Facilitating Hope Among the Hopeless: The Role of Ideology and Moral Content in Shaping Reactions to Internal Criticism in the Context of Intractable Conflict

Julia Elad-Strenger, Bar Ilan University
Eran Halperin, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)
Tamar Saguy, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC)

Objective. This study examines the conditions under which exposure to internal criticism among one’s rival in conflict is effective in facilitating more positive views toward the rival. Methods. In two experiments, Jewish Israelis were exposed to a Palestinian criticizing Palestinians for violations of either “binding” or “individualizing” moral values. Results. Exposure to Palestinian internal criticism increased rightists’ hope regarding the conflict and decreased their support for exclusion of Palestinians, particularly when the criticism targeted “binding” (vs. “individualizing”) moral values. Exposure to both types of criticism decreased leftists’ hope regarding the conflict. Conclusions. Internal criticism can facilitate positive views about one’s rival in conflict when the target audience holds particularly rigid and negative views about the self-criticizing group, and particularly when the criticism communicates adherence values that echo those of the target audience. This study critically informs the design of interventions to induce hope and improve intergroup attitudes in intractable conflict.

What embitters the world is not excess of criticism, but an absence of self-criticism.
—G. K. Chesterton

In 2012, the Israeli Academy-Award nominated documentary The Gatekeepers was commercially released in Israeli movie theaters. The film featured in-depth interviews with the former chiefs of Israel’s shadowy Security Agency “Shin Bet,” in which they voiced criticism of former and present policies of the Israeli government vis-à-vis the Palestinians. When the film first came to public notice in Israel, it was received with considerable negative attention: although some critics and officials considered it an act of provocation, others attempted to discredit the film director and security chiefs, dismissing them as naïve, hypocritical, and even anti-Zionist (e.g., Brandstetter, 2013; Goldberg, 2014). Similar claims have been made against “Breaking the Silence,” an Israeli organization made up of former Israeli soldiers who publish written and video testimonies describing their service in the Palestinian territories. Since its establishment, it has been under attack for tarnishing the image of Israel overseas by allegedly speaking against the Israeli army (e.g., Matar, 2015).

The Israeli public’s negative response to The Gatekeepers documentary, as well as to the activities of “Breaking the Silence,” is not unique. According to past research, individuals
who voice criticism against their own group run the risk of being rendered deviants (e.g., Eidelman, Silvia, and Biernat, 2006; Jetten and Hornsey, 2010). Insofar as they represent a threat to the group’s cohesion and to its positive image, such deviant group members are liable to be devaluated, downgraded, and sometimes even excluded from the group (for a review, see Jetten and Hornsey, 2014), particularly when the internal criticism is communicated to an outside audience (Ariyanto, Hornsey, and Gallois, 2010).

Although internal criticism is likely to be received negatively by fellow group members, recent research suggests that it may in fact improve the out-group’s attitudes toward the self-criticizing group. This hypothesis was examined in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which is considered a prototypical example of an intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013) in which society members of both parties to the conflict hold relatively negative and rigid views of their rival. Across several studies, Saguy and Halperin (2014) demonstrated that Jewish Israelis who were exposed to a Palestinian criticizing Palestinians (e.g., “Palestinians’ violence against Israel was exaggerated”) were more hopeful with regard to the intergroup relations than those not exposed to the criticism, and consequently more open to Palestinians’ views and more willing to support intergroup compromise. According to the authors, members of groups in conflict do not generally expect rival group members to express a self-critical perspective. Therefore, exposure to such criticism may imply that the self-criticizing rival is more heterogeneous and open-minded than initially expected.

Considering this evidence for the beneficial effects of exposure to internal criticism on intergroup relations, the following question arises: is exposure to internal criticism effective in facilitating more positive intergroup attitudes among all target audiences within the exposed out-group? In the context of the relations between groups in conflict, the out-group is surely not a homogeneous entity. Naturally, out-group members with different ideological predispositions differ in the extent to which they expect their rival group to express a self-critical perspective, and in the extent to which they see the rival’s self-critical position, in and of itself, as congruent with their own views of the rival. A related question has to do with the content of the criticism. Aside from reflecting the self-criticizing group’s ability or willingness to self-criticize, internal criticism may present the target audience with the opportunity to learn of the values endorsed by the self-criticizing group. Insofar as different ideological groups endorse different sets of societal values, the effectiveness of exposure to rival group members’ internal criticism may also depend on whether the internal criticism implies value-congruence between the target audience and the self-criticizing group.

The present research critically informs past research on the effects of exposure to self-criticism on intergroup relations in the context of protracted conflict, by examining the role of (1) the target audience’s political ideology, and (2) the congruence between the target audience’s political ideology and the moral content of the criticism. In the next sections, we outline the theoretical basis for our hypotheses.

**The Target Audience’s Political Ideology and Responses to Out-Group Self-Criticism**

Society members involved in protracted conflicts develop a unique sociopsychological repertoire that allows them to view the conflict situation in a comprehensive, coherent, and meaningful way (Bar-Tal, 2013). Over time, this reformed repertoire crystallizes into a well-organized system of societal beliefs, attitudes, and emotions that penetrates the institutions and communication channels of the society (Bar-Tal, 2013). One of the central elements of this sociopsychological infrastructure is the *ethos of conflict*, defined as the configuration of central shared societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to the
society and gives meaning to the societal life under conditions of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013). This conflict-supporting ethos comprises beliefs pertaining to the following common themes: justness of goals, victimization, security, positive collective self-image, delegitimization of the opponent, patriotism, unity, and peace (Bar-Tal, 2013). When such an ethos is adopted, in-group members are portrayed as patriotic and peace-loving victims of the adversary’s violence, whereas out-group members are delegitimized and portrayed as untrustworthy and incapable of change. As a result, this orientation to the conflict strives to preserve the existing order—continuing the conflict, without taking the risk of dealing with the uncertainty that peacemaking requires (Bar-Tal, 2013). Once adopted, these conflict-supporting beliefs become the prism through which members of society interpret reality, accumulate information and create their political attitudes (Bar-Tal, 2013).

Studies show, however, that not all society members adopt this ethos of conflict to the same extent. In the Israeli context, for example, the ideological split between left and right is primarily defined by citizens’ positions on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (i.e., “dovish” vs. “hawkish” positions, respectively) such that “hawks”/rightists hold more deeply rooted conflict-supporting beliefs than “doves”/leftists (e.g., Arian and Shamir, 2008; Bar-Tal, 2013). It therefore follows that rightists, compared to leftists, tend to perceive Palestinians as a more homogeneous and stably negative group (Bar-Tal, 2013), have less hope regarding the resolution of the conflict (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014), have less favorable attitudes toward contact with Palestinians (Maoz, 2003), and express lower openness to Palestinians’ viewpoint and narrative (Hameiri et al., 2014).

Although internal criticism communicates negative information about the self-criticizing group, it signals to the target audience that the group acknowledges its own negative facets. Therefore, although the criticism itself might reinforce the rival’s negative view of the group, the self-acknowledgement it communicates is likely to be surprising particularly to the target audience that holds negative attitudes toward it. Insofar as the violation of expectation is central for producing the effects of internal criticism on attitudes toward the self-criticizing group, Jewish-Israeli rightists (hawks) should be more surprised by the fact that Palestinians criticize their group, and hence more positively affected than leftists by exposure to such criticism. Following this logic, exposure to such criticism may elicit disappointment among leftists because self-criticism runs contrary to their attempts to propagate Palestinians’ positive qualities to the Israeli public. Therefore, rather than being unaffected by Palestinian self-criticism, leftists may even express more negative views of Palestinian self-criticism, leftists may even express more negative views of Palestinians and less hopeful views regarding the conflict when exposed to such criticism.

Importantly, Saguy and Halperin (2014) did not find political ideology to moderate the effects of Palestinian internal criticism on Jewish Israelis’ hope levels and their attitudes toward Palestinians. Insofar as the sample used by Saguy and Halperin (2014) mirrored the distribution of political attitudes in the Israeli population, it is possible that the sample was skewed to the right (Hermann, 2012) so that the main effects found for the criticism manipulation may have been primarily driven by rightist participants. This possibility is supported by Saguy and Halperin’s report of a mean of 3.33 on the ideology scale (on a 1–7 scale with 1 = extreme right and 7 = extreme left; see Saguy and Halperin, 2014, Study 4) suggesting that the majority of the sample were right-wingers. Thus, in the current work we aimed to recruit samples that would provide a relatively equal representation of both ends of the political spectrum—to enable to test our focal predictions regarding the role that political ideology plays in responding to internal critique.

The first aim of the current study is thus to extend the findings of Saguy and Halperin (2014) by systematically examining the effects of exposure to the rival’s internal criticism on two distinct target audiences: leftists (doves) and rightists (hawks). Based on the foregoing
discussion, we hypothesize that the target audience’s political ideology will moderate the effect of exposure to out-group self-criticism, such that exposure to Palestinian internal criticism will improve Jewish-Israeli rightists’, but not leftists’, attitudes toward Palestinians.

The Moral Content of the Criticism and Responses to Out-Group Self-Criticism

Although internal criticism communicates negative information about the self-critical group, it also indirectly communicates which values its members (or some of its members) endorse. If, for example, a group criticizes itself for acting too violently, it indirectly implies endorsement of values associated with nonviolence. Thus, those exposed to the criticism not only learn of the out-group’s ability for self-criticism, but also of the values that guide their moral judgment. Given that similarity in values (Schwartz, Struch, and Bilsky, 1990), attitudes (e.g., Rocca and Schwartz, 1993) and emotions (e.g., McDonald et al., 2015) across group lines was found to lead to various positive intergroup outcomes, to the extent that the values communicated by the critic echo the target audience’s values, exposure to the criticism can generate a hopeful feeling that there might be a way of resolving the conflict and stepping out of the vicious violent cycle.

To test this idea, the present research relies on the well-established distinction between the values that are endorsed by political liberals and conservatives. According to Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009; Graham, Nosek, and Haidt, 2012; Haidt, 2012), liberals (leftists) and conservatives (rightists) rely on different sets of moral foundations when making moral judgments. Liberals/leftists consistently show greater endorsement of moral foundations that emphasize the rights and welfare of individuals (“individualizing” foundations, i.e., harm/care and fairness/reciprocity) compared to moral foundations that emphasize group cohesiveness (loyalty/betrayal), social order (authority/submission), and self-control (sanctity/derogation) (i.e., “binding” foundations). Conservatives/rightists, on the other hand, endorse and use “individualizing” and “binding” foundations more equally. Importantly, there are consistent differences in moral concerns across the political spectrum: Liberals/leftists show greater endorsement of “individualizing” foundations compared to conservatives/rightists, whereas conservatives/rightists show greater endorsement of “binding” foundations compared to liberals/leftists. According to Graham, Nosek, and Haidt (2012), members of both political groups are well aware of these intergroup differences, and even tend to exaggerate their magnitude.

The criticism manipulations used by Saguy and Halperin (2014) were not designed to imply the values endorsed by Palestinians, but rather focused on communicating Palestinians’ ability for self-reflection. In their study, participants were exposed to two types of internal Palestinian criticism. The first (used in Studies 1, 3, and 4) presented a Palestinian critic criticizing Palestinians for their exaggerated violence toward Israel, costing the lives of innocent Israeli civilians. The content of this criticism may be seen as representing violation of individualizing moral foundations (i.e., harm), and in addition, it communicates support

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1In Israel’s political discourse, the terms “liberal” and “conservative” are not frequently used. Instead, the dominant terminology revolves around the left–right distinction. The political left and right are primarily divided on their attitudes toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: leftists represent more “dovish” conflict-related attitudes (support for compromises with Palestinians) and rightists more “hawkish” positions (more militaristic attitudes, lower willingness to compromise). Nevertheless, this ideological divide is also akin to the liberal–conservative divide, in its broader sense, with Israeli leftists prioritizing liberal values such as civil rights, individual freedoms, democratic values, and separation of religion and state and Israeli rightists emphasizing conservative values such as the concern for established cultural and religious traditions, social order, and preservation of the ethnic national identity of the state (e.g., Arian and Shamir, 2008).
or empathy for participants’ own group (i.e., Jewish Israelis). Thus, it is difficult to ascertain which component of the content exerted the effects in those studies. Is it the Palestinians’ ability for self-criticism per se? The values communicated by the criticism? Or the implied support and empathy for the in-group’s suffering? Given that all three can produce the effect, differentiating the value dimension can clarify its particular role in driving the effects of internal criticism. Thus, in the current research we used criticism that does not imply support for the in-group in any way. The second type of criticism (used in Study 2 in the Saguy and Halperin, 2014, work) was unrelated to the Israeli–Palestinian relations (i.e., “Palestinians are indifferent when it comes to the education of their children. It is time that we, as a society, will put more emphasis on promoting education and would invest more in our children”), but was vague in terms of the moral domains it represents, thus not clearly communicating adherence to either individualizing or binding moral foundations. More specifically, its content could be interpreted both as a violation of “individualizing” foundations (not enough investment in children) and as a violation of “binding” foundations (“It is time that we, as a society, will put more emphasis on promoting education”). It is therefore unclear whether the beneficial effects of the criticism stem from the internal critique per se, or its perceived moral content. Thus, the second aim of the present research is to extend Saguy and Halperin (2014) by varying the moral content of the criticism along the lines of moral foundations theory, while focusing exclusively on the effects of internal criticism on issues unrelated to the tensions between the two groups, thus providing a cleaner examination of our predictions regarding value similarity.

Based on the findings reviewed above, we hypothesize that rightists who are expected to be positively affected by exposure to internal criticism as opposed to leftists would be particularly affected by criticism that is congruent with their own values. Specifically, because the endorsement of “binding” foundations differentiates rightists from leftists, and therefore signals stronger value similarity to rightists, we hypothesize that exposure to internal criticism that implies endorsement of “binding” foundations will be particularly effective in improving rightists’ orientations toward the out-group. To clarify, individualizing foundations are also endorsed by rightists, and thus, criticism on the violation of those values could be effective for impacting rightists as well (as could have been the case in Saguy and Halperin, 2014). However, we expect the effect of a criticism on the violation of binding foundations to be stronger, as those values differentiate rightists from leftists and are therefore likely to communicate greater value similarity.

The Present Research

The goal of the present research is to extend previous findings by Saguy and Halperin (2014) on the effects of exposure to out-group internal criticism on intergroup relations in the context of intractable conflict by examining potential boundary conditions for such effects. This research includes two experimental studies conducted in the context of the relationship between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian citizens of Israel (also referred to as Arab-Israelis, or Arab citizens of Israel), which has been historically characterized by high levels of perceived intergroup hostility and great mutual mistrust (e.g., Waxman, 2012). In both studies, Jewish-Israeli leftists and rightists were either exposed or not exposed to a Palestinian official voicing internal criticism against Palestinian citizens of Israel in a radio interview. In contrast to the manipulations used by Saguy and Halperin (2014), the internal criticism in the present study was either framed as a violation of “binding” moral foundations (i.e., “We lack in-group loyalty”), or as a violation of “individualizing”
moral foundations (i.e., “We harm the weak”), and was in both cases unrelated to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Drawing on the aforementioned research, two complementary hypotheses will be tested:

**Hypothesis 1**: The effects of exposure to Palestinian internal criticism are qualified by the target audience’s political ideology, such that Jewish-Israeli rightists’, but not leftists’, attitudes toward Palestinians will improve following exposure to such criticism.

**Hypothesis 2**: The effects of exposure to Palestinian internal criticism are qualified by the congruence between the target audience’s political ideology and the moral content of the criticism, such that Jewish-Israeli rightists’ attitudes toward Palestinians will improve following exposure to such criticism, particularly when it is framed as a violation of “binding” (more so than “individualizing”) foundations.

**Study 1**

In Study 1, Jewish Israelis were exposed to pretested interviews with a Palestinian official voicing criticism against Palestinians for violating either “binding” or “individualizing” moral values. The goal of the study was to examine how exposure to these types of internal criticism affects leftist and rightist Jewish Israelis’ hope regarding future relations with Palestinians, and their support for exclusion of Palestinians from the shared political and social sphere. Previous studies have identified hope regarding the future of relations between rival groups in conflict as a crucial emotion for promoting conflict resolution, as it enables them to consider new paths with respect to the conflict, and to imagine a future that is different and better than the present (Bar-Tal, 2013; Cohen-Chen et al., 2014). Indeed, Saguy and Halperin (2014) identified hope as the key affective mechanism underlying the effects of exposure to out-group’s internal criticism on intergroup attitudes: the sense that the rival in conflict is capable of self-criticism can drive a positive outlook on the future of the relations between the groups, which in turn elicits more positive attitudes toward the rival.

In the context of the present study, we focused on hope as potentially shaping (i.e., reducing) Jewish Israelis’ exclusionist attitudes toward Palestinians, which have emerged as a particularly dominant and permanent manifestation of the tensions between Jewish and Palestinian citizens of Israel (e.g., Kook, 2002). We predicted that exposure to Palestinian internal criticism will increase rightists’ (but not leftists’) hope regarding the relations between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, and decrease rightists’ (but not leftists’) support for exclusion of Palestinians (H1). We further predicted that this will be the case particularly when the criticism is framed as a violation of “binding” (more so than “individualizing”) foundations (H2).

Finally, we explored the possibility that the effects of “binding” and “individualizing” criticism on exclusion will be mediated by levels of hope.

**Method**

**Participants.** One hundred sixty-two Jewish-Israeli participants (82 males and 80 females; age ranging from 20 to 74, $M_{age}$ [standard deviation, $SD$] = 41.42 [13.39]; $M_{ideology}$ [SD] = 4.06 [1.77]; 1–7 scale) were recruited online by an Israeli survey company
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(Internal Criticism, Ideology, and Moral Content) To ensure that the sample includes as few centrists as possible and is relatively balanced between self-reported leftists and rightists, participants were preselected to participate in this study based on their votes in the 2015 general elections: the sample consisted of Jewish Israelis who either voted for a moderate-extreme left-wing party (Meretz) or for a moderate-extreme right-wing party (Habait Hayehudi). Indeed, the sample mean of political ideology was identical to the midpoint of the ideology scale. We omitted 12 participants who incorrectly answered the reading comprehension items, resulting in a sample of 150 participants. Sample size was determined before any data analysis: power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009), based on an alpha of 0.05, and power set to the standard 80 percent, indicated that we have exceeded the desired sample size for detecting a medium-sized interaction effect (0.15) in a multiple regression.

Procedure and Measures

Participants were informed that they were about to listen to a short interview discussing pressing issues within the Palestinian community, and were then randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions (control/“binding” criticism/“individualizing” criticism) in which they were exposed to one of three short interviews discussing pressing issues within the Palestinian community. In order to ensure the internal nature of the criticism and the sense that it was not intended to impress or appease an outside audience, the interview concerned internal Palestinian matters rather than the intergroup conflict itself, was recorded in Arabic and presented as an interview broadcasted in a Palestinian radio station. In the control condition, the interviewee discussed factual details on the excessive use of arms by Palestinians toward targets within their community. In the experimental conditions, this factual description was followed by the Palestinian official criticizing the use of arms as violating either “binding” or “individualizing” moral values. The content of the criticism in each condition was framed using keywords and concepts related to individualizing/binding moral domains (Graham et al., 2012). In the “binding” criticism condition, the Palestinian official criticized the use of arms as a violation of “binding” values (e.g., “the excessive use of arms within the Arab sector reflects the erosion of authority within the Palestinian community . . . damages the reputation and positive image of the sector . . . is a betrayal in the loyalty to the sector and in our sector’s cohesion”). In the “individualizing” criticism condition, the Palestinian official criticized the excessive use of arms as a violation of “individualizing” values (e.g., “victims are primarily the weak and needy—children, the elderly, and uninvolved civilians within the Arab sector . . . these acts only worsen the inequality within the Palestinian community”).

These interviews were pretested among 63 Jewish-Israeli participants, to confirm that the criticism conditions differ in the value-related content but not in valence (see full results of the pretest in the supplementary Appendix, Section A). Findings of the pretest indicate that the interviewee was perceived as more critical of the excessive use of arms in the criticism conditions (“binding” and “individualizing”) compared to the no-criticism (control) condition, and that both criticism conditions were perceived as equally negative. Finally, results revealed that participants perceived the interview in the “binding” criticism condition as communicating the violation of “binding” foundations more than the “individualizing” and control interviews, and perceived the interview in the “individualizing” criticism condition as communicating the violation of “individualizing” foundations more than the interview in the “individualizing” and control conditions. None of these effects were moderated by political ideology. Taken together, these findings confirm that the
“individualizing” and “binding” criticism conditions differ from the control condition in the extent to which they convey criticism against the Palestinian society. Findings also confirm that the “individualizing” and “binding” criticism conditions differ in their value-related content, but not in the perceived negativity (valence) of the criticism.

After listening to the pretested interviews, participants answered reading comprehension items, followed by a measure of hope (“I am hopeful regarding the prospects of improving the relationship between Jewish-Israelis and Palestinian citizens of Israel”; see Saguy and Halperin, 2014) and a six-item measure of support for exclusion of Palestinians (e.g., “Palestinians should not be allowed to appear on television or give public speeches,” “Palestinians should be banned from becoming ministers or Parliament members,” “All Palestinians should leave the state of Israel”; α = 0.93). Both measures were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (=not at all) to 7 (=very much). Finally, participants indicated their political ideology by rating it on a 1–7 scale (1 = extreme right, 2 = right, 3 = center right, 4 = center, 5 = center left, 6 = left, 7 = extreme left).

Results and Discussion

H1: The effects of criticism are qualified by the target audience’s political ideology.

To test our first prediction, we created a variable that would reflect the existence versus absence of criticism (regardless of content) and examined its effects on the outcome measures, as a function of political ideology. To that end, we coded the three conditions into one dichotomous variable with the “individualizing” and “binding” criticism conditions coded as 1 and the control condition as 0. We then ran a simple moderation analysis employing Hayes’ (2018) PROCESS regression procedure (model 1), with the criticism/no-criticism variable as the predictor and political ideology as the moderator. The criticism (vs. no criticism) × political ideology interaction on hope was significant (b = −0.47, SE = 0.17, t = −2.71, p = 0.008, confidence interval [CI] = [−0.82, −0.13]). An examination of the conditional effects revealed that exposure to criticism (vs. no criticism) significantly increased hope among rightists (b = 1.08, SE = 0.49, t = 2.41, p = 0.017, CI = [0.19, 1.97]), but not among leftists (b = −0.59, SE = 0.43, t = −1.36, p = 0.175, CI = [−1.43, 0.26]). A similar analysis to predict exclusion of Palestinians revealed a nonsignificant criticism (vs. no criticism) × political ideology interaction (b = 0.11, SE = 0.13, t = 0.91, p = 0.364, CI = [−0.13, 0.36]), and a nonsignificant main effect for criticism (vs. no criticism; b = −0.05, SE = 0.23, t = −0.22, p = 0.825, CI = [−0.50, 0.40]). Similar results were obtained when controlling for age, sex, religiosity, income, and education.

These results support H1 with regard to hope, indicating that exposure to Palestinian internal criticism increases rightists’, but not leftists’, hope regarding the conflict. In fact, the pattern of results among leftists suggests that exposure to criticism (vs. no criticism) slightly decreases leftists’ hope levels.

H2: The effects of criticism are qualified by the congruence between target audience’s political ideology and the moral content of the criticism.

To analyze the effects of “binding” criticism (vs. control) and of “individualizing” criticism (vs. control) on hope levels, as a function of participants’ political ideology, we ran a moderation analyses for a multicategorical IV (Hayes, 2018). The analysis involved two dummy variables as independent variables: D1 (1 = binding criticism and 0 = control and individualizing criticism) and D2 (1 = individualizing criticism and 0 = control and...
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FIGURE 1
The Interactive Effects of Criticism Type and Political Ideology on Hope (Study 1)

binding criticism). Consistent with H2, the two-way interaction between D1 (“binding” vs. control) and political ideology was significant ($b = -0.52, SE = 0.20, t = -2.60, p = 0.010, 95\% CI [-0.91, -0.12]$). Simple effects revealed that the “binding” criticism affected only rightists (1SD below the mean), such that it increased hope levels ($M = 4.06$) compared to the control condition ($M = 2.77$), $b = 1.29, SE = 0.51, t = 2.53, p = 0.012, 95\% CI [0.28, 2.30]$. For leftists (1SD above mean), this effect was not significant ($b = -0.54, SE = 0.50, t = -1.08, p = 0.283, 95\% CI [-1.53, 0.45]$). Although there was a significant two-way interaction between D2 (“individualizing” vs. control) and political ideology ($b = -0.43, SE = 0.20, t = -2.12, p = 0.036, 95\% CI [-0.83, -0.03]$), simple effects were nonsignificant among both rightists ($b = 0.89, SE = 0.51, t = 1.75, p = 0.082, 95\% CI [-1.59, 0.35]$) and leftists ($b = -0.62, SE = 0.49, t = -1.26, p = 0.211, 95\% CI [-1.53, 0.45]$), but were in the same direction as the effect for the binding criticism. Results of these analyses are presented graphically in Figure 1.

Similar results were obtained with regard to exclusion of Palestinians. As hypothesized, the two-way interaction between D1 (“binding” vs. control) and political ideology was significant ($b = 0.28, SE = 0.14, t = 2.02, p = 0.045, 95\% CI [0.01, 0.55]$). Simple effects revealed that the “binding” criticism affected only rightists, such that it decreased exclusion ($M = 2.86$) compared to the control condition ($M = 3.60$), $b = -0.74, SE = 0.35, t = -2.09, p = 0.038, 95\% CI [-1.44, -0.04]$. For leftists (1SD above mean), this effect was not significant ($b = 0.25, SE = 0.35, t = 0.71, p = 0.477, 95\% CI [-0.44, 0.94]$). The two-way interaction between D2 (“individualizing” vs. control) and political ideology was nonsignificant ($b = -0.07, SE = 0.14, t = -0.47, p = 0.638, 95\% CI [-0.34, 0.21]$). Results of these analyses are presented graphically in Figure 2.\(^2\)

\(^2\)Similar patterns of results were obtained when conducting 2 (rightists vs. leftists) × 3 (condition) analyses of variance (see supplementary Appendix, Section B).
To summarize, our results support H2 by indicating that it is only rightists whose hope and exclusion levels were impacted by internal criticism of the out-group, and that exposure to such criticism is particularly effective when it underscores values that rightists hold as important (“binding” moral foundations).

Having established the significant effects of “binding” criticism (vs. control) on both potential mediator (hope) and outcome variable (exclusion of Palestinians) among rightists, we examined whether the effects of “binding” criticism on rightists’ exclusion levels are mediated by their effect on hope. To this end, we used Hayes’ (2018) PROCESS bootstrapping command with 5,000 iterations (Model 8) with a multicategorical IV to test the indirect effects (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes, 2007) of the D1 × ideology and D2 × ideology interaction terms on exclusion of Palestinians through hope. As hypothesized, the indirect effect of the interaction between D1 (“binding” vs. control) and political ideology on exclusion via hope was significant ($a \times b = 0.06, SE = 0.04, [CI] = [0.01, 0.16]$). Because zero is not in the 95 percent CI, the indirect effect is significantly different from zero at $p = 0.05$, thus establishing moderated mediation. As expected, the conditional indirect effect of “binding” criticism on exclusion via hope was significant among rightists ($b = -0.16, SE = 0.10, [CI] = [-0.38, -0.01]$). These results are presented graphically in Figure 3.

Taken together, the results of Study 1 indicate that the effects of exposure to internal criticism among the rival group in conflict are qualified by the political ideology of the target audience, such that only rightists’, but not leftists’, attitudes toward Palestinians are positively affected by exposure to such criticism. Our findings also suggest that the moral content of the criticism plays a role, at least to some extent, in driving its beneficial effects: rightists were particularly affected by exposure to criticism when the criticism communicated adherence to values that they themselves endorse (more than leftists),
suggesting that the moral content of the criticism plays a role in driving its beneficial effects. More specifically, in line with the basic tenets of MFT (Graham, Nosek, and Haidt, 2012), exposure to internal criticism on the violation of “binding” moral values was particularly effective in decreasing rightists’ support for exclusion of Palestinians. These effects were mediated by an increase in rightists’ hope regarding the intergroup relations.

As expected, leftists were unaffected by any type of criticism. Since the violation of expectation plays a central role in the effects of internal criticism on attitudes toward the self-criticizing group (Saguy and Halperin, 2014), this result can be attributed to leftists being less surprised than rightists by the very fact that a Palestinian has voiced internal criticism against his community, regardless of the content of that criticism. Another potential explanation for these results can be deduced from the pattern of results with regard to hope, which indicate that both types of internal criticism marginally decrease hope levels among leftists. It may be that Palestinian self-criticism elicits disappointment among leftists because self-criticism runs contrary to leftists’ attempts to propagate Palestinians’ positive qualities to the Israeli public.

Study 2

In Study 2, we aimed to conduct a high-powered replication of Study 1 and to extend it by, first, assessing perceived surprise by the criticism as a potential explanation for the differences in responses of leftists and rightist to the criticism, and by improving our hope measure. We employed the same internal criticism manipulations that were used in Study 1 and examined the same complementary hypotheses that the effects of criticism are either qualified by the ideology of the target audience (H1) or by both their ideology and the
moral content of the criticism (H2). As in Study 1, we expected hope levels to mediate the effects on criticism on exclusion levels.

**Method**

**Participants.** Two hundred fifty-four participants (126 males and 127 females, one participant did not indicate his/her gender; age ranging from 18 to 71, $M_{age} [SD] = 40.75 [14.55]$, $M_{ideology} [SD] = 3.90 [1.59]$; 1–7 scale) were recruited online by an Israeli surveying company (Midgam). In this study, we used an improved and more precise recruitment method to ensure that our sample mainly comprises of self-identified leftists and rightists (rather than centrists). To this end, we asked participants to indicate their political ideology in a presurvey conducted two days before collecting the data for the present study, and recruited only participants who self-identified as either rightists or leftists (1–3 and 5–7, respectively, on the 1–7 political ideology scale). We omitted 26 participants who incorrectly answered the reading comprehension items and 4 participants who spent an irregular amount of time reading the manipulation article (deviating more than 2.5 $SD$ from the mean time spent on the relevant website page), resulting in a sample of 224 participants. Power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009), based on an alpha of 0.05, and power set to 90 percent, indicated that we have exceeded the desired sample size for detecting a medium-sized interaction effect (0.15) in a multiple regression.

**Procedure and Measures**

As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions (control/“binding” criticism/“individualizing” criticism). The criticism manipulations used in this study were identical to those used in Study 1. After listening to the fictitious radio interview and answering the reading comprehension items, participants completed a two-item measure of hope (“I am hopeful regarding the prospects of improving the relationship between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian citizens of Israel,” “I am optimistic regarding the future of the relations between Jewish Israelis and Palestinian citizens of Israel”; $\alpha = 0.75$), followed by the measure of exclusion of Palestinians used in Study 1 ($\alpha = 0.93$). Items were rated on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

To examine whether the extent to which the internal criticism violates Jewish Israelis’ expectations of Palestinians influences the effects of criticism on attitudes, participants in both criticism conditions were also asked to rate the extent to which they were surprised by the fact that the interviewee voiced criticism against Palestinians (“I found that fact that the interviewee criticized the PCI community surprising,” rated on a 1–7 scale).

**Results and Discussion**

We followed the same statistical procedures used in Study 1 to examine our moderation hypotheses.

**H1:** The effects of criticism are qualified by the target audience’s political ideology.

As in Study 1, the criticism (vs. no criticism) $\times$ political ideology interaction on hope was significant ($b = -0.41, SE = 0.13, t = -3.13, p = 0.002, [CI] = [-0.67, -0.15]$). An
examination of the conditional effects revealed that exposure to criticism (vs. no criticism) somewhat increased hope among rightists, an effect that was marginally significant ($b = 0.53, SE = 0.29, t = 1.82, p = 0.069, [CI] = [-0.04, 1.10]$), but significantly decreased hope among leftists ($b = -0.79, SE = 0.30, t = -2.64, p = 0.009, [CI] = [-1.37, -0.20]$). Consistent with the pattern of results of Study 1, the criticism (vs. no criticism) × political ideology interaction on exclusion was marginally significant ($b = 0.23, SE = 0.13, t = 1.86, p = 0.064, [CI] = [-0.01, 0.48]$), such that exposure to criticism (vs. no criticism) did not significantly decrease exclusion either among rightists ($b = -0.40, SE = 0.27, t = -1.45, p = 0.148, [CI] = [-0.94, 0.14]$) or leftists ($b = 0.34, SE = 0.28, t = 1.22, p = 0.225, [CI] = [-0.21, 0.90]$). Similar results were obtained when controlling for age, sex, religiosity, income, and education.

To summarize, consistent with Study 1, results support H1 with regard to hope, indicating that exposure to Palestinian internal criticism somewhat increases rightists’, but not leftists’, hope regarding the conflict. In fact, in the current study, leftists’ hope levels were significantly reduced following exposure to Palestinian internal criticism (vs. no criticism). Exposure to criticism (vs. no criticism) did not have a significant effect on either rightists’ or leftists’ exclusion levels, but the direction of the effects was similar—suggesting an improvement in attitudes among rightists.

**H2:** The effects of criticism are qualified by the congruence between target audience’s political ideology and the moral content of the criticism.

As in Study 1, we examined the effects of “binding” criticism (vs. control) and of “individualizing” criticism (vs. control) on hope levels, as a function of participants’ political ideology using moderation analyses for a multicategorical IV (Hayes, 2018). Consistent with H2, the two-way interaction between D1 (“binding” vs. control) and political ideology was significant ($b = -0.52, SE = 0.15, t = -3.42, p = 0.001, 95 percent CI [-0.82, -0.22]$). Simple effects revealed that the “binding” criticism affected only rightists (1SD below the mean), such that it increased hope levels ($M = 3.20$) compared to the control condition ($M = 2.45$), $b = 0.82, SE = 0.36, t = 2.38, p = 0.018, 95 percent CI [0.15, 1.58]). For leftists (1 SD above mean), this effect was not significant ($b = 0.08, SE = 0.24, t = 0.34, p = 0.736, 95 percent CI [-0.39, 0.55]$). The two-way interaction between D2 (“individualizing” vs. control) and political ideology was also significant ($b = -0.32, SE = 0.14, t = -2.18, p = 0.031, 95 percent CI [-0.61, -0.03]$). Follow-up analyses revealed that “individualizing” criticism decreased leftists’ hope regarding the relations with Palestinians ($b = -0.84, SE = 0.40, t = -2.16, p = 0.032, [CI] = [-1.64, -0.07]) but did not affect rightists’ hope levels ($b = 0.42, SE = 0.35, t = 1.19, p = 0.234, [CI] = [-0.27, 1.12]$). Results of these analyses are presented graphically in Figure 4.

Results regarding exclusion of Palestinians were also similar to the ones obtained in Study 1. The D1 (“binding” vs. control) and political ideology was significant ($b = 0.33, SE = 0.14, t = 2.26, p = 0.025, 95 percent CI [0.04, 0.61]$). As hypothesized, the “binding” criticism affected only rightists (1SD below the mean), such that it decreased exclusion levels ($M = 3.10$) compared to the control condition ($M = 3.84$), $b = -0.74, SE = 0.34, t = -2.16, p = 0.032, 95 percent CI [-1.42, -0.07]). For leftists (1SD above mean), this effect was not significant ($b = 0.56, SE = 0.39, t = 1.45, p = 0.147, 95 percent CI [-0.20, 1.33]$). “As in Study 1, the D2 (“individualizing” vs. control) and political ideology interaction was nonsignificant ($b = 0.15, SE = 0.14, t = 1.11, p = 0.269, [CI] = [-0.12, 0.42]$). Results of these analyses are presented graphically in Figure 5.3 Similar results for

3Similar patterns of results were obtained when conducting 2 (rightists vs. leftists) × 3 (condition) analyses of variance (see supplementary Appendix, Section B).
hope and exclusion were obtained when controlling for age, sex, religiosity, income, and education.

To summarize, our results support H2 by indicating that it is only rightists whose hope and exclusion levels were impacted by internal criticism of the out-group, and that exposure to such criticism is particularly effective when it communicates Palestinians’ adherence to “binding” (but not “individualizing”) moral values.

Having established the significant effects of “binding” criticism (vs. control) on both potential mediator (hope) and outcome variable (exclusion of Palestinians) among rightists,
we examined whether the effects of “binding” criticism on rightists’ exclusion levels are mediated by their effect on hope. To this end, we used Hayes’ (2018) PROCESS bootstrapping command with 5,000 iterations (Model 8) with a multicategorical IV to test the indirect effects (Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes, 2007) of the D1 × ideology and D2 × ideology interaction terms on exclusion of Palestinians through hope.

As hypothesized, the indirect effect of the interaction between D1 (“binding” vs. control) and political ideology on exclusion via hope was significant \(a \times b = 0.14, SE = 0.07, [CI] = [0.04, 0.30]\). Because zero is not in the 95 percent CI, the indirect effect is significantly different from zero at \(p = 0.05\), thus establishing moderated mediation. As expected, the conditional indirect effect of “binding” criticism on exclusion via hope was significant among rightists \(b = -0.24, SE = 0.14, [CI] = [-0.56, -0.03]\). These results are presented graphically in Figure 6.

**Additional Analyses**

To examine leftists’ and rightists’ perceived surprise with the fact that the interviewee criticized the Palestinian community, we examined the effect of the criticism type (“binding”/“individualizing”) × political ideology interaction on participants’ surprise with criticism. This analysis compares the two criticism conditions to each other (rather than to the control condition), since participants in the control condition were not exposed to any type of criticism and thus did not rate their surprise with the criticism. To this end, we centered the continuous political ideology variable, and created a dichotomous criticism-type variable by coding the “individualizing” criticism as 0 and “binding” criticism as 1. To conduct the analysis, we ran a moderation analysis employing Hayes’ (2018) PROCESS regression procedure (model 1). This analysis revealed a significant main effect for
political ideology on *surprise with criticism*, with rightists reporting significantly higher levels of surprise than leftists (\( b = -0.33, SE = 0.09, t = -3.68, p = 0.000, [CI] = [-0.51, -0.15] \)). Criticism type did not have a significant effect on surprise with criticism, nor did it interact significantly with political ideology to predict surprise levels. These findings suggest that leftists were significantly less surprised than rightists by the fact that the interviewee criticized the Palestinian community, regardless of the content of criticism.

Taken together, the results of Study 2 replicate and extend the results of Study 1, by indicating that exposure to a Palestinian criticizing Palestinians improves Jewish-Israeli rightists’, but not leftists’, emotions, and attitudes toward Palestinians compared to non-exposure to criticism (consistent with H1). Also as in Study 1, results suggest that the effects of exposure to criticism on rightists’ attitudes are also moderated by its moral content, such that criticism on the violation of “binding” (compared to “individualizing” moral values) is particularly effective in increasing their hope and reducing their support for exclusion of Palestinians (consistent with H2). In fact, not only did exposure to “individualizing” criticism not improve leftists’ attitudes toward Palestinians, but it also significantly decreased leftists’ hope regarding the intergroup relationship, as did the exposure to “binding” criticism, consistent with the pattern of results of Study 1.

As an important addition to Study 1, the findings of Study 2 suggest the observed effects among leftists can be attributed to them being less surprised than rightists by the very fact that a Palestinian voiced criticism against his community.

**General Discussion**

Despite the often negative responses of group members to fellow group members criticizing their group (e.g., Eidelman, Silvia, and Biernat, 2006; Levine, 1989), recent research (Saguy and Halperin, 2014) suggests that such internal criticism can actually benefit the group when it is communicated to the rival out-group in the context of intergroup conflict. The main goal of the present research was to examine the hypothesis that the beneficial effects of such internal criticism may be qualified by two important factors: the political ideology of the target audience, and the congruence between its ideology and the moral content of the criticism.

In two experimental studies, Jewish-Israeli leftists and rightists were exposed to a Palestinian official voicing criticism against Palestinians for violating either “binding” or “individualizing” moral values. The results of Studies 1 and 2 indicate that the effects of exposure to criticism are primarily qualified by the ideology of the target audience, such that it was only beneficial among those who hold particularly rigid and negative views of Palestinians: Jewish-Israeli rightists. The fact that exposure to criticism did not improve leftists’ attitudes toward Palestinians can be attributed to their already positive attitudes toward Palestinians, as implied by the floor effect in their exclusion ratings. It may also, however, be attributed to them being less surprised than rightists by the fact that a Palestinian was criticizing his own group (as was indicated by the results of Study 2). It may be that leftists generally view Palestinians as more capable of self-criticism than do rightists, and are perhaps more prone to be exposed to instances of Palestinian internal criticism in the media or in real-life contexts. In fact, our findings indicate that Palestinian internal criticism decreases leftists’ hope regarding the intergroup relations, independent of its moral content. It may be that Jewish-Israeli leftists are fragile in their embrace of hope regarding the conflict, requiring an idealized understanding of Palestinians in order to maintain that embrace. To the extent that Palestinians make salient that they are, to some extent, “negative”—and thus slide toward confirming the negative view that the right propagates about them—leftists’ views
of Palestinians may slide a bit in the more conventional direction for Israeli cultural and political discourse. Future work can further explore the effects of “individualizing” criticism on leftists’ emotions and attitudes toward groups that they tend to see more negatively, or as less likely to voice self-criticism, such as members of their political out-group.

Our findings also suggest, however, that the beneficial effects of exposure to criticism on rightists may be qualified, at least to some extent, by its moral content: Leftists are discouraged by any instance of internal criticism voiced by Palestinians, whereas rightists are encouraged by such critiques, particularly when they imply value similarity to their political in-group. These findings shed further light on the different ways in which out-group’s internal critique is perceived by different target audiences or ideological groups. Consistent with the basic premises of MFT (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 2012), internal criticism for violating “binding” moral foundations improved rightists’ emotions and attitudes toward Palestinians (Studies 1 and 2). These findings suggest that for exposure to internal criticism to improve the emotions and attitudes of those with more rigid, hawkish attitudes toward their rival in conflict, it should not only violate their expectations regarding the rival’s ability to self-criticize, but also indirectly communicate adherence to the values they endorse.

Importantly, although the criticism manipulations were pretested for perceived moral content, we cannot rule out the possibility that the differences between the manipulation texts are not limited to moral framing. Examining perceived moral content or perceived value similarity as a potential mediator may have increased the risk of exposing the goals of our study to participants. Nevertheless, future studies are encouraged to examine the inclusion of implicit or subtle manipulation checks within the studies themselves to further clarify the mechanism underlying the manipulation effects. Future studies are also encouraged to further explore whether exposure to explicit value similarity between groups in conflict exerts similar effects to those of implied value similarity (e.g., through exposure to internal criticism).

The present research thus extends the research conducted by Saguy and Halperin (2014) in two important ways. First, the present research systematically varied the moral content of the criticism and focused exclusively on the effects of internal criticism on issues unrelated to the tensions between the two groups, thus allowing for a cleaner examination of the role of value similarity in moderating the effects of exposure to criticism. Second, the present research was based on a more politically diverse sample than that used by Saguy and Halperin (2014), allowing us to systematically examine the effects of exposure to Palestinian internal criticism on leftist and rightist target audiences, demonstrating that such criticism may be discouraging for leftist audiences. By suggesting that internal out-group criticism exerts differential effects on members of different political groups, and that its effects depend on the moral framing of the criticism, the findings of the present research can inform the development of more nuanced criticism-based interventions to facilitate positive attitudes toward the rival in conflict, particularly among those who are the least hopeful regarding the intergroup relations. More specifically, the findings of the present research suggest that interventions based on internal criticism may only be effective for audiences who typically hold more negative views of the out-group and the intergroup relationship, or are less exposed to instances of self-criticism by the out-group, and therefore do not expect them to voice such criticism. It may therefore be, for example, that the beneficial effects of exposure to out-group criticism are not generalizable to target audiences who are members of the weaker party in conflict (e.g., Palestinians). Such target audiences, like Jewish-Israeli leftists in the present study, may not be surprised by the out-group’s self-criticism since they are generally more exposed to various voices (including self-critical ones) within the stronger
party’s community. Future studies are encouraged to examine the generalizability of these findings to all “conflicting” parties.

Our findings also suggest that even when the target audience is surprised by such criticism, its effectiveness may depend on the congruence between its moral content and the target audience’s values. Therefore, in addition to the characteristics of the target audience, framing the criticism in terms of values typically endorsed by the target audience should also be considered in order to as an effective psychological tool for improving intergroup relations. Finally, our findings point toward potentially detrimental effects of exposure to internal criticism on certain target audiences. Specifically, we observed a decrease in reported hope regarding future relations between the conflicting parties among leftists, who generally hold more hopeful views of the conflict. Exposing such audiences to out-group internal criticism may therefore have problematic effects, as they may discourage the very people who dedicate themselves to pursuing and advocating more positive intergroup relations.

Taken together, the findings of the current studies shed more light on the conditions in which internal criticism interventions can be used to facilitate positive intergroup attitudes in an intergroup context characterized by great rigidity, hostility, and mistrust. Our hypotheses were examined in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which is considered a prototypical example of an intractable conflict, and is thus a particularly interesting case study for our hypotheses. In such protracted contexts, both societies (particularly the more hawkish subgroups within each) develop a relatively rigid ethos of conflict, which in turn hardens their views of their rival and reduces their hope regarding the future of the conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2013). Shedding light on the conditions in which such attitudes can “unfreeze” may have particularly important consequences on developing interventions to reduce intergroup tensions in such extremely violent, protracted contexts. At the same time, shedding light on the potential shortcomings of such interventions (i.e., their effects on a more dovish target audience) may prove critical as such subgroups have an important role in facilitating hope and more positive intergroup attitudes within each society.

That being said, several factors can be potentially relevant in applying the findings of the present study in other contexts, such as conflicts between high and low status groups within the same society (e.g., blacks and whites in the United States) or in the context of international nonintractable conflicts. First is the intractability of the examined conflict. Specifically, in less protracted and violent conflicts, leftists and rightists may be less polarized in terms of their views of the rival, thus reducing the extent to which leftists are discouraged by the rival’s self-criticism. The second factor may be the power relations between the groups. The target audience’s surprise may be even stronger if the self-criticizing group is the high-status group in the conflict, which may increase the beneficial effects of the criticism. Finally, whether the groups in conflict share a common superordinate identity may affect the extent to which they respond positively to intergroup similarity. Consistent with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), it may be that value similarity with the out-group may be perceived by the target audience as threatening their need to maintain intergroup distinctiveness, and thus have negative effects on their attitudes toward its members, even if such similarity is implied by internal criticism. Future studies are encouraged to examine the applicability of our findings in other contexts of intergroup conflict.

REFERENCES


**Supporting Information**

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

**Table 1**: Full model output of the moderated moderation analyses: Political ideology and Ideology Salience as moderating the effects of “binding”/“individualizing” criticism on hope and exclusion of PCIs.

**Table 2**: Conditional effects of “binding” criticism on hope and exclusion of PCIs at different values of the moderators: political ideology and political ideology salience