AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology:
Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes

ISSN: 0022-3514

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000333

Disrupting the System Constructively: Testing the Effectiveness of Nonnormative Nonviolent Collective Action

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Collective action research tends to focus on motivations of the disadvantaged group, rather than on which tactics are effective at driving the advantaged group to make concessions to the disadvantaged. We focused on the potential of *nonnormative nonviolent action* as a tactic to generate support for concessions among advantaged group members who are resistant to social change. We propose that this tactic, relative to normative nonviolent and to violent action, is particularly effective because it reflects *constructive disruption*: a delicate balance between disruption (which can put pressure on the advantaged group to respond) and perceived constructive intentions (which can help ensure that the response to action is a conciliatory one). We test these hypotheses across 4 contexts (total $N = 3650$). Studies 1–3 demonstrate that nonnormative nonviolent action (compared with inaction, normative nonviolent action, and violent action) is uniquely effective at increasing support for concessions to the disadvantaged among resistant advantaged group members (compared with advantaged group members more open to social change). Study 3 shows that constructive disruption mediates this effect. Study 4 shows that perceiving a real-world ongoing protest as constructively disruptive predicts support for the disadvantaged, whereas Study 5 examines these processes longitudinally over 2 months in the context of an ongoing social movement. Taken together, we show that nonnormative nonviolent action can be an effective tactic for generating support for concessions to the disadvantaged among those who are most resistant because it generates constructive disruption.

Keywords: advantaged group, collective action, effectiveness, social change, social movements

Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000333.supp

> "Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored. My citing the creation of tension as part of the work of the nonviolent resister may sound rather shocking. But I must confess that I am not afraid of the word 'tension.' I have earnestly opposed violent tension, but there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is necessary for growth."
>
> ~Martin Luther King Junior, *Letter From a Birmingham Jail*

Collective action and grassroots social movements are often assumed to be pivotal in advancing social change toward greater equality (Louis, 2009). Notable examples include the civil rights movement, early feminist struggles, and the Stonewall riots which are reflected in contemporary movements such as Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, and the modern LGBTQ+ movement. Whereas some protests may have spurred large changes in public opinion or policy, others seem to have had little impact or even provoked regressive backlash (Brym & Maoz-Shai, 2009; McAdam & Boudet, 2012; Piven, 2008). Yet, although we know much about what motivates individuals for collective action (e.g., Klandermans, 2002; van Zomeren, 2013; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), we know rather little about the social and political effectiveness of such actions, and even less about the social-psychological conditions and processes that make collective action more or less effective (Louis, 2009; for exceptions see Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017; Saguy & Szekeres, 2018; Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019; Teixeira, Spears, & Yzerbyt, 2020; Thomas & Louis, 2014).

Against this backdrop, we focused on whether, when, and how collective action (by the disadvantaged group) can motivate sup-

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The fourth study in this work was part of a large project financed by the Ruderman Family Foundation and the Arison Foundation.

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port for the disadvantaged's policy goals among those resisting social change (within the advantaged group). This may be an important step to advance social change, because this often requires the support of both disadvantaged and advantaged group members, and more generally the power of public opinion to enforce it. This is why *violent* collective action may easily backfire (Orazani & Leidner, 2019)—it is likely to be perceived as communicating destructive and aggressive intentions from the disadvantaged and thus further alienate resistant advantaged group members. Yet on the other hand, action that is entirely normative and nonviolent (e.g., peaceful demonstration) may reduce collective action to a toothless ritual that the advantaged, especially those motivated to maintain the status quo, can easily ignore or dismiss. We therefore propose that action which is both nonnormative *and* nonviolent (e.g., civil disobedience) may be especially effective at increasing support among more resistant advantaged group members. This is because it can generate the constructive tension described by Martin Luther King Jr., an optimal balance between the protesting group being perceived as *disrupting the system*, yet with *constructive intentions* behind it, which we term constructive disruption.

Through this research, we aim to advance the existing literature in three key ways. First, we systematically study the reactions of *advantaged* group members to three specific collective action *tactics* (normative nonviolent, nonnormative nonviolent, and violent action). This focus is important and potentially consequential because the advantaged are often in the majority and have more access to power and resources than the disadvantaged and are therefore more capable of effecting change (Goodman, 2011; Iyer & Leach, 2009). Second, our focal outcome is *support for the movements policy goals*, which could be an additional pathway to social change (Burstein, 2003; Burstein & Linton, 2002), different from willingness to join the disadvantaged's action (Teixeira et al., 2020). Finally, we uniquely conceptualize and test an underlying social-psychological mechanism (*constructive disruption*) for why nonnormative nonviolent action may be an effective collective action tactic for more resistant advantaged group members.

Collective Action Tactics

Collective action is often categorized along two dimensions: (a) whether or not the tactics used adhere to societal norms (normative vs. nonnormative action; Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Halperin, 2016; Tausch et al., 2011; Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990) and (b) whether or not the action is violent (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Orazani & Leidner, 2019; Saab, Spears, Tausch, & Sasse, 2016; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Although these two dimensions are sometimes used interchangeably, they are not necessarily fully aligned. Although in Western societies violent action is almost always considered nonnormative, there can still be nonviolent actions that are also nonnormative. Most notably, the philosophy of civil disobedience practiced by Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., specifically calls for actions that violate laws and norms but in a nonviolent manner (King, 1991; Nojeim, 2004).

As such, we can differentiate at least three tactics produced by these two dimensions.[1] First, normative nonviolent action refers to any action that is within socially accepted and legal norms of society and is also nonviolent, such as peaceful demonstrations, rallies, or petitions. Second, nonnormative nonviolent action refers to forms of action that are not societally normative but also not violent, such as strikes, sit-ins, blocking roads, and so forth that violate norms or laws to disrupt usual cooperative relations.[2] Third, nonnormative violent action refers to action that is violent such as riots or property destruction (hereafter *violent action*). Lastly, it is important to note that *inaction* could also be considered a "tactic" (Stuart, Thomas, & Donaghue, 2018), such that disadvantaged group members might hope that by choosing not to act they might receive better treatment from the advantaged. Thus, we aim to, when possible, compare these tactics with situations where there is a lack of action.

When considering the psychological effects of these tactics, it is important to bear in mind advantaged group members' initial support, or lack thereof, for the disadvantaged's goals, because this is likely to affect how they might respond to the action (Saguy & Szekeres, 2018; Teixeira et al., 2020; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Advantaged group members vary in the extent to which they support maintaining intergroup hierarchies (see Goren & Plaut, 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), with some being supportive of attempts to reduce group-based inequality (Knowles, Lowery, Chow, & Unzueta, 2014; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). However, many advantaged group members are generally resistant to social change and thus predisposed to disagree with the goals of the protestors, which is in line with major theories of intergroup relations (Jost & Hunyady, 2003; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) that suggest the core motivation of advantaged group members is to preserve their own status. Therefore, we focus on understanding which tactic might be most effective for these more resistant advantaged group members, because they may represent a large section of the advantaged group and are those whose opinions are arguably in the most need of change.

Specifically, we focus on whether action can change public opinion to generate support for concessions among the advantaged, rather than whether it can motivate advantaged group members to protest on behalf of the disadvantaged themselves, which has been the focus in other recent research on the effects of collective action (Teixeira et al., 2020). We see this as a potentially complementary route to social change, given that it may be difficult to motivate large numbers of the advantaged group to take action (in fact, even among the disadvantaged only a small minority are willing to act; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987). In contrast, increasing advantaged group members' willingness to make concessions that would advance the policy goals of the disadvantaged may be a more achievable outcome for a larger portion of the advantaged group. In addition, reviews of research in political science and sociology suggest that the success or failure of collective action in achieving its policy goals often depends on the extent to which an action is

[1] Theoretically a fourth type could be differentiated, namely normative violent action. However, because the normative use of violence is usually related to the use of force by the government or military, this tactic is less relevant to collective action of the disadvantaged. Thus, we focus on the other three types of action.

[2] The norms used to categorize these types of action are those of the dominant social system, and they usually serve to maintain the smooth functioning of society, including its intergroup hierarchy. Thus, nonnormative nonviolent action violates these norms and rules and goes beyond the "acceptable" or "legal" to disrupt cooperative relations that maintain hierarchy.

able to generate public support for policy change (Burstein, 2003; Burstein & Linton, 2002).

There is evidence to support the downsides of both violent and normative nonviolent action when it comes to motivating concessions from resistant advantaged group members. Violent action may be seen as an attempt to harm the advantaged group, or take over their power (Jonas & Fritsche, 2013; Sweetman, Leach, Spears, Pratto, & Saab, 2013). Indeed, is was shown to reduce support for the disadvantaged, even among sympathizers (Simpson, Willer, & Feinberg, 2018). In contrast, normative nonviolent action is more likely to be viewed positively by members of the advantaged group (Orazani & Leidner, 2019; Zlobina & Gonzalez Vazquez, 2018), but it may be too harmonious to change advantaged group members' views. This is consistent with the notion of the "velvet glove" (Jackman, 1996), which argues that harmony between groups can preserve hierarchy by making systems group-based oppression run smoothly. Research has supported this idea by showing that interventions that succeed in reducing prejudice do not necessarily increase support for policies that would address inequality (Dixon, Durrheim, & Thomae, 2017; Dixon, Levine, Reicher, & Durrheim, 2012; Saguy, 2018; Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009; Wright, 2009). Thus, without some disruptive pressure, advantaged group members are more likely to ignore or dismiss resistance than to make concessions. This is why we suggest that nonnormative nonviolent actions may be most likely to be effective, because they produce the constructive disruption needed for the resistant advantaged to support concessions.

Nonnormative Nonviolent Action as Constructive Disruption

We propose that action that is both nonnormative *and* nonviolent is ideal for generating support for concessions to the disadvantaged among resistant advantaged group members. Specifically, the nonnormative nature of the action can generate pressure on the advantaged to respond to the protest by disrupting normal cooperative relations, whereas the nonviolent nature of the action can help increase the likelihood that this response would be conciliatory and include concessions to the protest. Thus, we argue that nonnormative nonviolent action (e.g., civil disobedience) is able to balance two opposing processes that are both required for collective action to be effective for generating support among the advantaged group: perceived disruption and constructive intentions.

Drawing from sociological theories (Piven, 2008; Sharp, 1994, 2013), we argue that collective action draws its power to motivate advantaged group members to respond from generating perceived disruption. Theorists who advocate for the effectiveness of disruptive action argue that the ability to withdraw cooperation from the relationships that maintain and sustain social hierarchy and the broader social order can incentivize powerful groups to make concessions. This is because the disruption produced could draw attention and focus the advantaged on the issues raised by the disadvantaged. In line with this notion, Chow, Lowery, & Hogan, (2013) found that Whites increased their support for policies advancing racial equality (e.g., affirmative action) after they perceived instability in (i.e., disruption to) their advantaged position. In a similar vein, studies of civil rights protests suggest that part of the reason for their success was that they were able to fragment White coalitions in the South by winning support from Whites whose lives were more directly disrupted by the protests (Andrews, Beyerlein, & Tucker Farnum, 2016). Thus, disruption may be able to move some critical mass of the advantaged group to become willing to make concessions related to the goals of the protestors.

However, disruptive action may have its limits. Highly disruptive action such as extremely violent riots or even terrorism can produce support for aggressive retaliatory action among the advantaged (Brym & Maoz-Shai, 2009; Fording, 1997). Such defensive reactions may be rooted in advantaged group members' "fear of falling," that is, fear of losing power or resources (Jetten, Mols, & Postmes, 2015, 2017). The advantaged group may fear that the protest will result in a regressive revolution, leading not to equality—but a new hierarchy with them as the disadvantaged (Sweetman et al., 2013).

Against this backdrop, we suggest that to be effective in generating support for concessions to the protest, perceived disruption must be *balanced* with the perception that the protestors have constructive intentions, defined as perceived intentions to improve the condition of both one's group but lack of intentions to harm the outgroup, and willingness to conclude the action if its goals are achieved. This is in line with attribution theories which argue that how we respond to others' behavior often depends on the attributions we make of the intentions behind that behavior (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967). Perceiving the disadvantaged's intentions as constructive in these terms should help allay advantaged group members' "fear of falling," thus making them more willing to make concessions in response to the disruption caused by the protest. In other words, the constructive intentions could help reduce a sense of threat produced by disruption and collective action in general (Di Bernardo et al., 2019; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008), and perhaps even make the protestors' demands seem more legitimate.

Constructive Disruption as a Psychological Balancing Act

Constructive disruption is a delicate balancing act that relies on the *presence* of and *balance* between both disruption and constructive intentions. For constructive disruption to occur, both aspects should be relatively high but also relatively *equal*. This idea of balance is used in other concepts in social psychology, most notably optimal distinctiveness and dual identity (Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010; Simon, Reichert, & Grabow, 2013), that also highlight the importance of balance between (sometimes opposing) processes. However, balance has also been used slightly differently to refer to a lack of cognitive dissonance and thus balance among attitudes (see Heider, 1958). Our conceptualization of balance is more similar to the balance described by optimal distinctiveness and dual identity, that is, two factors that are present in relatively equal quantities such as on a scale that is balanced (e.g., optimal distinctiveness is derived from relatively equal amounts of personal distinctiveness and belonging, and dual identity reflects relatively equal identification with two groups).

Given our conceptualization of constructive disruption as a balance of two factors, we measured each factor separately and then combined the two measures according to methods developed in the dual identity literature (Levy, Saguy, van Zomeren, &

Halperin, 2017). To have a strong dual identity one must be meaningfully identified with both groups. However, sometime the relevant identities can be in opposition to each other. For example, many Arabs living in Israel tend to identify more with their Arab identity (and less with their Israeli identity) or vice versa. Thus, to capture dual identity Levy et al. (2019, 2017) considered both the strength of both identities and the extent to which they differ from one another by using a formula, which sums the two levels of identification and then subtracts the difference between them.

According to this formula, if a person is identified highly with each identity, and there are no differences in the level of each identification, her dual identity score would be high. If, however, she is very high on one type of identity and very low on the other, her dual identity score would be low. We adopt this formula to measure constructive disruption, because just as an individual needs to balance both identities to maintain a dual identity, for action to produce constructive disruption it must balance both disruption and constructive intentions. Specifically, we adapted the formula to be:

$$(Disruption + Constructive\ Intentions) - |Disruption - Constructive\ Intentions|$$

By subtracting the absolute value of the difference from the sum, this formula gives high scores to action that has relatively high levels of both disruption and constructive intentions, but relatively low scores to action that produces only one but not the other.[3]

The Current Research

Our goal was to test the effect of nonnormative nonviolent action (compared with no action, normative nonviolent action, and violent action) on support for concessions among advantaged group members who are resistant to social change. We operationalized support for concessions as support for making the policy changes demanded by the protest. We hypothesized that nonnormative nonviolent action (relative to the other tactics) will result in most support among resistant advantaged group members (Hypothesis 1). This is because it should generate the most constructive disruption relative to other types of collective action (Hypothesis 2), specifically the nonviolent aspect of the action should communicate constructive in intentions to all observers, and nonnormative aspect should generally be perceived as disruptive. This unique combination of disruption and perceived constructive intentions will drive support for concessions specifically among those resistant (Hypothesis 3), as the disruption helps generate pressure to overcome their resistance, whereas the constructive intentions help increase the likelihood that a response will be conciliatory However, the balance of these two should only be effective for those more resistant to social change, as they need this combination, whereas those more open to social change should not need the pressure from disruption to respond to the protest.

We test this proposed model (see Figure 1) in five empirical studies. Studies 1–3 focused on experimentally testing nonnormative nonviolent action's effectiveness among advantaged group members resistant to change (Hypothesis 1), as well as providing some initial evidence for the proposed mechanism (Hypotheses 2 and 3). Studies 4 and 5 provided further evidence for the mechanism's effectiveness among resistant advantaged group members (Hypothesis 3) and expanded the external and ecological validity of the findings by using real ongoing protests. The studies span multiple contexts, use multiple indicators of resistance to social change, and a mixture of empirical methods (see Table S1 of online supplemental materials for an overview). Across studies, we included context-relevant individual-difference indicators of the extent to which advantaged group members are resistant to social change. We did so, rather than focusing on one single moderator across all studies, because we aimed to use the most relevant resistance to *the specific group protesting*, which does not always align with variables reflecting a general preference for hierarchy or equality (e.g., social dominance orientation). Furthermore, ideally we would measure baseline resistance to the disadvantaged's goals (and we did this where possible, such as in Study 5), but otherwise we used potential moderators that conceptually aligned with resistance to the goals of the specific disadvantaged group (e.g., prejudice toward that group).

In addition, despite our focus on resistant advantaged group members, we do not claim that those who show less resistance will not respond differently to different protest tactics. Based on previous research (Teixeira et al., 2020; Thomas & Louis, 2014), we expected to find any such differences in solidarity based action, as support for the protest's policy goals is likely to be already high among such advantaged group members. To enable tests of this possibility, our studies included a measure of solidarity-based action intentions, for which we report the findings in the online supplemental materials, because it is not the focus of this paper.

Study 1

Study 1 was conducted in the context of ongoing demonstrations in opposition to police violence against African Americans in the United States. We selected this context because it represented a live ongoing movement in which the disadvantaged were trying to achieve policy change (e.g., changes to policing practices) and were generally facing resistance from large parts of the advantaged group. Consistent with research on Whites' resistance to social change in the racial context (Knowles & Peng, 2005; Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, & Goff, 2006), we operationalized resistance to social change as White racial identification (as those who are more strongly identified with their White racial identity should be most resistant to social change with Black Americans). This study was focused on providing initial support for Hypothesis 1 stating that nonnormative nonviolent action, relative to other tactics, would be more effective at increasing support for concessions among those resistant to social change.

[3] We chose this formula over a simple sum because it is better able to differentiate whether balance is present. For example, someone could rate an action as 7 on disruption and 2 on constructive intentions, producing a sum of 9. Whereas someone else could rate an action as 5 on both variables, producing a sum of 10. The first should be low in our variable of constructive disruption, and the second should be high—yet the receive almost exactly the same scores using a sum. Using our formula, the first ratings would lead to a score of 4 (instead of 9 when a simple sum was used). and the second would produce a score of 10, thus successfully capturing the lack of balance and thus lack of constructive disruption reflected in the first ratings, and the presence of balance, and thus high constructive disruption in the second.



Figure 1. Proposed model.

Method

Participants and procedure. Participants were 213 White Americans recruited via MTurk. Twenty participants (9.4% of the original sample) were excluded because they spent less than 15 s reading the manipulation article or failed at least two (of three) attention check questions (e.g., "This is an attention check. Please select strongly disagree for this question"), leaving a sample of 193 (M_{age} = 47.62, 50.8% female, 30% conservative, 18.7% moderate, 51.3% liberal). Sample size was based on a power calculation assuming 80% and a small to medium effect (Cohen's f^2 = .06) for the key interaction term in the model.

The procedure for this study and all others was approved by the ethics committee at the last author's university. Participants were invited to take part in a study on reactions to news articles about current events. They were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In the *control* condition, the article included some background and statistics on police brutality and discriminatory police practices and described that these issues had become central issues in American politics. In the three action conditions, this same paragraph also appeared, but was then followed by another paragraph describing collective action taken by the African American community in Philadelphia, PA.[4]

In the *normative nonviolent* condition, the article described a large peaceful demonstration where the community rallied in front of the police station, holding signs and singing protest songs, and community leaders spoke about the issue of police brutality and discriminatory policing. In the *nonnormative nonviolent* condition, the article described a strike taken by a large portion of the African American community where they refused to pay tickets and fines to the police. Similarly to the other conditions, it described community leaders announcing the strike and speaking about the issues of police brutality and discriminatory policing. In the *violent* condition, participants read an article very similar to the other conditions, except that the protestors were described as calling for violence against the police, and the protest degraded into a violent riot at the end, with protestors attacking the police and police station. After reading the article, participants completed a number of measures examining their perceptions of, and reactions to, the protest. We note that this study and the other studies included a number of additional exploratory measures, all of which are reported in the online supplemental materials.

Measures.

Manipulation checks. One item ("To what extent do you think the actions of African Americans described in the news article were violent or nonviolent?") measured participants' perceptions of the violence on a scale from 1 = *completely nonviolent* to 7 = *extremely violent*. We used two items ("To what extent do you think the actions of African Americans described in the news article complied with societal norms for expressing protest and discontent?" and "To what extent do you think the actions of African Americans described in the news article were legal?") to measure participants' perceptions of the normativity of the action, on a scale of 1 = *not at all* to 7 = *completely* (r = .60). We included two items rather than one asking about normativity, because we felt that this concept might not be clear to the average reader. As laws are institutional indicators of societal norms (Tankard & Paluck, 2017), we felt that asking about legality would allow us to ask about normativity in a way that is more concrete and clear to the average person.

Support for concessions. Three items measured participants' support for policies that would have taken steps to address the key inequality highlighted by the protest: "The city of Philadelphia should begin to reform its policies in light of the recent protests there," "The city of Philadelphia should try to implement some of the specific aims of the protestors there (community oversight of the police, body cameras, etc.)," "States should be required to review policing polices to find and correct policies that are racially discriminatory" (α = .88).

Resistance to social change. Resistance to social change with the specific group protesting (in this study Black Americans) was operationalized as White racial identification. Three items assessed participants' level of identification with their racial group, for example, "I feel strong ties with other White Americans" (α = .87).

[4] Philadelphia was chosen because it has a large African American population, but at the time there had not yet been any significant cases of police brutality or protests against police brutality that drew national attention. Thus we hoped that this would make it as free as possible from the preconceived notions people already hold towards African American activism on this issue.

Demographic questionnaire. Participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire.

Results

All analyses were conducted in R Version 3.6.1 (R Core Team, 2017), and the relevant data file and code can be found at https://osf.io/bq32x/. We present the descriptive differences between conditions and the correlations between the main variables for all studies in the online supplemental materials. We began by conducting manipulation checks and then we tested our main hypothesis by creating dummy variables with the nonnormative nonviolent condition as the reference group. This created three comparisons: nonnormative nonviolent versus control, nonnormative nonviolent versus normative nonviolent, and nonnormative nonviolent versus violent. We then examined their interaction with resistance to social change on support for concessions.

Manipulation checks. We first conducted one-way ANOVAs examining differences in the extent to which the conditions we perceived as normative and violent, which revealed that there were significant differences in terms of perceived violence, $F(3, 189) = 94.5$, $p < .001$, and perceived normativity, $F(3, 189) = 81.9$, $p < .001$ (for a figure visualizing these findings, see the online supplemental materials). Planned comparisons revealed that the violent condition was perceived as significantly more violent than all other conditions ($ps < .001$, $ds > 1.50$). In addition, both the normative nonviolent and nonnormative nonviolent conditions were perceived as significantly less violent than the control ($ps < .001$, $ds > 1.10$). This may be because the control condition did not mention a specific protest and thus when answering different participants thought of different forms of protest resulting in an average near the midpoint of the scale. There was no significant difference between the normative nonviolent and nonnormative nonviolent conditions on perceived violence.

On perceived normativity, planned comparisons revealed that the normative nonviolent condition was perceived as significantly more normative than the nonnormative nonviolent and control conditions ($ps < .001$, $ds > 2.40$), and that the violent condition was perceived as less normative than all other conditions ($ps < .001$, $ds > 0.92$). However, there was no significant difference between the control and nonnormative nonviolent condition, which both fell around the midpoint of the scale, likely because the control did not specify a specific action. Overall, these results support our classification of the three conditions as normative nonviolent, nonnormative nonviolent, and violent, although it was slightly less clear how the control condition was interpreted (see the discussion section).

Hypothesis 1: Nonnormative nonviolent action increases concessions among resistant advantaged group members. We tested Hypothesis 1 by conducting a regression including the dummy variables with nonnormative nonviolent action as the reference group, resistance to social change, and the interaction terms between them. There were no main effects; however, the interaction between resistance to social change and the dummy variable reflecting the difference between the normative nonviolent and nonnormative nonviolent conditions was significant as well as the interaction between resistance to social change and the dummy variable reflecting the difference between the violent condition and the nonnormative nonviolent condition (see Table 1). Simple slopes analyses of these interactions (see Figure 2) revealed that for those high in resistance to social change nonnormative nonviolent action significantly increased support for concessions relative to the normative ($b = -0.66$, $SE = .33$, $t = 1.97$, $df = 185$, $p = .049$) and violent conditions ($b = -0.75$, $SE = .35$, $t = 2.17$, $df = 185$, $p = .03$) and marginally in comparison with the control condition ($b = -0.60$, $SE = .16$, $t = 1.65$, $df = 185$, $p = .10$). There were no significant effects of condition among those low in resistance to social change ($ps > .11$).

Discussion

Results provided initial support for Hypothesis 1: Nonnormative nonviolent action increased support for concessions to the protest (compared with the other conditions) among advantaged group members who should be more resistant to social change (i.e., high White identifiers). This indicates that this may be the most effective tactic in generating support among resistant advantaged group members. Our manipulations of each tactic in the context of an ongoing protest movement were successful, which increases confidence in both the internal and external validity of these initial findings. However, it was less clear what the control condition (which did not mention a specific action) reflects, because participants may have thought of various recent protests in this condition which influenced their responses. Because ideally this condition

Table 1
Effects of Collective Action on Support for Concessions Moderated by Resistance to Social Change

Predictors	*b*	*SE*	95% CI	*t*	*df*	*p*
Intercept	5.72	0.17	[5.38, 6.05]	33.70	185.00	**<.001**
Condition D1: NNNV vs. Control	−0.36	0.25	[−0.85, 0.13]	−1.46	185.00	0.146
Condition D2: NNNV vs. NNV	−0.05	0.24	[−0.54, 0.43]	−0.22	185.00	0.825
Condition D2: NNNV vs. Violent	−0.12	0.24	[−0.60, 0.35]	−0.51	185.00	0.612
Resistance to social change	0.11	0.12	[−0.12, 0.34]	0.96	185.00	0.337
Condition D1 × Resistance to Social Change	−0.17	0.18	[−0.53, 0.20]	−0.91	185.00	0.366
Condition D2 × Resistance to Social Change	−0.43	0.16	[−0.74, −0.11]	−2.67	185.00	**0.008**
Condition D3 × Resistance to Social Change	−0.45	0.18	[−0.80, −0.10]	−2.54	185.00	**0.012**
Observations			193			
R^2/R^2 adjusted			0.088/0.053			

Note. D1 = NNNV versus Control; D2 = NNNV versus NNV; D3 = NNNV versus Violent; NNNV = Nonnormative Nonviolent; NNV = Normative Nonviolent. Significance level for bold is $p < .05$.



Figure 2. Effects of collective action on support for concessions moderated by resistance to social change. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.

would reflect inaction (so the effects of the other kinds of action could be compared with the effect of no action at all), in the next study we decided to use a more specific context without a clear ongoing movement.

Study 2

Study 2 was conducted in the context of relations between Palestinian/Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel. Palestinian/Arab citizens of Israel are nonimmigrant minority of about 20% of the Israeli population and are subject to multiple forms of discrimination in education, employment, and citizenship rights (Adalah, 2011; Smooha, 2002). Although this minority frequently engages in collective action on a number of issues (e.g., the recently passed nation-state law; see Kremnitzer, 2018), we created a fictitious, but plausible, context for this study to give us as much control as possible over the manipulation of the tactics used in the action. Specifically, we described protests against a potentially discriminatory policy instituted at Haifa University, an Israeli university with the largest percentage of Palestinian/Arab students (Ali, 2013).

As in other research in the Israeli–Arab context (Pratto et al., 2014), we operationalized resistance to social change as political ideology, because political ideology in Israel is almost entirely determined according to attitudes toward the conflict with Palestinians. Within this context, rightists are resistant to advancing the status of the Palestinian minority (e.g., the current right-wing government recently passed legislation emphasizing the Jewish nature of the state and demoting the status of Arabic), whereas leftists tend to be more sympathetic to attempts to reduce discrimination faced by Palestinian citizens.

Method

Participants and procedure. Participants were 226 Jewish Israelis recruited via an online survey company. Thirty participants (13% of the original sample) were excluded because they spent less than 15 s reading the manipulation article,[5] leaving a sample of 196 (M_{age} = 41.45, 53.6% female, 16.3% leftist, 41.8% centrist, 41.9% rightist). Sample size was based on the same power analysis in Study 1.

Participants were invited to take part in a study on reactions to news articles about current events. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In all conditions, an ostensible news article described how the university had instituted a new policy requiring that students have military service to live in the dorms (service is mandatory for Jewish citizens, but not for Palestinian/Arab citizens—most of whom do not serve because of their objections to the Israeli occupation of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza). The article explained that Palestinian/Arab students felt this policy was discriminatory because it effectively barred them from living in student dormitories and had appealed the decision, but their appeal had been rejected by the university.

In the *control* condition, the article continued and said that despite this negative ruling, Arab students had decided to take no further action against the policy. The three action conditions were similar to those used in the previous study but adapted to the current context. In the *normative nonviolent* condition, the article described a large peaceful demonstration against the new policy. In the *nonnormative nonviolent* condition, the article described a strike by the Arab students on paying tuition and fees to the university. In the *violent* condition, the article described a radical protest that degraded into a violent riot. After reading the article, participants completed a number of measures examining their perceptions of and reactions to the protest.

Measures.

Manipulation check. The manipulation checks measuring perceived violence and normativity (r = .78) were identical to

[5] We intended to use the same exclusion criterion in all studies, but attention check questions were mistakenly not added to the final translated version of this study. So we simply used the same reading time criterion as in Study 1.

Study 1, except that they referred to the actions of the Arab students.[6]

Support for concessions. Three items measured participants support for policies that would have taken steps to address the key inequality highlighted by the protest "The change in the policy should be cancelled and the university should return to the old system," "The university administrators should meet with Arab student leaders and work together with them to devise a new system that they feel is more fair," and "The university administrators should meet with Arab student leaders to negotiate an end to action against the policy" ($\alpha = .74$).

Resistance to social change. Resistance to social change with the specific group protesting (in this study Palestinian citizens of Israel) was operationalized as political ideology (see Pratto et al., 2014), which was measured on a scale ranging from 1 (*extreme leftist*) to 7 (*extreme rightist*).

Demographic questionnaire. Participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire. Items included gender, age, education, employment, and religiosity.

Results

Manipulation checks. One-way ANOVAs were used to examine differences in the extent to which the conditions we perceived as normative and violent. There were significant differences between conditions in perceived normativity, $F(3, 192) = 34.01$, $p < .001$, and perceived violence, $F(3, 192) = 30.16$, $p < .001$ (for a figure visualizing these results, see the online supplemental materials). Planned comparisons revealed that the normative nonviolent condition was perceived as significantly more normative than the nonnormative nonviolent and violent conditions (ps $< .03$, ds > 0.41) and the violent condition was perceived as less normative than all other conditions (ps $< .001$, ds > 1.43). The control condition was perceived as equally normative to the normative nonviolent condition ($p = .62$, $d = .09$), and somewhat more normative than the nonnormative nonviolent condition ($p = .08$, $d = 0.32$). On perceived violence, planned comparisons revealed that the violent condition was perceived as significantly more violent than all other conditions (ps $< .001$, ds > 1.54). There were no other significant differences between conditions on perceived violence (ds < 0.20).[7]

Testing Hypothesis 1. To test our first hypothesis, we conducted a regression including the dummy variables with nonnormative nonviolent action as the reference variable, resistance to social change, and the interaction terms between them (see Table 2). There was a marginally significant effect of resistance to social change. The interaction between resistance to social change and the dummy variable reflecting the difference between the normative nonviolent conditions and the nonnormative nonviolent condition was significant (see Figure 3). Simple slopes analysis of this interaction revealed that for those resistant to social change, nonnormative nonviolent action significantly increased support for concessions relative to normative nonviolent action ($b = -0.79$, $SE = 0.41$, $t = -1.94$, $df = 188$, $p = .05$) and also relative to the control condition ($b = -0.83$, $SE = 0.42$, $t = -1.99$, $df = 188$, $p = .049$). In contrast, for those more open to social change, normative nonviolent action increased support for concessions compared with nonnormative nonviolent action ($b = 0.75$, $SE = .041$, $t = 1.84$, $df = 188$, $p = .07$).

Discussion

Study 2 replicated support for Hypothesis 1 in a context in a cleaner context where there was not a preexisting movement. For Israeli rightists, who are generally resistant to social change, support for the Arabs' policy demands was consistently low, unless Arabs protested in a non-normative, nonviolent manner. Indeed, normative protest, as well as violent protest, did not generate support relative to the control condition. The stable and pervasive resistance of rightists in Israel to a wide range political concessions with respect to Palestinian citizens (Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012; Reifen Tagar, Morgan, Halperin, & Skitka, 2014) lends these findings extra weight.

However, a limitation of the research so far is that we have operationalized normative nonviolent, nonnormative nonviolent, and violent action the same way in each study. Thus, it could be argued that the results so far are not informative about the effectiveness of different collective action tactics more generally, but rather only of the specific actions described in the manipulations (i.e., a peaceful demonstration, strike, and riot). Therefore, in Study 3 we designed a manipulation that described a week of collective action events consisting of four actions, all of which used normative, nonnormative, or violent tactics depending on the condition. Beyond these changes to the manipulation, our central goal in Study 3 was to investigate our proposed mechanism for the findings of Studies 1 and 2 and thus to test our full theoretical model.

Study 3

Study 3 aimed to test whether nonnormative nonviolent action would increase support for concessions among those resistant to social change (rightists) because of perceptions of the action as producing *constructive disruption*. To that end, we measured perceived disruption and perceived intentions separately and computed the formula describe in the introduction to assess constructive disruption. Based on our theoretical rational, we expected perceived disruption to increase from the normative to nonnormative to violent conditions, whereas perceived constructive intentions would decrease from the normative to nonnormative to violent conditions, meaning that constructive disruption should be highest in the nonnormative condition. This sense of constructive disruption is hypothesized to be linked to support for concessions among those resistant to social change and thus explain nonnor-

[6] Because of the changes in the control condition, we added one item measuring the extent to which participants perceived that collective action had occurred based on the definition of Wright and colleagues (1990), to show that the action conditions were perceived as more "active" than the control. ("To what extent do you think the Arab students described in the article are acting together to promote the status of Arabs on campus?"). Results for this manipulation check are presented in footnotes.

[7] There were significant differences between conditions in the perceived presence of collective action $F(3, 192) = 13.25$, $p < .001$. With the action conditions perceived as significantly more "active" than the control condition (ps $\leq .03$). Interestingly, the violent condition was seen as containing significantly less collective action than the normative and nonnormative conditions (ps $< .03$); however, it was still perceived as containing more action than the control condition ($p = .03$). This difference of the violent condition may be due to the items reference to "promot[ing] the status of Arabs on campus," some participants may have felt that violence would harm the status of Arabs and thus reduced their responses on this item.

Table 2
Effects of Collective Action on Support for Concessions Moderated by Resistance to Social Change

Predictors	*b*	*SE*	95% CI	*t*	*df*	*p*
Intercept	4.26	0.20	[3.86, 4.66]	20.91	188.00	**<.001**
Condition D1: NNNV vs. Control	−0.40	0.29	[−0.98, 0.18]	−1.37	188.00	0.172
Condition D2: NNNV vs. NNV	−0.02	0.30	[−0.60, 0.56]	−0.07	188.00	0.946
Condition D2: NNNV vs. Violent	−0.33	0.30	[−0.93, 0.26]	−1.10	188.00	0.271
Resistance to social change	−0.29	0.15	[−0.58, 0.00]	−1.96	188.00	0.052
Condition D1 × Resistance to Social Change	−0.32	0.23	[−0.77, 0.13]	−1.39	188.00	0.167
Condition D2 × Resistance to Social Change	−0.58	0.21	[−0.99, −0.16]	−2.74	188.00	**0.007**
Condition D3 × Resistance to Social Change	−0.23	0.22	[−0.67, 0.20]	−1.05	188.00	0.293
Observations			196			
R^2/R^2 adjusted			0.250/0.222			

Note. D1 = NNNV versus Control; D2 = NNNV versus NNV; D3 = NNNV versus Violent; NNNV = Nonnormative Nonviolent; NNV = Normative Nonviolent. Significance level for bold is $p < .05$.

mative action's effectiveness for these advantaged group members. Thus nonnormative nonviolent action should be the only tactic able to balance both of these mechanisms and generate constructive disruption, and this is why we think it is particularly effective.

Method

Participants and procedure. Participants were 326 Jewish Israelis recruited via an online survey company. Fifty-two participants (15.9% of the original sample) were excluded because they spent less than 15 s reading the manipulation article or failed two (of three) attention check questions, leaving a sample of 274 (M_{age} = 42.28, 48% female, 19.8% leftist, 42.5% centrist, 37.7% rightist). The sample size for this study was determined by a power analysis based on the effect size of the interaction on support for concessions in Study 2.

The procedure was similar to the one used in Study 2, with the addition of some changes to the manipulations to strengthen them and increase their external validity. Each condition (except for the control) described a number of different actions that all used the same broader kind of tactics. In the *normative* nonviolent condition, the article described Arab students making an online petition against the policy and sending it to the student administration, wearing t-shirts protesting the policy to a speech of the Dean, putting up posters against the policy in the dormitories, and holding a peaceful demonstration against the policy. In the *nonnormative* nonviolent condition, the article described Arab students spamming the website of the student administration for student feedback with so many complaints that they crashed the website, disrupting a speech of the Dean by walking to the front and gathering in front of him in the auditorium, organizing a "sleep-in" where students spent the night in the lobby of the dormitories, and striking on paying tuition and fees. In the *violent* condition, the article described Arab students hacking the student administration's system and destroying important records, throwing objects at the Dean while he gave a speech, vandalizing the security booth at the student dormitories, and holding a demonstration against the policy that devolved into a violent riot.

Measures.

Manipulation check. The same measures were used to assess participant's perceptions of the presence of collective action, the violence of the action, and the normativity of the action (correlation between the two items; r = .81).



Figure 3. Effects of collective action on support for concessions moderated by resistance to social change. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.

Constructive disruption. As a result of our conceptualization of a balance of two factors, we measured each with its own scale and then combined the two measures according to methods developed in the dual identity literature (Levy et al., 2017). We measured *constructive intentions* with seven items asking participants about whether they thought the protestors had goals and intentions aimed at achieving positive change or harming the outgroup, and whether they would end the action if their goals were achieved. Items included "To what extent do you think the Arab students want to live in peace and harmony with the Jewish Israelis," ". . . to achieve a just society where all nationalities/ethnicities are treated equally," ". . . to get revenge on Jews for past discrimination" (reverse scored), ". . . to damage and wreak havoc on the University" (reverse scored), "I think that if the University addresses Arab students' concerns university life will return to normal," "I think that if the University addresses Arab students' concerns Arabs students would accept the changes," "I think that if the University addresses Arab students' concerns Arabs students would stop having these sorts of actions" ($\alpha = .84$).

Perceived disruption was measured with three items, "The actions of the Arab students have disrupted normal life at the University of Haifa," "The actions of the Arab students have disrupted positive relations between Jews and Arabs at the University of Haifa," and "The actions of the Arab students have disrupted the smooth functioning of the University of Haifa" ($\alpha = .89$). These two measures were then combined into a single measure of constructive disruption, by summing the two measures and then subtracting the difference between them. This formula was taken from the dual identity literature (Levy et al., 2017, 2019) to create a measure of constructive disruption that reflects our concept of balance:

$$(Disruption + Constructive\ Intentions) - |Disruption - Constructive\ Intentions|$$

Support for concessions. Was measured with the same items as in Study 2, with the addition of one new item ("The administration should find a solution that does something to address Arab student's concerns even if they do not remove the policy," $\alpha = .77$).

Resistance to social change. Was measured using political ideology as in Study 2. Participants completed a brief demographics questionnaire. Items included gender, age, education, employment, and religiosity.

Results

Manipulation checks. Again, one-way ANOVAs were used to examine differences in the extent to which the conditions we perceived as normative and violent. There were significant differences between conditions in terms of perceived normativity, $F(3, 270) = 69.95$, $p < .001$ and perceived violence $F(3, 270) = 68.07$, $p < .001$ (for a figure visualizing this, see the online supplemental materials).[8] The normative nonviolent condition was perceived as significantly more normative than the nonnormative and violent conditions ($ps < .002$, $ds > 0.56$), and the violent condition was perceived as less normative than all other conditions ($ps < .001$, $ds > 1.80$). The control condition was perceived as equally normative to the normative nonviolent condition ($p = .19$, $d = 0.20$), and somewhat more normative than the nonnormative nonviolent condition ($p = .06$, $d = 0.32$).

On perceived violence, planned comparisons revealed that the violent condition was perceived as significantly more violent than all other conditions ($ps < .001$, $ds > 1.80$). In addition, the normative nonviolent condition was perceived as more violent than the control ($p = .048$, $d = 0.29$), and the nonnormative nonviolent condition as more violent than the control ($p = .001$, $d = 0.68$). Although these later differences in perceived violence were unexpected, they are likely caused by the heightened intensity of the action in the revised manipulation. In addition, no condition even approaches the perceived violence of the violent condition (or the midpoint of the scale which would indicate agreement with the statement that the protests were violent). Thus, overall these results support our classification of three conditions as normative nonviolent, nonnormative nonviolent, and violent.

Testing Hypothesis 1. We tested our first hypothesis by conducting a regression including the dummy variables with nonnormative nonviolent action as the reference variable, resistance to social change, and the interaction terms between them (see Table 3). There was a marginally significant effect of resistance to social change, and of the dummy variable reflecting the comparison between nonnormative nonviolent and violent action ($b = -0.76$, $SE = .24$, $t = -3.15$, $df = 268$, $p = .002$). In addition, the interaction between resistance to social change and the dummy variable reflecting the difference between the nonnormative and control condition was significant ($b = -0.42$, $SE = .19$, $t = -2.16$, $df = 268$, $p = .03$). Simple slopes analysis of this interaction (see Figure 4) revealed that for those resistant to social change nonnormative nonviolent action significantly increased support for concessions relative to the control condition ($b = -0.96$, $SE = 0.35$, $t = -2.75$, $df = 268$, $p = .01$) and violent condition ($b = -1.03$, $SE = 0.35$, $t = -2.94$, $df = 2\,68$, $p = .01$), and marginally compared with the normative nonviolent condition ($b = -0.60$, $SE = 0.35$, $t = -1.73$, $df = 268$, $p = .08$). For those open to social change, there was only a significant difference between the normative and violent conditions ($b = 0.73$, $SE = .32$, $t = 2.25$, $df = 268$, $p = .03$).

Testing Hypothesis 2: Nonnormative nonviolent action leads to the most constructive disruption. We then tested our hypothesis that nonnormative nonviolent action produces the highest levels of constructive disruption. There were significant differences between conditions in terms of the perceived disruption $F(3, 270) = 59.33$, $p < .001$, and also in terms of constructive intentions, $F(3, 270) = 11.62$, $p < .001$ (see Figure 5). As predicted, perceived disruption increased from the control condition, to the normative condition, to the nonnormative condition, to the violent condition and all differences were significant ($ps < .01$, $ds > 0.47$). Perceived constructive inten-

[8] There were also significant differences between conditions in terms of the perceived presence of collective action, $F(3, 270) = 17.45$, $p < .001$. Planned comparisons revealed that as expected the control condition was perceived as containing significantly less collective action than the normative and nonnormative conditions ($ps < .001$). The violent condition was again perceived as containing significantly less collective action than the normative and nonnormative conditions ($ps < .001$); however, it was not perceived as containing more action than the control condition ($p = .12$). Again this may be attributable to violence being seen as harmful to the status of Arabs on campus.

Table 3
Effects of Collective Action on Support for Concessions Moderated by Resistance to Social Change

Predictors	*b*	*SE*	95% CI	*t*	*df*	*p*
Intercept	4.84	0.18	[4.49, 5.20]	26.88	266.00	**<.001**
Condition D1: NNNV vs. Control	−0.42	0.24	[−0.90, 0.06]	−1.70	266.00	0.089
Condition D2: NNNV vs. NNV	−0.18	0.24	[−0.65, 0.30]	−0.73	266.00	0.468
Condition D2: NNNV vs. VIOLENT	−0.76	0.24	[−1.23, −0.28]	−3.15	266.00	**0.002**
Resistance to social change	−0.28	0.15	[−0.58, 0.03]	−1.81	266.00	0.072
Condition D1 × Resistance to Social Change	−0.43	0.20	[−0.81, −0.04]	−2.16	266.00	**0.032**
Condition D2 × Resistance to Social Change	−0.33	0.21	[−0.74, 0.07]	−1.62	266.00	0.107
Condition D3 × Resistance to Social Change	−0.22	0.19	[−0.60, 0.17]	−1.11	266.00	0.268
Observations			274			
R^2/R^2 adjusted			0.235/0.215			

Note. D1 = NNNV versus Control; D2 = NNNV versus NNV; D3 = NNNV versus Violent; NNNV = Nonnormative Nonviolent; NNV = Normative Nonviolent. Significance level for bold is $p < .05$.

tions were the same in the control and normative conditions ($p = .76$, $d = 0.23$), decreased from the normative (although not significantly so) to the nonnormative nonviolent condition ($p = .16$, $d = .30$), and decreased further from the nonnormative nonviolent condition to the violent condition ($p < .001$, $d = .76$). In addition, only in the nonnormative nonviolent condition was the difference between constructive intentions and disruption nonsignificant, suggesting that it was the only type of action that was able to balance these two perceptions. Overall, this pattern is in line with our general theoretical expectations that disruption would increase as one moved from normative to nonnormative to violent action but that constructive intentions would decrease.

We therefore proceeded to calculate our measure of constructive disruption that combines these two variables. A one-way ANOVA comparing the conditions on this outcome was also significant, $F(3, 270) = 18.02$, $p < .001$. Planned comparisons revealed that, as expected, the nonnormative nonviolent condition induced significantly more constructive disruption than all other conditions (ps $< .001$, ds > 0.64). The control condition was significantly lower than all other conditions (ps $< .002$, ds > 0.54), and the violent condition was slightly higher than the normative nonviolent condition ($p = .06$, $d = .30$ see Figure 6).

Testing Hypothesis 3: Constructive disruption as the mechanism behind the effectiveness of nonnormative nonviolent action. Next, we examined our hypothesis that constructive disruption would mediate the effect of nonnormative nonviolent action on support for concessions among those resistant to social change. Because we are interested in nonnormative nonviolent action versus the other conditions (which displayed the same pattern) we collapsed the other conditions into one for ease of analysis and presentation of the results.[9] According to this model, although nonnormative nonviolent action increased constructive disruption compared with all conditions, this increase in constructive disruption would only be translated into support for concessions for those resistant to social change.

We tested this model (equivalent to Model 15 in PROCESS, Hayes, 2013) using the *lavaan* package in R with bootstrapped significance tests (the full model is displayed in Table 4 and Figure 7). We first examined whether there was an interaction between resistance to social change and constructive disruption above and beyond the effects of condition and their interactions with resistance to social change because this would be the first support for our hypothesis that constructive disruption would drive support for concessions to the protest, but only among resistant advantaged group members (i.e., rightists). As we expected, the interaction between political ideology and constructive disruption was significant. Simple slopes analysis of this interaction (see Figure 8) revealed that for rightists, constructive disruption significantly predicted support for concessions ($b = 0.19$, $SE = 0.05$, $t = 3.81$, $df = 268$, $p < .001$). However, for leftists, constructive disruption did not predict support for concessions ($b = -0.02$, $SE = 0.05$, $t = -0.34$, $df = 268$, $p = .73$).

Because the hypothesized interaction was significant and in the expected direction, we then examined whether the moderation mediation was present. Importantly, the indirect effect of nonnormative nonviolent action via constructive disruption was significant only for those resistant to social change, namely, rightists ($b = 0.40$, $SE = 0.13$, $p = .001$), but not for those open to social change ($b = -0.02$, $SE = 0.11$, $p = .85$). In addition, the index of moderation mediation (the difference between these two effects) was significant ($b = 0.42$, $SE = 0.17$, $p = .02$).

Discussion

Study 3 supported our overall model, replicating the findings of Studies 1 and 2 and providing first evidence that constructive disruption is the mechanism for the effect of nonnormative action. Nonnormative nonviolent action produced the highest levels of constructive disruption, that is, it was the form of action seen by participants as both disruptive but also communicating constructive intentions. This constructive disruption was linked to support for concessions to the protest particularly among more resistant advantaged group members, and it mediated the effect of nonnormative nonviolent action for these advantaged group members.

Against this backdrop, we designed Studies 4 and 5 to further validate the hypothesized mechanism in real-world contexts of collective action. Whereas the first three studies used vignettes, which allowed us to experimentally manipulate the type of action,

[9] Results hold even if we do not collapse the other conditions together and instead use three dummy variables.



Figure 4. Effects of collective action on support for concessions. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.

as a result they arguably were less similar to collective action as it unfolds in the real world. Therefore, in Studies 4 and 5 we wanted to increase the ecological validity of the findings by shifting to correlational and longitudinal designs in the contexts of real ongoing protest movements.

Study 4

Study 4 was conducted in the context of an ongoing movement by the disabled community in Israel, which was characterized by the use of nonnormative nonviolent tactics. In Israel, disabled citizens receive a pension from the government based on their ability to work. However, the 100% pension is still only about half the minimum wage. After a committee in the Israeli parliament rejected for a third time a bill that would have increased this pension, the disabled community began a series of protests with the aim of generating pressure to raise the pension to the minimum wage. These protests were mainly nonnormative and nonviolent, as most peacefully occupied and blocked large roads and intersections in major cities, leading to major traffic jams. Based on the results of our previous studies, we hypothesized that if these protests were successful in producing constructive disruption, then they should be effective in increasing support for concessions to the protest among those more resistant to social change with the disadvantaged.

Study 4 made use of correlational data collected while these protests were occurring, which enabled us to test Hypothesis 3, stating that resistant advantaged group members who experienced a sense of constructive disruption in response to the protest, would be more supportive of concessions. We operationalized resistance to social change as prejudice toward people with disabilities (advantaged group identification did not make sense in this context given that "not disabled" is not usually a salient category with which people identify). Nor did political ideology map onto resistance to the disabled's protest in the Israeli context.

Method

Participants and procedure. We made use of a nationwide representative survey of Israelis conducted as an index of attitudes toward people with disabilities.[10] Participants were 2881 Jewish Israelis recruited via an online survey company. One hundred eighty participants (6% of the original sample) were excluded because they failed an attention check question.[11] In addition, because we were focused on the advantaged group, we also excluded participants who themselves were disabled ($n = 204$). This left a final sample of 2503 participants ($M_{age} = 37.64$, 70.9% female, 15.8% leftist, 26.6% centrist, 57.6% rightist). The sample size for this study was determined by the budget and requirements of the NGO that conducted this panel.

Participants completed a battery of questionnaires measuring their perceptions, attitudes, and emotions toward people with disabilities including their level of prejudice toward people with disabilities (for full list of all measures, see the online supplemental materials). At the end of the survey, participants read a brief description of the protests of the disabled community. Following this, participants were asked a few questions regarding their perceptions of this protest.

Measures. Resistance to social change was operationalized as prejudice toward people with disabilities, which was measured as a part of the standard battery of items within the main survey. The measure included five items adapted from the classic and modern racism scales (McConahay, 1986), for example, "In Israel there is no discrimination against people with disabilities" ($\alpha = .73$). Owing to constraints on survey length, each of the following measures included only one item.

Exposure to the protests. Was assessed with the item "To what extent were you exposed to these protests?" on a scale from 1 = *not at all exposed* to 7 = *highly exposed* so we could control for general levels of exposure.

[10] This index is conducted every year since 2016 by aChord: Social Psychology for Social Change, a NGO aimed at applying social psychological knowledge that is headed by the last author. The index is funded by the Ruderman Family Foundation and the Arison Foundation, who determined the budget and constraints for the index. More information about the index, as well as the funders can be found at https://www.negishut.co.

[11] Because of the length and scale of this study, only one attention check item was included.

Constructive disruption. Was again calculated based on two separate measures of perceived constructive intentions and disruption that were combined using the same formula. Constructive Intentions were measured with one item "I think that the demonstrators from the disabled organizations were trying to improve Israeli society" on a scale of 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree*. Perceived Disruption was measured with one item "I think the protests that were a part of this movement caused disruption to people's lives" on a scale of 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree.*

Support for concessions. Was measured with one item "I support the demand of the protesters to raise disability pensions to the level of the minimum wage" on a scale of 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree.* Participants also completed a brief demographics questionnaire. Items included gender, age, political ideology, education, employment, and religiosity.

Results

Correlations between all main variables and descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 5. Overall, exposure to the protest was high with 86% of the sample reporting high levels of exposure (i.e., above the midpoint of the scale or 5–7 in raw values). In addition, as we would expect based on the fact that the protests were nonnormative and nonviolent, constructive disruption was also relatively high with means around five on both disruption and constructive intentions.

We then tested Hypothesis 3 that constructive disruption would predict higher support for concessions among those who are more resistant to the social change, that is, higher in prejudice. We conducted a regression with constructive disruption, resistance to social change, and their interaction as predictors, and with exposure to the protest as a control variable (see Table 6). There was a significant effect of constructive disruption, resistance to social change, and exposure to the protest. In addition, the interaction between resistance to social change and constructive disruption was significant. Simple slopes analysis of this interaction (see Figure 9) revealed that constructive disruption was significantly associated with support for concessions for those resistant to social change ($b = .12$, $SE = .01$, $t = 9.59$, $p < .001$), but not for those more open to social change ($b = -0.02$, $SE = .01$, $t = -1.66$, $p = .10$).

Discussion

Study 4 provided additional support for the proposed mechanism in the context of an ongoing protest movement: Among participants who were highly prejudiced against the disabled, the extent to which they perceived the ongoing nonnormative protests as being both disruptive but also having constructive intentions predicted the extent to which they supported the protestors' key demand. Consistent with the previous studies, we did not find such a relationship among those low in prejudice, who were already more sympathetic to the movement's goals.

Studies 1–4 so far have provided both experimental and correlational support for the effectiveness of nonnormative nonviolent action via constructive disruption.[12] As yet another test of our hypotheses, Study 5 examined these processes longitudinally. Indeed, most protests and collective action in the real world are not isolated events but rather parts of larger movements and thus play out over time. Therefore, we wanted to examine these processes longitudinally in the context of an ongoing, large scale, nation-wide social movement.

Study 5

Study 5 was a three-wave longitudinal study conducted in the context of the student led activism following the Parkland shooting. After a school shooting at Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida claimed the lives of 17 people in February 2018, students from Parkland and around the country planned a series of three large nationwide actions. First, the "Enough!" School Walk-Out on March 14th, then the March for Our Lives in Washington, DC on March 24th, and finally the National School Walk Out on April 20th. Estimates of participation ranged from 700,000 to a million across the country for each of these events. Because these protests were planned and well publicized in advance, it gave us an opportunity to plan a study to longitudinally test our hypothesis about the perceptions of constructive disruption as determining support for the protesters' policy goals among resistant participants.

Method

Participants and procedure. This study consisted of three waves: one wave prior to the actions, one wave following one of the school walk outs, and one wave following the "March for our Lives" protest in Washington, DC.[13] Participants at Time 1 were 605 Americans recruited via MTurk ($M_{age} = 37.6$, 56.4% male). Participants were told they were participating in the first wave of a study on current events. The final sample (after wave 3) consisted of 432 participants ($M_{age} = 39.4$, 60.6% female, retention rate of 71%).[14] At wave 1, participants completed measures re-

[12] We also attempted a follow-up to Study 5 in which we directly manipulated constructive disruption. However, one of the manipulations was unsuccessful (the manipulation of constructive intentions), making interpretations of the results difficult. For the sake of openness but also clarity and brevity, we report this study in the online supplemental materials.

[13] We only sampled three times because of an initial plan to compare between the effects of the walk-outs and the demonstration (March for Our Lives). Originally, we thought that the school walkouts would be perceived as more nonnormative and thus allow us to compare between normative and nonnormative action. Children leaving school could be perceived as nonnormative, and some schools were discussing punishing children who participated. However, because normative protest (March for our Lives) was second, if we found differences between this protest and the others we would not be able to know whether this was a result of order or the protest's tactics. In an attempt to avoid this limitation, after time 1 we randomly divided the sample it two groups: One that was sampled after the first walk-out and then after March for our Lives (wave 2 was 6 days after wave 1 and wave 3 was 10 days later), and the second that was sampled after March for our Lives and then after the final walk-out (wave 2 was 16 days after wave 1 and wave 3 was 27 days later). Using this strategy we hoped to be able to disentangle the effects of the type of protest from the order. However, in the end, all protests were perceived as equally normative (see the online supplemental materials for detailed analyses); therefore, we simply collapsed the two orders together and controlled for which order grouping participants were in. This means that time 2 was following the first school walkout for some participants and following the "March for our Lives" demonstration for others, whereas time 3 was after the "March for our Lives" demonstration for some and after the second walkout for others. We analyzed the data in this way because time 2 represented the first opportunity to observe change in our participants, and therefore it was more comparable to merge these two points together, even though they were collected at different time points. This would be similar to collapsing a cross sectional data set (e.g. where participants aged 6–12 were measured over 3 years) by year to observe change by year rather than according to age.

[14] Dropout analyses are included in the online supplemental materials.



Figure 5. Condition differences on perceived disruption and constructive intentions. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. Please interpret the vertical axis as mean values for the dependent variables identified by the legend.

garding their perceptions of protests in favor of gun control, their support for the policies advocated by such protests, and their demographic information. Wave 1 was collected on March 8, 2018, so after the school shooting but prior to any major collective action regarding it. At waves 2 and 3, participants were directly exposed to a short news clip and article describing the action that had just taken place, and then answered the same measures from wave 1 except now these measures referred specifically to the protest to which they had just been exposed.

Measures.

Resistance for social change. (only measured in wave 1) Was operationalized as support for gun control versus gun rights which was measured by asking participants to classify themselves into one of 4 categories: "I strongly support of the right to bear arms and strongly oppose to restrictions on access to guns," "I tend to support of the right to bear arms and tend to be opposed to restrictions on access to guns," "I tend to support restrictions on access to guns and tend to be opposed to an unrestricted right to bear arms," or "I strongly support restrictions on access to guns and strongly oppose to an unrestricted right to bear arms." These were collapsed into two groups (Support vs. Oppose Gun Control) for ease of analysis, this served as our baseline measure of resistance to the protest. Also only measured in wave 1, participants completed a brief demographics questionnaire. Items included gender, age, political ideology, education, SES, political party, and others.

Constructive disruption. Was measured in waves 1–3 with two separate measures of constructive intentions and disruption that were combined using the formula presented in prior studies. Constructive Intentions were measured with nine items based on those used in previous studies, for example: "I think the protestors advocating for more restrictive gun regulations have good intentions," "I think the protestors are trying to wreak havoc and create conflict to get what they want" (reverse-scored), and "I think that if there are changes made to gun regulations the protestors would stop having these sorts of actions" (αs $>$ .84). Perceived Disruption was measured with three items similar to the previous studies, for example: "The recent protests advocating for more restrictive gun regulations



Figure 6. Condition differences on constructive disruption. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.

Table 4
Moderated Mediated Model of Constructive Disruption of the Interaction Between Type of Action and Resistance to Social Change

Predictors	*b*	*SE*	95% CI	*t*	*df*	*p*
Intercept	4.45	0.09	[4.27, 4.64]	47.08	268.00	**<.001**
Constructive disruption	0.08	0.03	[0.02, 0.15]	2.43	268.00	**0.013**
Resistance to social change	−0.51	0.07	[−0.66, −0.37]	−6.92	268.00	**<.001**
Condition D1: NNNV vs. Other Conditions	0.29	0.22	[−0.13, 0.72]	1.35	268.00	0.17
Condition D1 × Resistance to Social Change	0.13	0.18	[−0.23, 0.49]	0.71	268.00	0.47
Constructive Disruption × Resistance to Social Change	0.07	0.03	[0.02, 0.13]	2.62	268.00	**0.008**
Observations			274			
R^2/R^2 adjusted			0.25/0.23			

Note. D1 = NNNV versus Other Conditions; NNNV = Nonnormative nonviolent action. Significance level for bold is $p < .05$.

disrupt normal life in the United States" on a scale of 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree* (αs >. 91).

Support for concessions. Was measured in waves 1–3 with five items reflecting the key demands of the protestors: "I support a nationwide ban on the sale of assault weapons (e.g. AK-47s)," and "I support requiring background checks for all gun buyers" on a scale of 1 = *strongly disagree* to 7 = *strongly agree* (αs > .84).

Results

Analysis strategy. Correlations between all main variables and descriptive statistics are displayed in tables in the online supplemental materials, code for analysis can be found at https://osf.io/m97n2/. Because measurements were only collected at three waves, we treated wave as a categorical variable and recoded it into two dummy variables. Wave 1 was treated as the reference variable, because it was the baseline and we were interested in whether there was change from the baseline at wave 2 and wave 3.

Main results. We tested whether there would be an increase in support for concessions at waves 2 and 3 for those who were initially resistant (opponents of gun control), when constructive disruption was high. We ran a mixed-model analysis using *lme4* on support for concessions, with the effect of wave and constructive disruption as within-subjects variables and gun control support versus opposition (initial support) as a categorical between-subjects variable (see Table 7). The hypothesized three-way interaction between initial support, constructive disruption and, and the wave dummy variable reflecting the difference between wave 1 and wave 2 was significant. Simple slopes analysis of this interaction (see Figure 10) revealed that participants who were initially resistant the more they perceived the protests as constructively disruptive across wave 1 and 2, the more their support for concessions increased from Time 1 to Time 2 ($b = 0.16$, $SE = .07$, $t = 2.14$, $p = .03$). Among those who already were already open to social change (supportive of gun control) there was no change over time in support for



Figure 7. Interaction between political ideology and constructive disruptions on support for concessions. Shaded area reflects 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 8. Moderated mediation model of mechanism of effect of nonnormative action. Standardized regression weights, nonsignificant paths displayed in gray. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

concessions. The three-way interaction between initial support, constructive disruption and, and the time variable reflecting the difference between wave 1 and wave 3 was not significant, indicating that change occurred primarily between waves 1 and 2.

Discussion

Study 5 provided longitudinal support for the proposed mechanism in the context of an ongoing protest movement (Hypothesis 3). As such, this study provides support for our hypothesis that when collective action produces constructive disruption among those who are resistant to social change, it can be effective in increasing their support for the movements' goals. For those who are more resistant, the more they perceived the protests as constructively disruptive across time, the more their support for concessions increased over time. Although this effect was in the same direction at wave 3, it was not statistically significant, suggesting that this effect may weaken over time and that protests may need to produce increasing levels of constructive disruption to continue to exert their effects over time.

Internal Meta-Analysis

Finally, to examine the robustness of our main hypothesized effects, we conducted an internal meta-analysis on the studies presented here (Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016). In this meta-analysis, we aggregated the effects for the two hypotheses which we tested across multiple studies: that nonnormative nonviolent action will be most effective in increasing support for concessions among resistant advantaged group members (Hypothesis 1), and that constructive disruption will drive support for concessions specifically among those resistant to social change with the disadvantaged (Hypothesis 3). Details of the analysis can be found in the online supplemental materials, and the results are summarized in Table 8. We analyzed all studies reported in text and one additional study reported in Footnote 13 and the online supplemental materials (which was not reported in text because of problems with a manipulation of constructive disruption). Overall among those resistant to social change, nonnormative nonviolent action significantly increased support for concessions compared with the control, normative nonviolent action, and violent action conditions, and constructive disruption significantly increased support for concessions.

General Discussion

Across five studies with correlational, experimental, and longitudinal designs, we examined whether and how different collective action tactics by the disadvantaged could generate support for policy goals among the advantaged. We consistently found that, relative to other types of action and to no action, nonnormative *and* nonviolent action tactic had the strongest effect on support for policy concessions among advantaged group members most resistant to change (Hypothesis 1). In addition, this tactic was particularly effective because it is most likely to generate constructive disruption (Hypotheses 2 and 3), that is, a delicate balancing act between perceiving a sense of disruption to the normal social order, but also constructive intentions. This balance is important because this sense of disruption generates sufficient pressure on the advantaged to address and respond to the protest, whereas the

Table 5
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

Variable	*M*	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5
1. Resistance to social change	2.42	1.04					
2. Exposure	6.01	1.53	−.14** [−.18, −.10]				
3. Perceived disruption	4.46	2.05	.16** [.12, .20]	.25** [.21, .28]			
4. Constructive intentions	5.24	1.80	−.34** [−.37, −.31]	.11** [.08, .15]	−.23** [−.26, −.19]		
5. Constructive disruption	7.30	3.70	−.06** [−.09, −.02]	.18** [.14, .22]	.68** [.66, .70]	.39** [.35, .42]	
6. Support for concessions	5.35	1.76	−.37** [−.40, −.33]	.19** [.16, .23]	−.20** [−.24, −.16]	.52** [.49, .55]	.14** [.10, .17]

Note. *M* and *SD* are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation.
** $p < .01$.

Table 6
Effects of Collective Action on Support for Concessions Moderated by Resistance to Social Change

Predictors	*B*	*SE*	95% CI	*t*	*df*	*p*
Intercept	5.36	0.03	[5.30, 5.43]	168.81	2498.00	**<.001**
Constructive disruption	0.05	0.01	[0.03, 0.07]	5.73	2498.00	**<.001**
Resistance to social change	−0.55	0.03	[−0.61, −0.49]	−17.66	2498.00	**<.001**
Exposure to the protest	0.15	0.02	[0.11, 0.20]	7.21	2498.00	**<.001**
Constructive Disruption × Resistance to Social Change	0.07	0.01	[0.05, 0.08]	8.52	2498.00	**<.001**
Observations			2,503			
R^2/R^2 adjusted			0.187/0.186			

Note. Significance level for bold is $p < .05$.

constructive intentions help ensure that such a response is conciliatory and helps address the grievances of the protestors.

Theoretical Implications

This research expands on and enriches the literature on intergroup relations, collective action, and social change in at least four ways. First, we contribute to a shift from studying disadvantaged group members' motivation for collective action to studying how to overcome resistance to social change among the advantaged group (which may play important role in advancing social change). Currently there is a large body of research on the psychological factors that motivate the disadvantaged to engage in action (e.g., Van Zomeren, 2013), but we understand relatively little about how this action translates into social change, especially in terms of collective actions effect on the advantaged group (Louis, 2009; Saguy & Szekeres, 2018).

Second, we more specifically expand research on the reactions of the advantaged group by focusing on support for the policy changes demanded by the disadvantaged. To the best of our knowledge, only one other paper (Teixeira et al., 2020) experimentally examined the effects of collective action on the advantaged group. Our work complements and moves beyond this work by considering the effectiveness of action in different terms and suggesting another possible route to social change. Whereas Teixeira et al. (2020) consider the effects of collective action on advantaged group members willingness to actually join in and participate in the collective action of the disadvantaged or in solidarity based action, we focused on the effects of collective action on support for policy concessions that would meet the goals advocated by the protestors. These represent two different and potentially complementary models of effective action for social change. One sees effective collective action as recruiting advantaged group members to join in the struggle, and that this might generate more pressure on other advantaged group members/policymakers to advance change. However, this is likely less relevant for advantaged group members who tend to be resistant to social change, who often make up large portion of the advantaged group. The second sees effective collective action as generating change in public opinion in support of the action's goals, particularly among those were



Figure 9. Relationship between constructive disruption and support for concessions. Shaded areas reflect 95% confidence intervals.

Table 7
Change Over Time on Support for Gun Control Policies by Resistance to Social Change and Constructive Disruption

Predictors	*b*	*SE*	95% CI	*t*	*p*
Intercept	6.11	0.09	[5.94, 6.28]	70.54	**<.001**
Constructive disruption	−0.03	0.01	[−0.05, −0.01]	−2.55	**0.01**
Wave D1: Wave 1 vs. Wave 2	−0.24	0.09	[−0.42, −0.07]	−2.68	**0.007**
Wave D2: Wave 1 vs. Wave 3	−0.16	0.09	[−0.33, 0.02]	−1.77	0.077
Resistance to social change	1.53	0.18	[1.17, 1.89]	8.32	**<.001**
Order	−0.02	0.10	[−0.21, 0.17]	−0.16	0.87
Wave D1 × Constructive Disruption	0.04	0.01	[0.01, 0.06]	2.92	**0.004**
Wave D2 × Constructive Disruption	0.03	0.01	[0.00, 0.05]	2.07	**0.04**
Resistance to Social Change × Constructive Disruption	−0.01	0.02	[−0.06, 0.04]	−0.46	0.64
Wave D1 × Resistance to Social Change	0.54	0.19	[0.16, 0.92]	2.78	**0.005**
Wave D2 × Resistance to Social Change	0.44	0.19	[0.06, 0.81]	2.30	**0.02**
Wave D1 × Resistance to Social Change × Constructive Disruption	−0.07	0.03	[−0.12, −0.01]	−2.39	**0.02**
Wave D2 × Resistance to Social Change × Constructive Disruption	−0.04	0.03	[−0.10, 0.01]	−1.53	0.13
Random effects					
σ^2			0.18		
$\tau_{00\ id}$			0.95		
ICC			0.84		
N_{id}			432		
Observations			1,296		
Marginal R^2/Conditional R^2			0.34/0.90		

Note. D1 = Wave 1 versus Wave 2; D2 = Wave 1 versus Wave 3; ICC = intraclass correlation coefficient. Significance level for bold is $p < .05$.

initially resistant, and this public opinion shift affecting policymakers (Burstein, 2003; Burstein & Linton, 2002; Piven, 2008). When each of these models is most effective and how they might be combined is a topic for further conceptual integration, empirical research, and scholarly discussion (see below), but our research here expands budding work on the effects of collective action by shedding light on this second model.

Third, this research advances a more systematic understanding of the social-psychological effects of different forms of collective action by comparing three distinct tactics used in action: normative, nonnormative, and violent. Previous research as usually considered these dimensions separately (Orazani & Leidner, 2019; Shuman et al., 2016; Simpson et al., 2018), or as simply overlapping, that is, normative equals nonviolent, nonnormative equals violent (Saab et al., 2016). Despite the fact that many famous activists (King, 1991; Nojeim, 2004) and political scientists point to civil disobedience and other forms of actions that could be considered both nonnormative and nonviolent as especially effective, this is one of the only psychological studies to consider nonnormative nonviolent action as a distinct tactic (for exceptions see Tausch et al., 2011; Zlobina & Gonzalez Vazquez, 2018), and the first to examine its effects on the advantaged group. Thus, our research provides initial experimental evidence in support of this tactic's effectiveness and a first empirical examination of the psychological mechanism that makes it effective (and for whom).



Figure 10. Effects of protest on support for concessions depending on constructive disruption. Shaded areas reflect 95% confidence intervals.

Table 8
Meta-Analysis of Effects for Resistant Advantaged Group Members

Study	Hypothesis 1			Hypothesis 3
	Nonnormative vs. control	Nonnormative vs. normative	Nonnormative vs. violent	Effect of constructive disruption
Study 1	.20	.23	.27	—
Study 2	.19	.21	.18	—
Study 3	.27	.17	.30	.16
Study 4	—	—	—	.09
Study 4b[a]	—	—	—	.15
Study 5: Wave 2 effect	—	—	—	.21
Study 5: Wave 3 effect	—	—	—	.20
Overall effect (*r*)	.23	.20	.25	.14
Significance	$Z = 3.00$, $p = .002$	$Z = 2.71$, $p = .006$	$Z = 3.38$, $p < .001$	$Z = 9.31$, $p < .001$

[a] This is the failed experimental study reported in the online supplemental materials.

Fourth, we uniquely conceptualized and tested the underlying social-psychological mechanism for the effectiveness of nonnormative action (*constructive disruption*). This novel notion (and measure) may help to shed light on the psychology of advantaged group members and how they react to direct challenges to the status quo from the disadvantaged. Prior research has shown that advantaged group members use several strategies to justify and maintain their advantaged position (Chow & Knowles, 2016; Knowles et al., 2014; Lowery et al., 2006; Saguy & Kteily, 2014). Some of these strategies are reflected in apathy and a passive lack of support for policies that would address inequality (e.g., the principle-implentation gap; Dixon et al., 2017), whereas other strategies involve active denial of inequality and defense of the hierarchy (for a review see, Knowles et al., 2014; Lowery et al., 2006). Our findings suggest that to be effective at winning support for the goals of the disadvantaged, collective action must strike a delicate balance between not allowing the advantaged to easily use either of these two kinds of strategies.

Perhaps this is why action that produces constructive disruption is potentially so effective, because it makes it difficult for the advantaged to rely on strategies they typically use to maintain their status. The disruption makes it difficult to simply ignore the disadvantaged; and a clear communication of constructive intentions makes it more difficult to justify a defensive response. That being said, this analysis is primarily relevant for resistant advantaged group members, for those who are already open to social change the disruption may be less relevant because they do not require pressure to address the problems of the disadvantaged. However, constructive intentions are likely still relevant as this may communicate to these sympathizers that the disadvantaged are open to having their active support, perhaps as allies.

Although we focused in our studies on the potential of nonnormative nonviolent action as an especially effective way to produce constructive disruption, we do not argue that this is the *only* way to produce it. For example, in Study 5 some people perceived a massive, nation-wide normative protest as producing constructive disruption, and after exposure to the action these people were more likely to be higher in support for its policy goals. This is why perhaps the most important findings of this research are those linking constructive disruption to support for the disadvantaged's goals among resistant advantaged group members. Indeed, future research should explore how other processes and interventions might also be able to generate this sense of constructive disruption, and thus this research could potentially inform the literature on interventions aimed at improving intergroup relations (Hameiri, Bar-Tal, & Halperin, 2014).

Practical Implications

Based on this research, which collective action tactic should disadvantaged groups choose to advance their status? Although a simple reading of these findings might suggest that nonnormative nonviolent action is the "most effective" form of action, a closer reading of these findings and other research (Saguy & Szekeres, 2018; Teixeira et al., 2020; Thomas & Louis, 2014) would suggest that which type of action is most effective depends on the goal. We demonstrate that nonnormative nonviolent action is effective for generating support for concessions to the protest that would advance its policy goals from those who were more resistant. On the other hand, other prior research has found that normative nonviolent action was more effective at turning sympathizers into active supporters (Teixeira et al., 2020; Thomas & Louis, 2014).[15] Thus, which action tactic will be most useful to the disadvantaged may depend on the goal: If they are facing resistance from the advantaged blocking the achievement of their goals, nonnormative nonviolent action may be more effective. However, if the disadvantaged are seeking to build a movement that includes members of the advantaged group, then normative nonviolent action will likely be more effective. The question is thus not which tactic is "most effective," but which tactic is most effective to achieve which goal for what audience.

Beyond selecting different tactics within a specific action, this research also provides insights for activists in what they need to do to make (any) action effective at producing change among those who are resistant. Based on our findings, activists should seek to find ways to *disrupt while still communicating their constructive intentions*. Previous research that found nonnormative nonviolent action to be less effective for the advantaged (Teixeira et al., 2020) and speculated on how to make it more palatable to them, as other

[15] Our own results on solidarity-based action (presented in the online supplemental materials) are in line with this finding. Among sympathizers, normative nonviolent action tended to be the most effective at increasing willingness to participate in solidarity-based action in Studies 1–3.

research found it may be more effective in increasing support among third parties and bystanders (Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015). Our research would indicate that if nonnormative nonviolent action can be disruptive *while still* communicating constructive intentions, then it will also be effective for the advantaged group.

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Although this set of studies has many strengths owing to its multimethod, multicontext, and multimeasure approach, one important limitation pertaining to collective action tactics is that the individual actions or series of actions were "pure" in their tactics (i.e., there was no mixing between normative, nonnormative, and violent actions within the same movement), unlike in the real world where most movements involve a mix of all these types of action. This is a methodological strength in terms of internal validity, but at the same this limits our ability to make claims about how larger social change processes unfold. Indeed, in most cases, movements involve protests with a mixture of tactics, that occur over time, and there are usually reactions from the advantaged group that affect both how the disadvantaged continue their struggle (e.g., Louis & Montiel, 2018) and public opinion among the advantaged. For example, even if a protest is generally not violent, even if only a small minority is violent, or if the violence is started by the authorities, this can have a tremendous effect on the way the movement is perceived and its effectiveness. Alternatively, some scholars have argued that it was images of policemen beating, setting dogs, and otherwise attacking nonviolent Black protestors that shifted White public opinion during the civil rights movement (Louis & Montiel, 2018; Oppenheimer, 1994). Although methodologically challenging, future research should strive to capture these more complex dynamics. This will involve testing the effects both of simultaneous actions using different tactics and understanding the combined effect generated by the protest itself and the reaction to it.

Future research should also explore the mechanism of constructive disruption further. Although this research offers fairly strong evidence that this balance of disruption and constructive intentions can make action more effective, it also raises new and intriguing questions. Most importantly, what *other* psychological changes among the advantaged group may be triggered by constructive disruption and might help to drive support for concessions? We suggest that disruption helps put pressure on the advantaged to respond, but we do not know how this process works psychologically. We speculate that one possibility is that this occurs through increasing advantaged group members' attention to the protest and inequality. Moreover, we suggest that constructive intentions help ensure that the response produced by such pressure is conciliatory, but here we also do not know enough about the psychological process. We speculate that this could be because constructive intentions reduce threat (Di Bernardo et al., 2019; Thomsen et al., 2008) or make the disadvantaged's claims seem more legitimate (Thomas & Louis, 2014). These questions and others should be explored in future research to better understand the psychology of constructive disruption.

We also note that this research was limited to intergroup contexts unfolding within democratic societies, and thus might not apply to other contexts. This is important to note because the logic of generating support for concessions to the protestors among the advantaged group is mainly relevant in a democratic society where public opinion has at least some impact on politics and policy. Future research could also examine behavioral manifestations of this shift in public opinion that would make it more likely to be reflected in the decisions of policymakers. For example, examining whether the support for concessions to the protest is reflected in attempts to motivate policymakers to make these concessions, for example, through signing petitions, writing letters, or making phone calls to relevant government officials.

However in a more authoritarian society, for example, different tactics may be needed to affect the smaller circle of decisionmakers, and perhaps more generally much more disruption is needed (see Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). In addition, there are many intergroup conflicts that are not contained within a single society. For example, while we studied the effects of the protests of Palestinians citizens within Israel, these findings may not apply to protests by Palestinians in the West Bank or Gaza, as they are generally thought of as outside of Israeli society. This could affect the findings in a number of ways: First, the separation from larger society may limit their ability to generate disruption. Second, their position as the outgroup in a violent intractable conflict may make it nearly impossible to communicate constructive intentions using any collective action tactic. Thus, further research is needed to apply these findings to more extreme contexts.

In addition, this research focused on how collective action affects members of advantaged groups, specifically those resistant among the advantaged group. Although we found nonnormative nonviolent action and constructive disruption to be less effective for those lower on resistance, this may have been in part attributable to a ceiling effect on the dependent variable. Therefore, future research could focus more on less resistant advantaged group members and develop more sensitive measures. Further, more sensitive measures of resistance should be developed. We used context-specific measures, because we were interested in resistance to the specific group protesting, but a more inherently psychological measure of resistance that could be altered to refer to any specific group should be developed to help better understand this resistance.

Finally, to more fully understand the impact of collective action it is important to also examine its impact on disadvantaged group members. Although this article suggests that nonnormative nonviolent action should be particularly effective for advantaged groups, what effect would it have on the disadvantaged? On the one hand it might be mobilizing, because it could be seen as taking a stronger stance against group-based injustice. But at the same time it could also deter disadvantaged group members from joining the movement, as nonnormative tactics carry higher risks. Further research is needed to elucidate these and other questions about how the disadvantaged react to different forms of action.

Conclusion

Whereas most research on social psychology has focused on the motivations of disadvantaged group members to engage in collective action to fight for equality, we shift the focus to what psychological effects this action has on the advantaged group. By doing so, we aim to advance our understanding of how and when collective action can actually advance social change. Across five

studies and four different collective action contexts, we consistently found that disadvantaged groups that employed a tactic combining *both* nonnormative and nonviolent action was particularly effective at increasing support for the disadvantaged's cause among those who were initially resistant to change. Its effectiveness was a result of its ability to generate a balance of both producing a sense of disruption but also communicating the constructive intentions of the protestors. This *constructive disruption* was particularly effective at driving support for the protesters' goals among advantaged group members who should be more resistant to social change with the disadvantaged. As such, this work indicates that to be effective at changing the minds of its opponents, collective action needs to avoid being too harmonious and thus easily ignored, requiring some level of disruption to apply pressure to its opponents. However, at the same time it cannot be too aggressive and thus drive further conflict, but rather should communicate constructive, positive intentions. In this way, collective action can generate the constructive tensions described by Martin Luther King, Jr., to spur change toward a more equal society.

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Received November 2, 2019
Revision received June 2, 2020
Accepted June 15, 2020 ■