an outgroup member (Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997; Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000) through excusing, legitimizing, or downsizing the offence (Otten & Gordijn, 2014; though see also the "black sheep" effect on punishment of ingroup deviants, e.g., Mendoza, Lane, & Amodio, 2014; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010). Ingroup-outgroup moral double standard, whether in the form of favoring the ingroup or tolerating ingroup's moral transgressions (Yudkin, Rothmund, Twardawski, Thalla, & van Bavel, 2016) or in the form of downgrading and discriminating the outgroup (Abrams, Houston, van de Vyver, & Vasiljevic, 2015), can have a negative effect on intergroup relations because it represents a violation of perceived or observed standards of justice (Adams, 1965). In the present research, we examine two manifestations of the latter form of double standard—punishment for transgressions and support for basic rights—and focus specifically on the psychological antecedents of these manifestations.

Factors Contributing to Moral Double Standard in Intergroup Relations

Several factors contribute to moral double standards. The perceiver's level of identification with the group (Braun, Otten, & Gordijn, 2009; Everett, Faber, & Crockett, 2015; Mendoza et al., 2014), emotions such as shame over the bias (Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013), and the offender's status (Abrams et al., 2013) all play a role in the use of moral double standards in intergroup contexts. In a different domain of ingroup-outgroup double

standards—that is, granting fewer human rights to outgroup members—high levels of social dominance orientation (SDO) and a preference for hierarchical (rather than egalitarian) relations between social groups were found to be negatively associated with support for equal human rights (e.g., Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; McFarland & Mathews, 2005). Viewing others outside the scope of justice or outside one’s moral community can also result in double standard (Opatow, 1990).

Group Entitlement as Another Factor Contributing to Moral Double Standard in Intergroup Relations

We propose that double standard in intergroup relations can also be predicted by a sense of *group entitlement*. This concept draws on psychological entitlement at the individual level, defined as a stable and pervasive sense that one deserves more and is entitled to more than others (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). Psychological entitlement is pervasive and global; it is not rooted in a specific situation (e.g., “I am entitled to social security because I paid into the system” or “I deserve an ‘A’ because I performed well in class”). Rather, it is experienced across situations and is stable across time. Psychological entitlement is linked to important interpersonal consequences, including competitive choices in a commons dilemma, selfish approaches to romantic relationships, and aggression following ego threat (Campbell et al., 2004). We propose that a similar sense of entitlement can exist at the group level: the sense that one’s group is entitled and deserving, regardless of specific situations and not in comparison to any other concrete group.

Previous studies referred to a sense of entitlement at the group level as a prescriptive view of the status that the ingroup is entitled to vis-à-vis outgroups (e.g., Abrams et al., 2013; Otten & Gordijn, 2014), or examined the responses to perceived violations of entitlement (Claassen, 2016; Major, 1994), but did not refer to a stable condition of a sense of deservingness. The novel conceptualization we propose is based on the application of

individual entitlement to the group level. Group entitlement is thus defined as the stable and pervasive belief that one’s ingroup deserves more and qualifies for more than other groups. The main innovation in our conceptualization is its prevailing and secure sense of deservingness, regardless of situation or specific circumstances. Because it revolves around the group’s ongoing entitlement—implicitly, based on its inherent merit—it is expected to be particularly predictive of support for group privilege and of indifference to intergroup disparities that disfavor other groups. In a way, it is an underlying mechanism of moral exclusion (Opatow, 1990): only members of the entitled ingroup deserve the full scope of justice and the ensuing rights and protection.

Group entitlement presents some aspects found in other theoretical constructs, but it is conceptually different from them. Collective narcissism includes some elements that resemble group entitlement, and is positively (though not strongly) associated with personal entitlement (de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). This perception integrates inflated regard for the ingroup with the belief that others do not sufficiently acknowledge it. In contrast, group entitlement is based on a more secure sense of collective worth, which does not hinge on the admiration of other groups and does not seek it. Group entitlement also differs from relative deprivation, in which the group is seen as entitled to receive what it lacks (Walker & Smith, 2002) rather than what it already and duly possesses. Group entitlement also bears some resemblance to moral exclusion and its consequences (Opatow, 1990; Passini & Morselli, 2017). Both concepts are based on the social categorization of “us” versus “them”; however, their focus is different. Moral exclusion singles out groups deemed unworthy because of their negative characteristics, sometimes to the point of dehumanization. As a result, these specific outgroups are perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. In contrast, the focus of group entitlement is on the worthiness and superiority of the ingroup. Rather than discriminating specific others and endowing

them with fewer rights and privileges, the ingroup is perceived as the most deserving due to its achievements or simply its stable, inherent worth. All other groups, even if not judged as particularly evil or threatening, would be deemed less deserving than the ingroup.

Our definition of group entitlement is based on a stable sense of existing and unmitigated entitlement, rather than on responses to threats to ingroup privilege. Based on this definition, we expected that group entitlement would be positively associated with double standard in intergroup relations. We also expected that high group entitlement would be associated with lower levels of distress when double standard favoring the ingroup is exposed. Finally, we expected that the predictive contribution of group entitlement would remain significant when other related variables (such as collective narcissism) are included.

To test these hypotheses, we conducted three studies. In Study 1, we examined the contribution of group entitlement to predicting double standard in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, focusing on the severity of punishment deemed appropriate for various transgressions among ingroup and outgroup members. In Study 2, we examined group entitlement as a predictor of double standard in majority–minority relations in Israel, with support for democratic rights for Israeli citizens (Jewish ingroup compared with Palestinians outgroup) as the criterion variable. In Study 3, we examined group entitlement as a predictor of double standard in the context of majority–minority relations between White Americans and African Americans, with support of citizen rights in the United States as the dependent variable. Because of the potential conceptual overlap between group entitlement and other variables (collective narcissism, personal entitlement, group identification, moral entitlement, social dominance orientation, and political orientation), they were all measured and included as additional predictors in all studies.

Study 1

The aim of Study 1 was to provide an initial examination of our hypotheses. To achieve this

goal, we conducted a correlational study in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, focusing on the severity of punishment deemed appropriate for various transgressions committed by ingroup and outgroup members. We measured Jewish Israeli participants' levels of group entitlement and their support for punishment for different misdeeds. We also measured several related constructs to test whether group entitlement has predictive value over and above variables such as collective narcissism, group identification, and political orientation.

Method

Participants and procedure. Three hundred and ninety Jewish Israeli participants¹ (198 men, 192 women; $M_{\text{age}} = 38.26$, $SD = 13.23$, age range = 18–70 years) were recruited through an online survey panel (<https://www.midgampanel.com/clients/index.asp>) and took part in the research in exchange for monetary compensation. The study was conducted in two waves as part of a larger research project. In T1 participants completed a series of questionnaires, including personal entitlement, group entitlement, group identification, collective narcissism, moral entitlement, social dominance orientation, support for punishment (transgressor unspecified), and demographic information (including political orientation), in this order. In T2 (2 weeks later) participants were contacted again and completed the support for punishment measure, this time regarding ingroup transgressors.

Measures. Unless stated otherwise, in all the studies all items ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Full measures of all three studies can be found in the supplemental material.

Group entitlement was measured using six items chosen from the Personal Entitlement Scale (Campbell et al., 2004). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that this scale is adapted to the group level. The items were chosen based on their relevance to the concept of group entitlement, particularly those relating to general deservingness and entitlement, without

referring to or comparing with other groups (sample item: “I feel that Jewish Israelis are entitled to more of everything”; $\alpha = .92$).

Support for punishment was based on Hunter, Stringer, and Watson (1991), and modified to the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The scale included five items describing various offences conducted in the context of intergroup conflicts. The offences were described in a general manner and without specifying the group identity of either offender or victim (e.g., “Burning down a house of worship”). Participants were asked to indicate how much they supported punishment for each offence ($\alpha = .83$). Answers ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much so*), so that low scores indicated little support for punishing the offender and high scores indicated strong support for punishment.

Control variables. To examine whether group entitlement has predictive value over and above other constructs, we included several measures that were associated with preferential treatment of the ingroup. Personal entitlement² was measured using a five-item scale based on Campbell et al. (2004; sample item: “I feel that I am entitled to more of everything”; $\alpha = .80$). Answers ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*to a very large extent*) indicating the extent to which participants agreed with each statement. Group identification was measured using a three-item Attachment Scale (sample item: “Being a Jewish Israeli is an important part of my identity”; $\alpha = .90$) and a three-item Glorification Scale (sample item: “Other ethnic groups can learn a lot from us”; $\alpha = .87$), both are forms of group identification and based on Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006). Collective narcissism was measured using a six-item scale based on de Zavala et al. (2009; sample item: “I wish other groups would more quickly recognize the authority of my group”; $\alpha = .89$). Moral entitlement was measured using a three-item scale based on Schori-Eyal, Klar, Roccas, and McNeill (2017; sample item: “Harming innocents is certainly justified when our existence is being threatened”; $\alpha = .75$). Social dominance orientation was measured using a four-item scale based on Sidanius

and Pratto (2001; sample item: “Superior groups should dominate inferior groups”; $\alpha = .68$). Political orientation was measured using a single item ranged from 1 (*extreme right*) to 7 (*extreme left*).

Support for punishment for Jews in Israel was measured using the same items as in the Support For Punishment Scale, but presented in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and adapted to describe Jewish Israeli offenders and Palestinian victims (sample item: “Burning down a mosque”; $\alpha = .88$). Answers ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much so*), so that low scores indicated no support for punishing the ingroup offender and high scores indicated strong support for punishment. Double standard was calculated by subtracting support for ingroup members’ punishment from support for general punishment (higher values indicate greater double standard).

Results and Discussion

We first conducted a factor analysis and found that all group entitlement items loaded onto a single factor (Table 1). We then examined, using principal component analysis with varimax rotation, whether group entitlement and collective narcissism were distinct constructs and loaded onto different factors. The results are presented in Tables 1 and 2 (for Studies 1–3) and show that the analysis yielded very clear two-factor solutions that are compatible with our preliminary construction of the scales.

Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations between group entitlement, collective narcissism, and other variables are reported in Table 3 (for Studies 1–3). Group entitlement was positively associated with collective narcissism, glorification, moral entitlement, and political orientation; and more moderately with SDO and group attachment. In terms of the relationship between group entitlement and the dependent variables, a moderate negative correlation was found between group entitlement and support for punishment for Jews in Israel; a moderate positive correlation was found between group entitlement and double standard in support for

Table 1. Items of the Group Entitlement Scale with factors loading in Studies 1–3 validation samples.

Item	Factor loadings		
	Study 1	Study 2	Study 3
1. "If an asteroid hit the earth, we would deserve to be on the first spaceship to Mars."	.79	.84	.85
2. "We demand the best because we are worth it."	.86	.84	.87
3. "We deserve more things in life."	.88	.88	.91
4. "My group deserve an extra break now and then."	.84	.66	.86
5. "Things should go our way."	.87	.87	.79
6. "I feel that we are entitled to more of everything."	.90	.92	.88

Note. Items that formed the final Group Entitlement Scale.

punishment. Thus, participants with high levels of group entitlement also exhibited stronger double standard in their support for punishment (i.e., lighter punishment for their ingroup members compared with unspecified offenders who committed the same transgressions).

To examine our main research hypothesis, we conducted a linear regression analysis to predict the double standard in punishment, controlling for various relevant constructs. In the first step of the regression, we entered variables we expected would predict group entitlement based on existing literature (Table 4). In the second step of the analysis, we entered group entitlement to examine whether it would predict double standard above and beyond these variables. As predicted, participants who felt that their group was highly entitled and deserving also exhibited greater double standard in their support for punishment ($B = 0.14$, $SE = 0.07$, $t = 2.01$, $p = .045$, 95% CI [0.00, 0.27]) above and beyond the effects of the variables entered in Step 1 ($R^2 = .13$, $F_{\text{change}} = 4.06^*$, $p < .01$; see Table 4). This relationship was not moderated by gender or political orientation, meaning that the association between group entitlement and double standard is similar for men and women as well as for people with different political ideologies.

The findings of Study 1 support our assertion that group entitlement has a unique contribution to predicting double standard in the form of supporting more lenient punishment for ingroup members. However, we tested our hypothesis in

the context of intergroup conflict only in relation to the preferential treatment of the ingroup and in the specific domain of support for punishment policies. While this supports the proposed role of group entitlement in intergroup dynamics, it represents a very specific form of double standard, and does not reflect other aspects of this phenomenon. In Study 2, we sought to examine whether the predictive role of group entitlement can be replicated and expanded to discriminating treatment of the outgroup in the context of majority–minority relations. To achieve this goal, we conducted Study 2 in the context of relations between Israeli Jews (the dominant majority group in Israel) and Palestinian citizens of Israel (the largest minority group in Israel).

Study 2

The aim of Study 2 was to examine our hypotheses regarding group entitlement as a predictor of double standard in the form of discrimination against a minority outgroup. We conducted a correlational study in the context of the relations between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel (also called Arab Israelis), focusing on support for democratic rights for Israeli citizens. Widespread nondemocratic attitudes and practices create fertile ground for nondemocratic legislation and the realization of discriminatory policies (Gibson, 2006). It is well established that political intolerance towards minority groups is the most prominent expression of such problematic attitudes (Stouffer, 1992). The

Table 2. Exploratory factor analysis for the group entitlement and collective narcissism items in Studies 1–3.

Factor (F) loadings	Item					
	Study 1		Study 2		Study 3	
	F1 (group entitlement)	F2 (collective narcissism)	F1 (group entitlement)	F2 (collective narcissism)	F1 (group entitlement)	F2 (collective narcissism)
Group entitlement items						
“If an asteroid hit the earth, we would deserve to be on the first spaceship to Mars.”	.72	.28	.82	.14	.65	.51
“We demand the best because we are worth it.”	.76	.38	.76	.24	.63	.55
“We deserve more things in life.”	.83	.30	.85	.09	.77	.48
“My group deserve an extra break now and then.”	.82	.24	.64	.17	.81	.34
“Things should go our way.”	.81	.32	.87	.02	.67	.41
“I feel that we are entitled to more of everything.”	.86	.30	.93	-.01	.62	.62
Collective narcissism items						
“I wish other groups would more quickly recognize authority of my group.”	.42	.66	.66	.53	.24	.83
“My group deserves special treatment.”	.64	.53	.77	.31	.24	.84
“I will never be satisfied until my group gets all it deserves.”	.46	.70	.73	.27	.31	.82
“I insist upon my group getting the respect that is due to it.”	.36	.78	.58	.40	.34	.81
“It really makes me angry when others criticize my group.”	.23	.75	.27	.68	.35	.64
“Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my group.”	.18	.83	.45	.80	.31	.74
“If my group had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.”			.58	.51	.42	.82
“The true worth of my group is often misunderstood.”			.12	.82	.37	.68
“I do not get upset when people do not notice achievements of my group.” (Reverse-coded)			.06	-.28	-.61	-.06

Note. Variance explained in Studies 1–3: 70.90%, 62.51%, 69.42%.

support or willingness to denounce the basic political rights of individuals who belong to a defined outgroup in a particular society contradicts basic

democratic values of equal rights and political opportunity. Such intolerance appears to be a deeply rooted problem, shared by many if not

Table 3. Correlations of group entitlement, personal entitlement, collective narcissism, glorification, attachment, moral entitlement, social dominance orientation, political orientation, double standard, and moral emotions (Studies 1–3, $N = 390, 103, 149$).

Measures		$M (SD)$	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Group entitlement	Study 1	3.92 (1.68)	–									
	Study 2	3.28 (1.50)	–									
	Study 3	3.89 (2.05)	–									
2. Personal entitlement	Study 1	4.18 (1.21)	.41**	–								
	Study 2	3.73 (1.04)	.47**	–								
	Study 3	3.31 (1.22)	.55**	–								
3. Collective narcissism	Study 1	4.79 (1.38)	.74**	.30**	–							
	Study 2	4.09 (1.18)	.71**	.25*	–							
	Study 3	2.80 (1.49)	.81**	.49**	–							
4. Glorification	Study 1	5.28 (1.31)	.54**	.16**	.66**	–						
	Study 2	4.24 (1.43)	.74**	.29**	.75**	–						
	Study 3	3.39 (1.59)	.73**	.41**	.80**	–						
5. Attachment	Study 1	5.65 (1.23)	.35**	.07	.51**	.77**	–					
	Study 2	5.16 (1.43)	.51**	.09	.55**	.73**	–					
	Study 3	4.35 (1.44)	.58**	.31**	.58**	.75**	–					
6. Moral entitlement	Study 1	4.73 (1.48)	.54**	.19**	.50**	.49**	.35**	–				
	Study 2	3.28 (1.50)	.55**	.23*	.57**	.53**	.29**	–				
	Study 3	n/a						–				
7. SDO	Study 1	2.55 (0.92)	.28**	.12**	.19**	.13**	–.02	.30**	–			
	Study 2	2.43 (1.08)	.26**	.16	.26**	.19*	.01	.41**	–			
	Study 3	2.32 (1.38)	.48**	.24**	.61**	.56**	.39**	n/a	–			
8. Political orientation	Study 1	3.37 (1.24)	.44**	.03	.48**	.44**	.27**	.45**	.23**	–		
	Study 2	3.79 (1.15)	.47**	.02	.52**	.52**	.31**	.52**	.35**	–		
	Study 3	3.50 (1.80)	.32**	.05	.43	.44**	.38**	n/a	.51**	–		
9. Double standard	Study 1	0.37 (1.41)	.25**	.02	.24**	.24**	.17**	.17**	.16**	.30**	–	
	Study 2	2.07 (0.77)	.44**	.15	.39**	.26**	.08	.38**	.10	.33**	–	
	Study 3	5.16 (0.86)	.19*	.18*	.38**	.23**	.06	n/a	.51**	.035	–	
10. Moral emotions	Study 1	n/a										
	Study 2	n/a										
	Study 3	3.42 (1.49)	–.24**	.10	–.15	–.19*	–.14	n/a	–.24**	.31**	.11	–

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .001$.

most democratic cultures (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009).

Palestinian citizens of Israel constitute 19% of the Israeli population, and many among the Jewish majority consider them a hostile minority that is loyal to Israel's enemies (Smootha, 2002). Although Palestinian citizens of Israel formally enjoy all the rights associated with citizenship, their symbolic exclusion from the polity manifests in various institutional spheres (Guetzkow & Fast, 2016; Smootha, 2002). For example, except for the Druze and the Bedouin minorities, Palestinian

citizens of Israel are not drafted into the Israeli Defense Forces, which is one of the major institutions for acquiring legitimacy, skills, and social capital. By all accounts, they are the most discriminated, marginalized group in Israel and face residential, educational, and occupational segregation (Lewin, Stier, & Caspi-Dror, 2006; Lewin-Epstein & Semyonov, 2019; Rosenhek, 1999).

We expected that Jewish Israelis characterized by high levels of group entitlement would exhibit greater double standard in their support for democratic citizen rights (i.e., a greater gap between

Table 4. Contribution of group entitlement to predicting double standard in support for punishment in Israel (Study 1).

Predictor	R ²	F _{change}	B
	Gap	Gap	Gap
Step 1	.12	7.19***	
PE			-.04
CN			.07
SDO			.16*
ME			-.05
Attachment			.03
Glorification			.09
Political orientation			-.25***
Step 2	.13	4.06*	
GE			.14*
PE			-.09
CN			-.01
SDO			.14
ME			-.08
Attachment			.03
Glorification			.08
Political orientation			-.24**

Note. PE = personal entitlement; CN = collective narcissism; SDO = social dominance orientation; ME = moral entitlement; GE = group entitlement.

support for democratic rights in general and support for democratic rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel), and that group entitlement would account for the variance in double standard over and above other relevant variables. We measured Jewish Israeli participants' levels of group entitlement and their support for democratic citizen rights (in general or for Palestinian citizens of Israel). As in the first study, we also measured the related constructs to examine whether group entitlement has a unique contribution to predicting double standard.

Method

Participants and procedure. One hundred and three Jewish Israeli students³ (16 men, 87 women; $M_{\text{age}} = 24.5$, $SD = 6.4$, age range = 19–30 years) took part in the research in exchange for course credit. Participants first completed a series of questionnaires, including support for democratic citizen rights for Israelis in general, group entitlement,

and the same control variables and in the same order as in Study 1. Participants then answered the measure of support for Palestinian citizens' democratic rights.

Measures. Unless stated otherwise, all items ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Group entitlement ($\alpha = .91$) was measured using the same scale as in Study 1.

Support for democratic rights was based on Durrheim et al.'s (2011) Racial Policy Attitude Scale and modified to the context of the relations between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel. The scale included seven items (sample item: "Every citizen should have the right to vote and be elected to any office"; $\alpha = .66$). Answers ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 6 (*very much so*).

Support for Palestinian citizens of Israel's democratic rights was measured using the seven democratic rights items with change of the word "every citizen" to "Palestinian citizens of Israel" ($\alpha = .72$). Answers ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 6 (*very much so*) indicating to what extent participants agreed with each statement. Double standard was calculated by subtracting support for democratic rights for Palestinian citizens of Israel from support for democratic rights in general (higher values indicate greater double standard).

Control variables. Personal entitlement was measured using the full 10-item Psychological Entitlement Scale (Campbell et al., 2004; $\alpha = .94$). Group attachment ($\alpha = .88$) and glorification ($\alpha = .87$), moral entitlement ($\alpha = .81$), social dominance orientation ($\alpha = .80$), and political orientation were measured using identical scales to those used in Study 1. Collective narcissism was measured using a nine-item scale (sample item: "I wish other groups would more quickly recognize authority of my group"; $\alpha = .87$).

Results and Discussion

Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations between group entitlement, collective narcissism, and other variables are reported in Table 3. In terms of the relationship between group entitlement and the dependent variables, a

Table 5. Contribution of group entitlement to predicting double standard in support for democratic citizen rights in Israel (Study 2).

Predictor	R ²	F _{change}	B
	Gap	Gap	Gap
Step 1	.24	4.35**	
PE			.05
CN			.22*
SDO			-.09
ME			.12
Attachment			-.09
Glorification			-.04
Political orientation			-.12
Step 2	.30	8.22**	
GE			.23**
PE			.04
CN			.15
SDO			-.10
ME			.09
Attachment			-.11
Glorification			-.11
Political orientation			-.09

Note. PE = personal entitlement; CN = collective narcissism; SDO = social dominance orientation; ME = moral entitlement; GE = group entitlement.

moderate to strong negative association was found between group entitlement and support for democratic rights for Palestinian citizens of Israel, and a moderate to strong positive association with double standard in democratic citizen rights. In addition, a positive association was found between group entitlement and collective narcissism, group glorification and attachment, and moral entitlement and political orientation. Group entitlement was also moderately associated with SDO.

To examine our main research hypothesis, we conducted a linear regression analysis to predict double standard in support for democratic citizen rights, with group entitlement as the predictor and controlling for various relevant constructs. We conducted stepwise analysis similar to the regression conducted in Study 1, in which we first entered the control variables, and second we entered group entitlement. As expected, participants who reported

high levels of group entitlement also exhibited greater double standard in their support for democratic citizen rights ($B = 0.23$, $SE = 0.08$, $t = 2.80$, $p = .005$, 95% CI [0.38, 0.07]), above and beyond the effect of the control variables ($R^2 = .30$, $F_{\text{change}} = 8.22^{**}$, $p < .005$; see Table 5). This relationship was not moderated by gender or political orientation.

Study 2 provided additional support for group entitlement as a separate construct that has a unique contribution to predicting double standard in minority–majority relations. It also demonstrated this predictive contribution in a somewhat different context and on a different manifestation of double standard (conferring democratic rights to a national ethnic minority within the same society, compared with punishment to an ingroup/unspecified transgressor). However, Studies 1 and 2 are not without limitations. Both were conducted among Jewish Israelis in the context of intergroup conflict in Israel, which can limit our ability to generalize conclusions based on their findings. In addition, we aimed to examine emotional and attitudinal responses when double standard regarding political rights is exposed. Moral emotions represent a key element of our human moral apparatus, influencing the link between moral standards and moral behavioral tendencies (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). They provide the motivational force, the power, and energy to do good and to avoid doing bad; they are also associated with the tendency to make reparations for the transgressions and wrongdoings that elicited them (Kroll & Egan, 2004). What emotions would members of the advantaged group experience when faced with double standard? Would they choose to rectify it? The goal of Study 3, hence, was to test these questions while expanding group entitlement as a predictor of double standard in a substantially different context of majority–minority relations: racial relations in the United States.

Study 3

To achieve the goals of Study 3, we conducted a correlational study similar in design to Study 2 in the context of majority–minority relations between

White Americans and African Americans, focusing on support for citizen rights in the United States. We also examined participants' affective response to double standard, and their willingness to amend their replies in order to rectify it. Learning that one's group employs double standard can imply that the group is not as good, moral, and deserving as one would want it to be. This can lead to experiencing group-based moral emotions such as shame and guilt over the ingroup's misbehavior, which in turn may prompt attempts at reparation and making amends (e.g., Allpress, Barlow, Brown, & Louis, 2010; Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008; Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012). However, because any feedback undermining the ingroup's moral image is threatening, it can instead lead to defensive responses that suppress such emotions (e.g., Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2004; Rotella & Richeson, 2013). In Study 3, we examined the association between group entitlement, double standard, and moral emotions.

We provided participants with false feedback indicating a supposed gap in White American participants' support for conferring citizen rights to African Americans compared with their support for general citizen rights (i.e., double standard), and measured their group-based moral emotions in response to it.

Then, we provided participants the opportunity to change their answers to the items on African American citizens' rights. We expected that because high-entitlement group members believe that their group deserves to be treated better than others, they would experience lower levels of moral emotions when double standard is exposed; and they would not choose to amend their replies to reduce the double standard. Finally, we expected moral emotions to mediate the relationship between group entitlement and willingness to amend double standard.

Method

Participants and procedure. One hundred and forty-nine White American participants (95 men, 54 women; $M_{\text{age}} = 34.5$, $SD = 10.5$, age range =

20–74 years) were recruited through Amazon's Mechanical Turk to take part in the research in exchange for monetary compensation. Participants first completed the same questionnaires as in Study 2 and in the same order (adapted to White–Black relations). Only moral entitlement was not included in Study 3, as it is not relevant in this context.⁴ Participants were then told that the measure of support for African American citizens' rights to which they just responded was identical to the general rights questionnaire they had completed at the beginning of the survey. The false feedback refers to the average gap of all respondents' replies (including their own) between the two scales of support for citizen rights, indicating discrimination against the African American minority. Participants received false feedback (represented by text and an infographic) indicating that the average gap of all respondents' replies was 20% (indicating discrimination against the African American minority):

In the beginning of the questionnaire we asked you about your attitudes about some rights for all citizens. Later we asked the same questions about applying these rights to African Americans. Often people exhibit a gap between their support for general citizen rights and their responses when the rights are framed in the context of African Americans. Now, we will calculate the gap between the answers you gave at the beginning of the study (general citizen rights) and the answers you gave about the same rights when referring to African Americans. The gap you will see is an average that combines your answers and those of all participants who previously completed this study. The graph shows a 20% gap between support for general citizen rights and support for citizen rights directed at African Americans. This is the average gap among people who participated in the study, and the gap in your own responses was not different from average. This means that you and other White Americans who participated in the study are more supportive of citizen rights towards all the citizens than they are supportive of citizen rights towards African Americans.

Following this feedback, participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they experienced group-based moral emotions (including guilt, shame, and disappointment) regarding the gap:

Please indicate how much the gap that you were exposed to (a different treatment to African Americans compared with all citizens of the United States) makes you feel each one of the following emotions: guilt about the gap, shame about the gap, disappointment in my group.

Finally, participants were presented again with the African American citizens' rights questionnaire, thus giving them an opportunity to change their responses and affect the supposed gap.

Measures. Group entitlement ($\alpha = .93$) was measured using the same scale as in Studies 1–2. Support for citizen rights was measured using seven items based on Study 2 and modified to the context of African American relations (sample item: “Every citizen should have the right to vote and be elected to any office”; $\alpha = .81$). Answers ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 6 (*very much so*). Support for citizen rights for African Americans in the United States was measured using the seven democratic citizen rights items changing “every citizen” to “African American citizen” ($\alpha = .86$). Answers ranged from 1 (*not at all*) to 6 (*very much so*) indicating to what extent participants agreed with each statement. Double standard was calculated by subtracting support for African American citizens' rights from support for citizen rights in general (higher values indicate greater double standard). Change in support for citizen rights for African American citizens in the United States was calculated by subtracting support for citizen rights for African Americans from support for them when given the opportunity to change their responses (higher values indicate greater change in attitudes toward African American citizens' rights in response to the alleged double standard). Group-based moral emotions regarding the gap were measured using three items adapted from Branscombe, Slugoski, and Kappen (2004) and

applied to the current context, indicating the extent to which participants experienced negative group-based emotions (guilt, shame, and disappointment) regarding the gap ($\alpha = .95$)

Control variables. Personal entitlement ($\alpha = .90$), group attachment ($\alpha = .78$) and glorification ($\alpha = .86$), collective narcissism ($\alpha = .92$), and social dominance orientation ($\alpha = .81$) were measured using identical scales to those used in Study 2. Political orientation was measured using a single item that ranged from 1 (*liberal*) to 7 (*conservative*).

Results and Discussion

Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations between group entitlement, collective narcissism, and other variables are reported in Table 3. In terms of the relationship between group entitlement and the dependent variables, a negative correlation was found between group entitlement and support for African American citizens' rights, and a negative association with group-based moral emotions about the alleged double standard. Group entitlement was positively correlated with double standard in support for African American citizens' rights. In addition, a positive association was found between group entitlement and collective narcissism, group glorification, attachment, and SDO. Group entitlement was also moderately correlated with political orientation.

We examined group entitlement as a predictor of double standard in support for citizen rights and of group-based moral emotions in response to supposed double standard. A significant, yet negative, gap was found between respondents' support for citizen rights and for African American citizens' rights ($M = 0.09$, $SD = 0.35$, $t = 3.13$, $p = .002$), indicating a tendency to favor African Americans' rights over general citizen rights. This finding indicates that there was no explicit double standard in participants' support for citizen rights.⁵ We therefore decided to examine our main research hypothesis by conducting a linear regression to predict the support for African American citizens'

Table 6. Contribution of group entitlement to predicting support for citizen rights for African Americans in the United States (Study 3).

Predictor	R^2	F_{change}	B
	Citizen rights for African Americans	Citizen rights for African Americans	Citizen rights for African Americans
Step 1	.32	11.29***	
PE			-.05
CN			-.28*
SDO			-.46***
Attachment			.21*
Glorification			.13
Political orientation			-.05
Step 2	.35	*5.47	
GE			-.23*
PE			-.11
CN			-.44**
SDO			-.46***
Attachment			.19
Glorification			.08
Political orientation			-.04

Note. PE = personal entitlement; CN = collective narcissism; SDO = social dominance orientation; GE = group entitlement.

rights, controlling for the same variables as in Study 2. We conducted a stepwise analysis similar to the regression conducted in Studies 1–2, in which we first entered the control variables and second we entered group entitlement. As predicted, participants who felt that their group was highly entitled and deserving also exhibited less support for African American citizens' rights ($B = -0.30$, $SE = 0.13$, $t = -2.34$, $p = .02$, 95% CI [0.05, 0.55]) above and beyond the effect of the control variables ($R^2 = .35$, $F_{\text{change}} = 5.47^*$, $p < .01$; see Table 6).

To test our second hypothesis, we conducted a linear regression analysis to predict group-based moral emotions in response to the alleged double standard in support for citizen rights (controlling for relevant variables). As predicted, participants who felt that their group was highly entitled and deserving also reported low levels of group-based moral emotions in response to the double standard allegedly displayed by their group ($B = -0.53$, $SE = 0.14$, $t = -3.76$, $p = .000$, 95% CI [-0.79, -0.24])

above and beyond the effect of the control variables ($R^2 = .22$, $F_{\text{change}} = 14.2^{***}$, $p < .001$; see Table 7).

To examine our third research hypothesis, we conducted a linear regression analysis to predict the change in attitudes toward African American citizens' rights in response to the alleged double standard. As predicted, participants who felt that their group was highly entitled and deserving also exhibited less change in their attitudes in response to their alleged double standard ($B = -0.31$, $SE = 0.15$, $t = -2.02$, $p = .045$, 95% CI [-0.61, -0.01]) above and beyond the effect of the control variables ($R^2 = .06$, $F_{\text{change}} = 4.08^*$, $p = .225$; see Table 8). The relationships between group entitlement and the dependent variables were not moderated by gender or political orientation.

Finally, we tested the hypothesis that moral emotions would mediate the relationship between group entitlement and willingness to amend double standard. Contrary to our hypothesis, moral emotions did not mediate the relationship between group entitlement and willingness to

Table 7. Contribution of group entitlement to predicting moral emotions regarding the supposed double standard (Study 3).

Predictor	R^2	F_{change}	B
	Moral emotions	Moral emotions	Moral emotions
Step 1	.14	**3.77	
PE			.18*
CN			.04
SDO			-.13
Attachment			.02
Glorification			-.15
Political orientation			-.21*
Step 2	.22	14.2***	
GE			-.52***
PE			.28**
CN			.33*
SDO			-.14
Attachment			.07
Glorification			-.06
Political orientation			-.22*

Note. PE = personal entitlement; CN = collective narcissism; SDO = social dominance orientation; GE = group entitlement.

amend the alleged double standard ($B = 0.03$, $SE = 0.02$, 95% CI $[-0.07, 0.00]$).

The results of Study 3 provide additional support, in a different context, for our main assertion regarding the role of group entitlement in intergroup bias and discrimination. The fact that no explicit double standard regarding African Americans' rights was found may be the result of a social desirability effect and participants' reluctance to express overt bias. As a proxy, we used as our dependent variable their actual support for African Americans' rights, which indicated that group entitlement was associated with lower support among White Americans to provide this minority group with basic rights.

Contrary to our hypotheses, the moral emotions we measured did not mediate the relationship between group entitlement and willingness to amend the double standard. One explanation could be that emotions do play a mediating role, but not the emotions we examined, that is, anger,

Table 8. Contribution of group entitlement to predicting change in attitudes (Study 3).

Predictor	R^2	F_{change}	B
	Change in attitudes	Change in attitudes	Change in attitudes
Step 1	.03	0.76	
PE			.10
CN			.12
SDO			.12
Attachment			.05
Glorification			-.20
Political orientation			-.04
Step 2	.06	4.08*	
GE			-.31*
PE			.16
CN			.29
SDO			.11
Attachment			.07
Glorification			-.15
Political orientation			-.04

Note. PE = personal entitlement; CN = collective narcissism; SDO = social dominance orientation; GE = group entitlement.

hatred, sadness. Another explanation would be that another process suppressed the mediation through moral emotions, for example, diffusion of responsibility (Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Vainapel, Weisel, Zultan, & Shalvi, 2019). It is possible that participants thought there was a norm of double standard and their change of answer would not matter. It is also possible that participants' experience of moral emotions as a result of the exposed double standard was associated with other benign outcomes, but not the type of reparation we measured (perhaps participants thought they were expected to be consistent in their responses).

General Discussion

In three studies, conducted in Israel and the United States, we found that group entitlement consistently predicted aspects of double standard in intergroup relations. High levels of group entitlement—the belief that one's group is worthier

than others and therefore deserves privileges and special treatment—predicted support for more lenient punishment to ingroup transgressors (Study 1, Jewish Israelis); less support for human rights to minority group members relative to human rights to ingroup members (Study 2, Jewish Israelis compared to Palestinian citizens of Israel); less absolute support for human rights to minority group members; lower group-based moral emotions over reported double standard; and less willingness to amend the double standard following feedback (Study 3, White Americans compared to African Americans). In all studies, the predictive contribution of group entitlement was over and above other relevant predictors measured (personal entitlement, group identification, collective narcissism, moral entitlement, SDO, and political orientation).

The results support our suggestion that group entitlement, as a stable and global belief in the group's deservingness, can have a significant impact on intergroup relations. In all studies, conducted in two countries and three different contexts, group entitlement was found to uniquely predict forms of double standard. Taken together, these findings suggest that group entitlement does indeed tap into a meaningful self-perception of some group members, which in turn affects their relations with other social groups. Bias and discrimination against less advantaged groups, which are reflected in intergroup double standard, can impair and fray the ties between society members; perceived group entitlement may contribute to these harmful processes, and therefore it is important to further advance our understanding of this belief and how it operates. Our findings indicate that although moral emotions may be involved, their role—and that of additional mechanisms—requires additional investigation. Interestingly, our findings also show that the effects of group entitlement on moral double standard focused on outgroup derogation are stronger than those focused on ingroup favoritism (see Tables 4–8). Further research should examine if these patterns are consistent.

Future research should also examine additional consequences of group entitlement: would

entitled groups feel impervious to criticism over their wrongdoings, and to the narratives and experiences of disadvantaged groups? How would they respond to attempts at social change and greater equality that would undermine their privileged status and perception? These directions, as well as the antecedents and boundary conditions of group entitlement, should be explored to increase our understanding of the phenomenon. Another important research direction would be to examine whether group entitlement affects group members' attitudes towards nonthreatening outgroups or subgroups that are not in competition or adversarial relations with the ingroup. We suggest that even friendly outgroups considered allies would still be seen as less deserving than the privileged ingroup by those members characterized by a strong sense of entitlement. Research in this direction would also help to more accurately examine the relationship between group entitlement and moral exclusion.

While this is not the focus of our present work, it should be noted that group entitlement could develop following collective experiences of suffering and hardship. People whose group suffered or who see it as disadvantaged may also feel entitled to behave in ways that benefit the group at the expense of others (Durrheim et al., 2011), or even aggressively to protect their group's interests (e.g., Schori-Eyal et al., 2017). This conceptualization of group entitlement is different from the one explored in the present research, as it is based on a belief that other groups are indebted to one's group because of its painful history, and that it deserves to be compensated for its suffering and neglect. This "deprived group entitlement" is similar to the findings indicating that individuals who believe that their groups were victimized feel they are less obligated to assist others (Warner, Wohl, & Branscombe, 2014) and more entitled to take aggressive actions against others (Schori-Eyal et al., 2017). This form of group entitlement and its consequences for intergroup relations should also be explored.

Group entitlement is likely to have substantial practical implications. Our findings indicate that a strong sense of group entitlement is associated

with double standard in multiple contexts. Double standard, in turn, may be seen as a violation of justice as it ignores basic principles of equity. The perception of violated justice can contribute to intergroup tensions and even hostilities, especially if group entitlement is accompanied by a lack of awareness of the double standard. As people are averse to learning of their group's privilege (Phillips & Lowery, 2015), they may be motivated to disregard the double standard to which they adhere. This lack of awareness could be perceived by those discriminated against, further exacerbating tensions and disgruntlement. Even before double standard is enacted, the belief in group entitlement and its implied superiority may be repulsive to members of other groups.

The individual differences found between members of advantaged groups indicate that membership in a socially dominant group, even one that may possess and instill a narrative of superiority and deservingness (Cichocka, 2016), does not necessarily lead to a strong sense of group entitlement. Just-world beliefs (Lerner & Clayton, 2011; Lerner & Simmons, 1966) and system-justifying beliefs (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Major, 1994) may explain these individual differences. People whose personal status is insecure and rely more heavily on the group as a source of positive image may also be those who prefer to see their group as entitled, to compensate for what they feel lacking as individuals (Grubbs & Exline, 2016). Future research should test these possible explanations through correlational and experimental designs (e.g., to examine whether self-affirmation would reduce threats to personal security and thus lead to reduced group entitlement as well).

While group entitlement is likely to have consequences beyond double standard (e.g., discrimination, intergroup violence), it would likely be very difficult to extinguish. Not only would those who believe in their group's entitlement be reluctant to give up the resultant privilege, but also because it is based on an implicit belief in the group's very positive value and its contributions to society in general, they would be loath to relinquish this flattering and positive perception of the

group and, by extension, of themselves. The high regard of the group and its achievements, reflected in its positive association with group glorification (particularly the superiority facet), would likely create a strong sentiment of group-based pride and increase group cohesiveness (Berndsen, Thomas, McGarty, Bliuc, & Hendres, 2017), making this belief even harder to relinquish even if its adverse consequences are exposed.

A possible solution may be to allow those high on group entitlement to maintain their perception of the group as a force for good, while cultivating a sense of obligation to help others. This would not pose a threat to the group's image and would even enhance it, but also channel the underlying sense of worth to prosocial (rather than discriminatory) tendencies. Again, this is reminiscent of the potential outcomes of group victimization, which can lead to commitment to helping others (Schori-Eyal et al., 2017; Vollhardt, 2012; Warner et al., 2014). Although this possible intervention is not without risks, it may be a first step in severing the association between group entitlement and discriminatory attitudes and policies such as double standard.

The present research provides important empirical evidence about group entitlement and its impact on intergroup double standard, but it also has some limitations. The correlative nature of the studies conducted limits our ability to draw conclusions about causal relationships; it is arguable, though unlikely, that group entitlement develops as a mechanism to justify double standard, discrimination, and ingroup privilege. Experimental research designs could assist in testing this possible interpretation. It is possible that participants felt that because other participants' score indicated a discriminatory gap, that was normative (especially if they were high in group entitlement and also held negative racial attitudes) and then chose not to change their response when given the opportunity. Another possibility is that people who are externally motivated to respond without prejudice would be more likely to show a change in attitudes after the manipulation than those who are low in external motivation (Plant & Devine, 1998). In this case,

people high in group entitlement would be low in both internal and external motivation, and that motivation may in fact drive this effect. A future direction could be creating a comparison condition where participants learn that people tend to score similarly on general citizen rights and on African American rights, and see if participants who are high in group entitlement become even more extreme in their attitudes.

Double standard would look different in other intergroup situations (e.g., immigration, refugees) and that should be explored further. Expanding the scope of the studies to other intergroup contexts (e.g., immigration, refugees) to paint a more complete picture of group entitlement—including its potential associations with related constructs, its underlying mechanisms (e.g., perception of global ingroup merit), and its various functions (e.g., as a defense mechanism when ingroup privilege is exposed)—is a possible future direction. Additional contexts would also help to further consolidate the structure of group entitlement and its relation to other constructs.

Extending the research on group entitlement in these directions, and examining additional forms of entitlement, could further increase our understanding of a perception that appears to be an important factor in shaping intergroup relations.

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Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. A power analysis using G*Power 3.0.10 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), specifying one

predictor and 7 degrees of freedom in a multiple regression, with 0.80 power (Cohen, 1992) and a small effect size ($f^2 = 0.20$) yielded a required sample size of 395. Because the sample was collected in two waves and was part of a larger research project, we recruited over 400 participants in T1; 390 participants completed both waves, and the results we report are based on their responses (no dropout bias was found on any of the relevant variables).

2. In Studies 2–3 we used the full measures of collective narcissism and personal entitlement, which were presented with fewer items in Study 1 because of technical constraints. Because Study 1 was conducted as part of a larger research project, we had to narrow down the number of items so that the entire survey would not be too long and to avoid respondent fatigue. We used the items which we assessed best reflect the core of collective narcissism and personal entitlement.
3. We conducted a power analysis based on the effect size found in Study 1, and found this sample size sufficient to provide a power of .80.
4. Moral entitlement is centered around threat to the group's physical existence and the need to defend against such threat by any means. Because African Americans do not pose a threat to the existence of the social group of White Americans, this variable was less relevant and therefore not included in the study.
5. Results of the regression analysis using group entitlement to predict the double standard, controlling for relevant variables ($B = 0.02$, $SE = 0.15$, $t = 0.11$, $p = .913$, 95% CI $[-0.29, 0.32]$).

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