Hoping for Peace during Protracted Conflict: Citizens’ Hope Is Based on Inaccurate Appraisals of Their Adversary’s Hope for Peace

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Abstract

Hope is an essential component in the pursuit of political change. In order to hope, citizens need to wish for the change and have some expectations that it could materialize. This article explores how the two components of hope (i.e., wishes and expectations) are constructed in the seemingly hopeless case of a protracted and violent conflict. Utilizing a large-scale survey administered in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, we show that citizens’ appraisals of their adversary’s wishes and expectations for peace affect their own wishes and expectations, which, in turn, influences their willingness to support peacebuilding efforts. Regrettably, citizens’ tendency to underestimate their rival’s wish for peace lessens their own hopes, which further abates the support for peacebuilding. The study is the first to illustrate a mechanism by which hope for peace is constructed and the pathways by which hope facilitates resolution. Theoretical and applied implications are discussed.

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Protracted ethnonational conflicts, like the ones between India and Pakistan, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and Palestinians and Jewish Israelis, are among the most challenging international disputes, even though, or perhaps because, they have been lasting so long. Research on protracted conflict suggests that the longevity of the conflict is one of the factors that further their continuation because the extreme duration of these disputes allows for an ossification of rigid beliefs that then become major obstacles in the way of peace (Coleman et al. 2007; Halperin and Bar-Tal 2011). One of the beliefs fueled by the protraction of the conflict is the belief that the conflict is innately irreconcilable (Rouhana and Bar-Tal 1998). Understandably, the continuous state of violence and hostility, coupled with numerous failures to reach an agreement diminish citizens’ belief in the feasibility of peace. In turn, low expectations that peace will ever materialize lead parties to divest efforts and resources from the pursuit of resolution. There is simply no incentive to support negotiations, compromise, or peacebuilding if peace is presumed to be unattainable (Coleman 2003). However, while the protraction of the conflict is likely to decrease citizens’ expectations for peace, it is also likely to increase their wish for peace. The ongoing violence should, if anything, raise citizens’ desires to stop the bloodshed and alleviate the suffering. The wish for peace should thus be high among those enmeshed in protracted conflict leading to increased motivation to engage in peace-promoting behaviors.

The interplay between wishing for a certain political outcome (in our case: “peace”) and expecting it materialize has a markable effect on political behaviors of publics and statespersons (Jervis 1976; Greenaway et al. 2016; Havel 1990). This interplay is captured in the construct of hope (Stotland 1969; Staats 1989; Lopez and Snyder 2003). Webster’s dictionary defines hope as a “desire accompanied by expectation of or belief in fulfillment.” Hope can thus be understood as an amalgam of two factors, a desire (i.e., wish) to attain a goal and some expectation (i.e., assessment of likelihood) that the goal can be attained (Staats and Stassen 1985; Stotland 1969; Averill, Catlin, and Chon 1990; Erickson, Post, and Paige 1975). It should be mentioned that the everyday use of hope is confusing. Sometimes hope is used to signify a wish, without assessing the likelihood of attainment (e.g., “I hope this email finds you well”). On other occasions, hope signifies expectations as when discovering original findings increases one’s “hopes” for journal publication.

Because of its centrality to political processes, hope for peace (or lack thereof) has been a popular research topic among conflict scholars (Antonovsky and Arian 1972; Dowty 2006; Halperin et al. 2008; Sagy and Adwan 2006; Stone 1982; Rosler, Cohen-Chen, and Halperin 2017; Hasan-Aslih et al. 2019; Cohen-Chen, Crisp, and
Halperin 2015; Bar-Tal 2001; Halevy 2017). Yet, scrutinizing these studies reveals that the confusion in the everyday use of hope affected the way hope was operationalized. Some studies reported on “hope for peace” but measured only participants’ expectations for resolution (e.g., Rosler, Cohen-Chen, and Halperin 2017). Other studies reported on participants’ “hopes for peace” but gauged only their wishes for peace (e.g., Antonovsky and Arian 1972), while in a different set of studies, it is unclear whether respondents were expressing their wishes for peace or their assessment of its feasibility (e.g., Halperin and Gross 2011).

The confusion about hope and the resulting unstandardized operationalization of the construct generated mixed results that made it hard to understand how hope functions during conflict. In potential, levels of hope could vary within and between societies because people differ in their desires for peace, vary in their beliefs in its likelihood, or some combination of both. Studying “hope” without separately gauging the distribution of the wish for peace and the belief (or disbelief) in its likelihood makes it impossible to investigate hope for peace, its antecedents, or its potential influence on public’s support for compromise and peacebuilding. One of the aims of this article is to rectify the confusion about hope and its operationalization by demonstrating the theoretical and methodological utility of separately measuring wishes and expectations.

The second goal is to explore the antecedences of hope for peace among those entrapped in prolonged violent conflicts. Specifically, we examine citizens’ appraisal of their adversary’s hope for peace as a potential predictor of citizens’ own hope for peace. We start our examination using the co-orientation model (Newcomb 1953; McLeod and Chaffee 1973). Co-orientation models describe the possible relationships between peoples’ orientation (i.e., attitudes, opinions) toward a particular object and their accurate or inaccurate appraisals of other peoples’ orientation toward that object. Our third aim is to test whether hope has direct consequences for conflict resolution. Specifically, we test how wishes and expectations for peace impact public support for peacebuilding initiatives. Overall, by looking at the antecedences and outcomes of wishes and expectations, we seek to present a fuller account of hope’s role in conflict.

The introduction continues as follows. We first explain how hope functions during protracted conflict. Utilizing the co-orientation model, we then compare between citizens’ hope for peace and citizens’ appraisals of their adversary’s hope for peace. Extending existing co-orientation models, we argue that the appraisal of the rival’s hope for peace is used by those mired in conflict to formulate their own hope for peace. Next, we explore hope’s potential to predict peace-promoting outcomes and introduce the conflict in Israel–Palestine as a fitting case to investigate the role of hope in protracted disputes. We end with offering a comprehensive model that explains the relationship between citizen’s appraisals of the adversary’s hope, their own hope, and their support for peacebuilding efforts.
Hope for Peace during Conflicts

Hoping to attain peace depends on how much peace is desired and how much it is expected to materialize. Previous research demonstrates that those living in protracted conflicts have very low expectation that peace will ever materialize (Rosler, Cohen-Chen, and Halperin 2017; Stone 1982; Telhami and Kull 2013; Leshem, Klar, and Flores 2016). Indeed, the protraction of the conflict and its durability in the face of numerous negotiations attempts provide good reasons to be pessimistic. However, pessimism about the possibility of peace might be so widespread in protracted conflict also because of its psychological benefits. Pessimism protects against potential disappointments (Breznitz 1986) and exonerates citizens from the taxing commitment to actively strive for peace. Another factor that may contribute to public pessimism is the skeptical outlook promoted by hard-line leaders. Skepticism is attractive because it offers seemingly “realistic” and “un-naive” interpretations of political reality and urges constituents to focus on the present rather than on “delusions” for political and social reform (Navot, Rubin, and Ghanem 2017; Oakeshott 1996). During conflicts, hawkish leaders can voice skeptical predictions about the possibility of peace to secure citizens’ support for hard-line policies and derail public pressure to strive for peace.

Although the protraction of the conflict might lead to decreased expectations for peace, it is likely to impact the wishes for peace in the opposite direction. Wishes for peace should be high because of the enormous sacrifices made by citizens involved in the violent dispute. Antonovsky and Arian (1972), for example, report that Jewish Israelis’ wish for “peace with the Arabs” was higher than their wish for national prosperity and economic stability put together. More recently, studies showed that during protracted conflict, the wish for peace is indeed high (Halperin et al. 2008; Leshem 2017). Simply put, the endless cycle of violence and hostility makes peace an extremely desirable outcome. Two points qualify the findings about the high levels of wishes for peace during conflicts. The first is that peace means different things to different people, and so the desire for “peace” is contingent on what “peace” entails. For instance, when peace is defined in an abstract form, citizens’ wishes for peace are very high (Leshem 2017). However, as the definition of peace becomes more concrete, the wish for peace declines. The second qualification is that the wish for peace, even in its abstract form, should not be considered obvious or invariant. Some have great desires for peace, whereas others are more indifferent to the concept (Leshem 2017).

The question then becomes, what predicts citizens’ wishes and expectations for peace? Studies conducted among Jewish Israelis demonstrated that dovish political ideology is one of the most robust predictors of higher expectations (Leshem 2017; Stone 1982) and higher wishes (Halperin et al. 2008; Leshem 2019) for peace. While political ideology is undoubtedly an important element influencing hope, past studies failed to consider an additional factor that may have a substantial impact on
citizens’ hope for peace, namely, citizens’ appraisals of their opponents’ hope for peace. People involved in conflict make speculations about their rival’s intentions in order to construct their own opinion on conflict-related matters (Spector 1977; Jervis 1976). This is especially true during protracted ethnonational conflict where the two sides are locked in a highly interdependent relationship dictated by mutual hostility and distrust (Kelman 1999; Zeitzoff 2016). Within these reciprocal toxic relations, opinions and positions of group members from one party are constructed, in part, as a reaction to opinions and positions speculated to be held by group members from the opposing party (Kelman 2018; Saguy and Halperin 2014; Maoz et al. 2002). Specifically, group members’ opinions and positions are formulated as opposition to, or competition with, the speculated positions of the other side (Kelman 1999; see also Magal, Bar-Tal, and Halperin 2018; Shaked 2018). Although the literature on protracted conflicts describes this dependency as detrimental to conflict resolution, the relations between citizens’ attitudes and their assessment of their adversary’s attitudes were not systematically compared in the context of protracted conflicts. The co-orientation model (Verčič, Verčič, and Laco 2006) provides the tool to conduct such systematic comparisons. We therefore use the co-orientation model to compare between citizens’ hope for peace and their appraisals of their adversary’s hope.

The Co-orientation Model

The co-orientation model, commonly used in the study of interpersonal communications (McLeod and Chaffee 1973; Newcomb 1953) and public relations (Broom 2005), examines the relations between peoples’ attitudes (termed “orientations”) and the attitudes they think are held by others. Co-orientation models were also utilized in the study of intergroup and international relations (e.g., J. Kim 2016; Tkalac Verčič, Verčič, and Laco 2019). For example, results from surveys conducted in Slovenia and Croatia revealed Slovenians’ and Croatians’ opinions on issues that concerned the tense relationship between the two nations but also their assessments of their rival’s opinions on the same issues (Verčič, Verčič, and Laco 2006; Tkalac Verčič, Verčič, and Laco 2019). Interestingly, in many cases, citizens assessed the positions of out-group members as more hard line and rigid than they actually were. The authors conclude that inaccuracies in assessing the out-group’s position on issues in dispute can exacerbate intergroup relations (Verčič, Verčič, and Laco 2006).

The co-orientation model (Figure 1) describes three dimensions of comparison between the opinions of the in-group, the opinions of the out-group, and the appraisals that each group has on the opinions of the other group (McLeod and Chaffee 1973; N.K. Kim 2018; Broom 2005). The first dimension is agreement, which signifies the similarity between the opinions of the two groups. For example, if Palestinians and Jewish Israelis exhibit identical levels of wishes for peace, we can say that the groups “agree” on this issue. The second is congruency, which reflects the similarity between group members’ opinion on an issue and their appraisals of
the out-group’s opinion on the same issues. For instance, if Jewish Israelis wish for peace and believe that Palestinians also wish for peace, then congruency is high. The third dimension is accuracy, which reflects the similarity between group members’ appraisals of the out-group opinions and the out-group’s actual opinions. If Palestinians wish for peace and Jewish Israelis accurately estimate that Palestinians wish for peace, then accuracy is high.

### Applying the Co-orientation Model to Hope for Peace

Although central to understanding processes within protracted conflicts, the hope for peace of rival groups and their assessment of each other’s hope for peace were never systematically examined. We thus apply the co-orientation model to conduct such systematical comparison. To measure the levels of agreement, accuracy, and congruency between citizens’ hopes for peace and their appraisals of their rival’s hope, we need to investigate these relations within each one of hope’s components.

### Wish for Peace

The appraised wish for peace of the adversary (appraised wish of adversary [AWA]) is exceptionally susceptible to inaccuracy because most of the information about the “enemy’s” wishes for peace is conveyed by biased sources that emphasize the rival’s reluctance to strive for peace (Halperin and Bar-Tal 2011; Kelman 2018). Citizens thus rely on the common and quite convenient belief that the adversary “seeks war, not peace,” which is spread as part of a broader set of negatively biased beliefs about the rival party (Bar-Tal et al. 2008; Bar-Tal, Oren, and Nets-Zehngut 2014). However, past studies have demonstrated that the wishes for peace are actually high.
during protracted conflicts (e.g., Halperin et al. 2008). Group members from both sides are thus likely to be in agreement when it comes to the wish for peace but underassess their adversary’s wish for peace. Group members are also likely to display incongruence between their own (high) wishes for peace and their biased appraisals of the adversary’s wishes for peace.

**Expectations for Peace**

Previous studies have shown that during protracted conflicts, expectations for peace are low (e.g., Telhami and Kull 2013). Agreement between the two sides about the low chances for peace are likely to be high because both parties witness and experience the grim reality of the conflict and the futile attempts to resolve it (Mitchelle 2014; Halperin 2016). Because of the conflict’s omnipresence, group members are likely to believe that most of those living in the conflict zone are skeptical about the chances for peace, including members of the rival group. Therefore, group members are likely to be quite accurate in appraising the (low) expectations for peace of their adversary (appraised expectations of the adversary [AEA]). Congruency is also likely to be high because group members’ low expectations for peace coincide with their belief that adversary also thinks that peace is impossible.

In sum, citizens are likely to exhibit low accuracy and congruency when it comes to appraising the out-group’s wish for peace but relatively high accuracy and congruency when it comes to appraising the out-group’s expectations for peace. Agreement between the groups is likely to be high in both wishes and expectations for peace because both groups are inclined to wish for peace but expect peace not to materialize.

Based on these arguments, we formulate the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** *Agreement:* Both groups will exhibit similar (high) wishes for peace and similar (low) expectations for peace.

**Hypothesis 2:** *Accuracy:* Both groups will significantly underassess their rival’s wishes for peace but accurately appraise their rival’s expectations for peace.

**Hypothesis 3:** *Congruency:* Both groups will display incongruence between their own wish for peace and the appraised wish of their rivals but will exhibit congruence between their own expectations for peace and the appraised expectations of their rivals.

**Appraised Hope of the Adversary as a Predictor of Citizens’ Hope**

Research in international relations that utilized the co-orientation model (Kim 2016; Verčič, Verčič, and Laco 2006; Tkalac Verčič, Verčič, and Laco 2019) used it to describe the agreement, accuracy, and congruency between citizens’ opinions and
their appraisals of their opponent’s opinions. We wish to go beyond the noninferential nature of co-orientation models by proposing that during protracted intergroup conflict, appraisals of the out-group’s hope for peace predict in-group members’ hope. The unique case of protracted conflicts facilitates the exploration of this avenue because members locked in a long-standing dispute form their beliefs and opinions, to a large extent, as a reaction to the speculated beliefs and opinions of the out-group (Kelman 2018; Saguy and Halperin 2014; Kelman 1999; Magal, Bar-Tal, and Halperin 2018; Shaked 2018). Here again, it is necessary to describe the postulated mechanism on how appraisals of the out-groups’ wishes and expectations for peace drive the wish and expectations for peace of the in-group.

Driving the formation of in-group members’ wish for peace is a normative-based competition concerning who wants peace more (Bar-Tal 2013; Oren 2019). To differentiate themselves from their “enemy” on normative grounds, group members will believe they wish for peace more than their opponents. The competition will be manifested in a positive association between citizens’ appraisals of the wish for peace of the adversary (AWA) and their own wish for peace such that an increase in AWA will result in an increase in citizens’ own wishes. A more epistemic-based mechanism is at work when people form their expectations for peace. During conflict, group members adhere to a common fallacy that the opponent holds the key for resolution (Deutsch, Coleman, and Marcus 2006) and thus is the side responsible for escalation and de-escalation. When citizens think that the “enemy” holds all the keys to resolution, they are bound to assess the likelihood of peace on their rival’s assessment (see Raviv et al. 1993). Leshem (2019), for example, showed that citizens calibrate their expectations for peace depending on whether a member of the rival group thinks that peace is possible. When a member of the out-group says that peace is possible, in-groups consider peace as a possibility. When an out-group member expresses the opinion that peace is impossible, in-groups deem peace as an impossibility. In other words, the AEA helps group members assess the likelihood of peace. In addition, citizens’ expectations for peace are also likely to be predicted by AWA. After all, resolution should be considered more likely if the rival is perceived to have strong wishes for peace and impossible if the adversary is presumed to have no wish for peace at all.

To sum, citizens’ wish for peace is anticipated to be impacted by AWA, while citizens’ expectation for peace is postulated to be impacted by AEA and AWA. Following are our hypotheses regarding the predictive power of appraised hopes for peace of the adversary.

**Hypothesis 4:** Citizens’ appraisals of their adversary’s wish for peace (AWA) will predict their own wishes and expectations for peace such that the higher the appraised wish for peace of the out-group, the higher citizens’ own wishes and expectations for peace.

**Hypothesis 5:** Citizens’ appraisals of their adversary’s expectations for peace (AEA) will predict their own expectations for peace such that the higher the
appraised expectations for peace of the out-group, the higher citizens’ own expectations for peace.

**Hope as a Predictor of Support for Peacebuilding**

So far, we have examined hope for peace and one of the tentative ways it formulates during protracted conflict. However, we should also investigate whether hope has practical implications for conflict resolution. In other words, hope’s ability to predict outcomes that facilitate peace must be demonstrated to make the claim that hope for peace matters. It stands to reason that the two components of hope will have a substantial impact on support for conflict-related initiatives and policies. Those with intense wishes for peace will be more likely to support peacebuilding than those whose wishes for peace are moderate or nonexistent. Expectations for peace are also likely to impact support for conflict-related initiatives and policies because those who think that resolution is impossible should have no reason to support peacebuilding, while those (few) who believe that peace is possible, even probable, are more likely to support peace-promoting steps.

Existing literature provides partial evidence about the predictive power of hope for peace (Shamir and Shikaki 2002; Cohen-Chen, Crisp, and Halperin 2015; Hasan-Aslih et al. 2019). However, because of the inconsistencies in the literature about how to conceptualize and operationalize hope, hope’s ability to predict conflict-related outcomes was not accurately tested. In the current study, we postulate that each component of hope will independently drive the support for peacebuilding. Our last hypothesis states that:

**Hypothesis 6**: Citizens’ wishes and expectations for peace will predict their support for peacebuilding such that higher wishes for peace and higher expectations for peace will predict greater support for peacebuilding.

The overall model (Figure 2) postulates that citizens’ appraisals of their rival’s hopes for peace affect their own hopes for peace, which in turn affects their support for peacebuilding.

**The Context**

Roughly a century old, the conflict between the Palestinian and Jewish national movements encapsulates the typical features of protracted ethnonational conflicts (Kriesberg 1998). It is a prolonged and violent dispute that demands significant investments from the rival parties and has had a devastating impact on local, regional, and international stability from 1948 onward (Brecher 2017; Kelman 2018). Most importantly, the physical and psychological well-being of Israelis and Palestinians living “between the River and the Sea” is continuously jeopardized by the violent and hostile reality of the conflict. Although the conflict is asymmetrical,
with Israel having superior political, military, and economic power (Shikaki 2018), both groups firmly adhere to rigid beliefs that serve as obstacles for resolution (Canetti et al. 2017, 2019). The absence of any advancement toward peace leaves the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip stateless and oppressed, and the Israelis unsecure both east and west of the Green Line. It is within this dire reality that we conduct our study on hope.

The present research was conducted simultaneously among 500 Jews living in Israel and 500 Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during three days of relative calm. The study improves the accuracy and generalizability of past studies on hope by (1) exploring both wishes and expectation as the two fundamental building blocks of hope for peace, (2) examining these two components among two parties in conflict, and (3) using large representative samples to increase the generalizability of the findings. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive study on hopes for peace administered in a conflict zone.

**Method**

**Sample and Procedure**

Palestinian and Israeli polling companies were contracted to administer the survey among nationally representative samples of Jewish Israeli and Palestinian adults. Data were collected in both populations between August 1 and 3, 2017. The simultaneous and quick collection of data decreased the potential influence of conflict-related events that may occur while data are being collected and increases comparability between the two samples. Jewish Israeli respondents were recruited
from an online pool managed by the Israeli polling company. Participants’ demo-
graphics, including gender, age, and the party they voted for in the 2015 general
elections, were collected in advance by the polling company. Cross-tabulating this
information with demographic reports published by Israel’s Central Bureau of Sta-
tistics created a sample that represented the Israeli population on selected demo-
graphic criteria. Palestinian respondents were recruited using a stratified probability
sample of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and were surveyed in
their homes. Trained Palestinian enumerators followed the surveying protocol com-
monly used in the Palestinian Territories (PT) by reading the questions aloud and
marking participants’ answers on the survey sheets. To account for potential social
desirability bias that might occur during face-to-face interviews, about half \( N = 240 \) of Palestinian participants were randomly assigned to fill the survey sheets
independently and so were not openly sharing their opinions with the interviewer.
Results reveal that social desirability biased participants’ answers on questions that
were politically sensitive (for full report see: Leshem, Nooraddini, and Witte 2019).
To correct for this bias, the surveying method was controlled for in all statistical
analyses. Correcting for the bias also allows for better comparison with the Israeli
participants who filled the online survey on their own. Full sampling procedures are
provided in the Online Appendix.

Overall, the samples largely represent the adult population of Jewish Israelis and
Palestinians living in the PT (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics 2018; Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics 2017; Pew Research Center 2016), though the Israeli
sample was slightly more secular than the Jewish Israeli population. To correct for
this skew, the sample was reweighted according to the true proportion of religiosity
in the Jewish Israeli population. All analyses were conducted on the reweighed
sample. The Israeli sample \( N = 500 \) consisted of 48 percent females, with age
ranging from nineteen to eighty-three \( (M = 44, SD = 15) \). Regarding religiosity, 49
percent identified as secular, 29 percent as traditional, 13 percent as religious, and
nine percent as orthodox. The Palestinian sample \( N = 500 \) consisted of 50.2
percent females, with age ranging from eighteen to seventy-three \( (M = 36, SD = 13) \). In terms of religiosity, eight percent identified as secular, 41 percent as somewhat religious, 43 percent as religious, and eight percent as very religious. See the
Online Appendix for full demographic measures. The margin of error for the entire
sample is \( \pm 3.18 \) percent, and for each national sample is \( \pm 4.38 \) percent at the 95%
confidence interval.

**Measures**

**Predictors**

**Hope for peace.** Hope was operationalized based on hope’s two core components,
wishes and expectations. Therefore, one scale gauged participants’ wish for peace,
and another scale measured their expectations that peace will materialize (Sagy and
Adwan 2006; Staats 1989). As noted, people vary in their understanding of what
“peace” is and what it entails (Biton and Salomon 2006). Thus, for the purpose of this study, we presented two propositions that reflect a definition of peace we term “generic reciprocal peace.” The first proposition was “an agreement that ensures the needs of the two peoples,” and the second was “an agreement that ensures security and safety for Israelis and independence and freedom for Palestinians.” As can be seen, the propositions are broad enough to include a wide range of possible solutions that may come across respondents’ minds but narrow enough to ensure the solutions are reciprocal and do not come at the expense of the core needs of either party. The first proposition leaves the definition of needs open, while the second proposition mentions the widely acknowledged national interests of each party.

The scale measuring wish and the scale measuring expectations contained the same two propositions mentioned above. In one scale, participants were asked to indicate how much they wished these propositions will materialize (0 = I have no such wish, 5 = I wish very much) and in the other scale how much they think these propositions will actually materialize (0 = totally unlikely, 5 = very likely). Collapsing each scale, two indices were constructed, the first indicating participants’ wish for reciprocal peace (α = .82) and the second their expectations that reciprocal peace will be realized (α = .83).2 Factor analysis showed that the wish items load well on the wish index (> .62), and the expectation items load well on the expectation index (> .65). No cross-loadings over .2 were observed.

**Appraised hope of the adversary.** The same propositions that were used above were utilized to gauge participants’ appraisals of the adversary’s hope for generic reciprocal peace. Jewish Israeli participants were asked to assess, based on their best knowledge, the extent that Palestinians wished that the two reciprocal peace propositions will materialize (0 = they have no such wish, 5 = they wish very much), and the extent that Palestinians expected the two propositions to actually materialize (0 = they believe it is totally unlikely, 5 = they believe it is very likely). Palestinian participants were asked identical questions about Jewish Israelis’ wishes and expectations for peace. To avoid forced and thus false appraisals, participants could indicate that they do not know how much members of the other group wished or expected peace. Out of 1,000 participants, 123 indicated that they did not know to appraise the out-group’s wish or expectations for peace ($N_{ISR} = 30$, $N_{PAL} = 93$). Because we were interested in testing the effects of citizens’ appraisals of their rival’s hope for peace on their own hopes, participants who did not know to assess their adversary’s hope on one, or both, components were excluded from the analysis. Representativeness of each national sample was maintained after exclusion (see supplemental material for full analyses). No covariate was associated with answering “don’t know” except nationality. Palestinians were more likely than Jewish Israelis to mark that they did not know the levels of their adversary’s wishes ($\chi^2 = 41.6, p < .001$) and expectations ($\chi^2 = 28.5, p < .001$) for peace. Collapsing each scale, two indices were constructed, one indicating participants’ appraisals of the wish for peace of the adversary (AWA, $\alpha = .89$) and the other their appraisals of the
expectations for peace of the adversary (AEA, $\alpha = .87$). Factor analysis showed that the AWA items load well on the AWA index (>.63) and that the AEA loaded well on the AEA index (> .61). No cross-loadings over .3 were observed.

**Covariates**

*Demographics.* Demographic variables included gender, age, years of education, and levels of religiosity.

*Political Ideology.* Previous research in the PT gauged Palestinians’ political ideology by asking them whether or not they supported the Fatah party (e.g., Lavi et al. 2014; Shelef and Zeira 2017). To generate a more nuanced measure of dovish/hawkish ideologies, one that is comparable across the two societies, we utilized items from the Adherence to the Ethos of Conflict Scale (EOC) (Bar-Tal et al. 2012; Canetti et al. 2017). The scale measures core conflict-related attitudes like the belief in the group’s exclusive indigenousness (e.g., “The exclusive right of the Israelis/Palestinians over the Land of Israel/Palestine results from it being our historic homeland”). Participants were asked to rate the extent they agreed with six ethos of conflict principles (1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree). One item was dropped due to low reliability. Therefore, the final scale included five items with higher scores indicating more hawkish positions ($\alpha = .67, .76_{ISR}, .51_{PAL}$; see the Online Appendix for the full scale).

**Outcome**

*Support for peacebuilding.* Three items gauged participants’ support for peacebuilding efforts that might be relevant to both audiences. Participants were asked to mark the extent they would be willing to “join nonviolent demonstrations of Palestinians and Israelis calling for peace, justice, and security for all,” “support a team of Palestinian and Israeli ex-diplomats that are working on drafting a just and sustainable solution to the conflict,” and “share the land for peace” (1 = not willing at all, 5 = willing very much). High scores indicate higher support for peacebuilding ($\alpha = .67$).

**Data Analysis Strategy**

Data analysis was conducted in several steps. First, we explored the means of main variables with a focus on agreement, accuracy, and congruency. Next, we utilized regression models to test whether appraisals of the adversary’s hope predict citizens’ own hope. As the last step, we tested a comprehensive model estimating the relative effects between appraisals of the adversary’s hope, citizens’ own hope for peace, and support for peacebuilding using structural equation modeling (SEM). All analyses were performed on the entire sample and each national sample separately. Because most of the trends were similar across societies, we report findings from the entire sample unless results from the national samples diverge from the general trends (results from each national sample are reported in the Online Appendix).
Results

Co-orientation

Agreement. Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the main variables in the entire sample and each society. Looking at the wishes and expectations for peace, it seems that in both societies, the wish for peace is relatively high (0.87 points above the 3.5 midpoint of the scale), with 62 percent of Palestinians and 76 percent of Israelis scoring above the midpoint. Expectations for peace, on the other hand, are meager (1.09 points below the 3.5 midpoint of the scale), with only 14.8 percent of Israelis and 21 percent of Palestinians scoring above the midpoint. Independent t tests demonstrate that Israelis have higher wishes for peace ($t = 4.9$, $p < .001$) whereas Palestinians have higher expectations for peace ($t = 4.2$, $p < .001$). In other words, though both societies display high wishes and low expectations for peace, in support of Hypothesis 1, the disagreements are still significant. Several explanations for the disagreements are offered in the discussion section.

Accuracy. Confirming Hypothesis 2 (Figure 3A), it seems that citizens underestimated their rival’s wishes by a full 1.72 points on a five-point scale (difference from zero: $t = 30.1$, $p < .001$) with 84 percent of Israelis and 79 percent of Palestinians underassessing each other’s wish for reciprocal peace. Underestimating the rival’s wishes for peace was marginally more pronounced among Palestinians than Jewish Israelis ($M_{PAL} = -1.82$, $SD = 1.87$, $M_{ISR} = -1.63$, $SD = 1.54$, $t = 1.7$, $p = .09$) and predicted by hawkish political ideology ($\beta = -.24$, $p < .001$) and religiosity ($\beta = -.14$, $p < .001$).

Providing additional support for Hypothesis 2, the difference between citizens’ appraisals of their adversary’s expectations for peace and the adversary’s actual expectations was only marginally different from zero ($M = -0.09$, $t = 1.7$, $p = .08$), indicating that Israelis and Palestinians accurately assess their opponent’s (low) expectations for peace (Figure 3B). Looking separately at each society, a more nuanced picture unfolds. It seems that Israelis underestimated Palestinians’

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations of Main Variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Range</th>
<th>Entire Sample</th>
<th>Palestinian Sample</th>
<th>Israeli Sample</th>
<th>Difference PAL – ISR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Support for peacebuilding</td>
<td>1–5</td>
<td>2.27 (1.24)</td>
<td>2.2 (1.35)</td>
<td>2.33 (1.12)</td>
<td>$t = -1.9$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Wish for peace</td>
<td>1–6</td>
<td>4.37 (1.54)</td>
<td>4.12 (1.6)</td>
<td>4.59 (1.43)</td>
<td>$t = -4.9^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Appraised wish of adversary</td>
<td>1–6</td>
<td>2.62 (1.71)</td>
<td>2.77 (1.87)</td>
<td>2.49 (1.54)</td>
<td>$t = 2.4^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Expectations for peace</td>
<td>1–6</td>
<td>2.41 (1.32)</td>
<td>2.58 (1.4)</td>
<td>2.23 (1.21)</td>
<td>$t = 4.2^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Appraised expectations of the adversary</td>
<td>1–6</td>
<td>2.32 (1.45)</td>
<td>2.48 (1.66)</td>
<td>2.19 (1.21)</td>
<td>$t = 2.9^{**}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Two-tailed.

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
expectations by only 0.39 points, while Palestinians overestimated Israelis’ expectations by only 0.25 points (though the inaccuracies were significant, $t = -6.5$, $p < .001$; $t = 3.1$, $p = .002$, respectively). Across societies, the tendency to underestimate the opponent’s expectations for peace was predicted by hawkish ideology ($\beta = -.2$, $p < .001$) and religiosity ($\beta = -.07$, $p = .03$).

**Congruency.** To estimate the congruence between group members’ hope and their appraisals of their adversary’s hope we constructed two within-subject variables: one indicating the incongruence between wish and AWA and the other indicating the incongruence between expectation and AEA. Positive scores indicate higher wishes than AWA and higher expectations than AEA, while negative scores indicate higher

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**Figure 3.** (A) Self-reported versus adversary-appraised wishes for generic reciprocal peace. Dashed line represents scale midpoint. ***$p < .001$. (B) Self-reported versus adversary-appraised expectations for generic reciprocal peace. Dashed line represents scale midpoint. ***$p < .001$. **$p < .01$.**
AWA than wishes and higher AEA than expectations. A score of zero reflects complete congruence.

In support of Hypothesis 3, the incongruence of the wish for peace is positive and large $M = 1.75, SD = 1.93$, demonstrating participants’ inclination to report their one’s own wishes for peace as much higher than the wish for peace of the opponent. This tendency was more pronounced among Jewish Israelis ($M_{ISR} = 2.1, SD = 1.7, M_{PAL} = 1.4, SD = 2.1, t = 5.47, p < .001$) and was predicted, in both societies, by political ideology such that hawks tended to exhibit more incongruency than doves ($\beta = .1, p = .003$). Still, even among doves (those scoring 1SD below the mean of the EOC measure), the incongruency in the wish for peace was positive and different from zero ($M = 1.5, SD = 1.6, t = 11.2, p < .001$), indicating that even doves think they wish for peace more than their rivals. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, the incongruency in expectations for peace is quite small, only .01 points on a $-5$ to $5$ scale (though different from zero, $t = 2, p = .05$). In fact, 33 percent of participants (the mode) exhibited complete congruence between their own expectations for peace and their appraisal of the adversary’s expectations. The congruency is similar among Jewish Israelis and Palestinians ($M_{ISR} = .03, SD = 1, M_{PAL} = .19, SD = 1.8, t = 1.5, p = .12$) and is not predicted by political ideology ($p = .7$).

Figure 4 provides a plot of within-subject incongruencies. The $Y$-axis denotes the extent participants were incongruent about the wish for peace, while the $X$-axis

![Figure 4. Incongruence. Positive scores on the Y-axis indicate more self-reported wish than appraised wish of the adversary. Positive scores on the X-axis indicate more self-reported expectations than appraised expectations of the adversary.](image-url)
denotes the extent participants were incongruent about expectations. As illustrated, most of the observations are clustered around the midpoint of the X-axis and above the midpoint of the Y-axis revealing citizens’ tendency to align their expectations for peace with those of the adversary and at the same time distinguish themselves from the adversary by believing they wish for peace more than their rivals.

**Predicting Hope for Peace**

Two multivariate regression models were used to explore whether citizens’ appraisals of their adversary’s hope for peace predicts their own hopes—one model predicting the wish for peace and the other predicting expectations. Collected demographics were also entered as tentative predictors in both models. Table 2 presents the standardized effects estimated in the two models.

In support of Hypothesis 4, AWA positively predicts citizens’ wishes and expectations for peace. The higher the appraised wish for peace of the opponent, the higher citizens’ own desires for peace and expectations that peace could materialize. Concurring with Hypothesis 5, citizens’ AEA positively predicts their own expectations for peace such that the more the “enemy” is speculated to believe peace is possible, the more citizens believe peace is possible. Hawkish political ideology was associated with lower wishes (β = −0.07, p = .07) and expectations for peace (β = −0.1, p = .002). However, Wald’s tests comparing effect sizes reveal that the effects of political ideology on citizens’ wishes and expectations for peace are always smaller than the effects of appraisals (effect on wish: AWA > EOC, F = 20.1, p < .001, AEA > EOC, F = 3.2, p = .07; effects on expectation: AWA > EOC, F = 28.4, p < .001, AEA > EOC, F = 41, p < .001).4 This point should be highlighted because political ideology is frequently cited as one of the most robust predictors of conflict-related

### Table 2. Effects of Predictors on the Wish and Expectation for Peace.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Wish for Peace β (SE)</th>
<th>Expect Peace β (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appraised wish for peace of adversary</td>
<td>.24*** (.04)</td>
<td>.19*** (.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appraised expectations for peace of adversary</td>
<td>.007 (.04)</td>
<td>.28*** (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkish political ideology</td>
<td>−.07 (.08)</td>
<td>−.1** (.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.14*** (.003)</td>
<td>.05 (.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1 = female)</td>
<td>.05 (.1)</td>
<td>.06* (.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>−.19*** (.06)</td>
<td>−.05 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>−.02 (.06)</td>
<td>.01 (.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationality (+ = Israel)</td>
<td>.08 (.13)</td>
<td>−.22*** (.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 877  
Adjusted $R^2 = .17$  
Adjusted $R^2 = .25$

*Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.*
beliefs in protracted conflicts (e.g., Shuman, Halperin, and Reifen Tagar 2018) including hope (Leshem 2019). Last, holding all else constant, it appears that Jewish Israelis and Palestinians have similar wishes for reciprocal peace but that Palestinians’ expectations for reciprocal peace are still significantly higher. We offer a tentative explanation for these findings in the discussion section.

Overall, in support of Hypotheses 4 and 5, citizens’ wishes and expectations for peace are influenced, to a large extent, by the appraised wishes and expectations for peace of the adversary. As the last step, we evaluate the merit of hope in advancing peace by exploring whether hope predicts support for peacebuilding efforts.

**Hope’s Role in Public Support for Peacebuilding**

SEM was utilized to explore the role of hope as a predictor of public support for peacebuilding while also estimating the relative effects among other key variables. Following the confirmation of Hypotheses 4 and 5, our hypothesized model positions AWA and AEA as antecedences of citizens’ wishes and expectations. Next, based on research that examined hope for peace as a predictor of peace-promoting outcomes (Cohen-Chen, Crisp, and Halperin 2015; Leshem 2019), we postulate that wishes and expectations are both antecedences of support for peacebuilding (see Figure 2). However, we also tested an alternative model where AWA, AEA, wishes, and expectations serve as direct antecedences of support for peacebuilding. The rationale for the alternative model is that, at least potentially, appraisals of the adversary’s wishes and expectations for peace could drive behavior directly not through citizens’ own hope for peace. In other words, in-group members’ belief that the adversary does not wish for peace and does not expect it to come could tentatively reduce in-group members’ support for peacebuilding regardless of their own wishes and expectations for peace.

We used maximum likelihood estimates in all SEM models and evaluated the quality of the models by examining how well they fit the data. To be considered a good fit, the models should pass the standard fit thresholds (root mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] ≤ .05, comparative fit index [CFI] ≥ .95, Tucker-Lewis index [TLI] ≥ .95, standard root mean square residual [SRMR] ≤ .08 and a $\chi^2/df$ ratio ≤ 3; Kenworthy et al. 2016). We controlled for all covariates, allowed for correlations between error terms of the endogenous variables and between the exogenous variables, and trimmed nonsignificant paths and correlations (see Lavi et al. 2014). Estimation of the hypothesized model yielded a good fit, $\chi^2 = 42.4$, $df = 19$, RMSEA = .037, CFI = .981, TLI = .965, SRMR = .027, $\chi^2/df$ ratio = 2.23, whereas estimation of the alternative model yielded a poor fit $\chi^2 = 127.5$, $df = 15$, RMSEA = .091, CFI = .9, TLI = .82, SRMR = .06, $\chi^2/df$ ratio = 8.5. A comparison of the models shows that the fit of the hypothesized model is superior to the alternative model, $\chi^2_{diff} = 85.1$, $df_{diff} = 5$, $p < .001$. Overall, it seems that the data support the hypothesized model and not the alternative one. As a last step, we made sure
that the hypothesized model is applicable in each society. In both societies, the hypothesized model performed well (Palestinian sample: $\chi^2 = 36.8$, $df = 19$, RMSEA = .048, CFI = .954, TLI = .941, SRMR = .04, $\chi^2/df$ ratio = 1.93; Israeli sample: $\chi^2 = 26.3$, $df = 19$, RMSEA = .03, CFI = .993, TLI = .99, SRMR = .025, $\chi^2/df$ ratio = 1.38).

Figure 5 presents the hypothesized model controlling for all covariates. For the sake of clarity, we present the model without the paths of the covariates (full model as well as the alternative model available in the Online Appendix).

As illustrated in Figure 5, citizens’ appraisals of their rival’s hope for peace predict their own how for peace, which, in turn, affects their support for peacebuilding. Comparing the coefficients, it appears that, at least when it comes to support for peacebuilding, the wish for peace is more impactful than the expectations for peace (Wald’s test $\chi^2 = 8.86$, $p = .003$). Scrutinizing the effect of covariates, it seems that hawkish political ideology, but not any other covariate, predicts citizens’ support for peacebuilding ($\beta = -.28$, $p < .001$). This finding confirms previous research that showed the robustness of ideology as a predictor of conflict-related behaviors during conflict (Pliskin, Sheppes, and Halperin 2015). However, our model reveals that a significant part of the well-documented effect of political ideology on peace-promoting outcomes is mediated by hope (indirect effect: $\beta = .08$, $p < .001$).

**Discussion**

Thinkers and political leaders from Fromm (1968) and Tillich (1965) to Havel (1990) and Barber (2016) highlighted the action-oriented nature of hope and its
practical consequence for political change. Building on this premise, the present study examines the role of hope in promoting peace in one of the most challenging ethnonational conflicts today. One of the principles guiding our study is that understanding hope entails exploring its two innate components—the wish for a political outcome and the belief it could be attained. This approach proved to be fruitful as it enabled us to correctly explore tentative predictors and potential outcomes of hope for peace while helping to explain the mixed results found in the literature. For instance, our study shows that people enmeshed in a protracted conflict have high wishes for peace (which corresponds to findings from studies that reported on “hopes” but were, de facto, measuring only wishes) and low expectations for peace (which is line with results from studies on “hope” that gauged only expectations).

Utilizing the co-orientation model also proved to be beneficial as it revealed the discrepancies and similarities between what people think and what people think their adversary thinks. As hypothesized, citizens underassess their rival’s wish for reciprocal peace (i.e., low on accuracy) and maintain a gap between their appraisals of the adversary’s wishes for reciprocal peace and their own wishes (i.e., low on congruency). Inaccuracy and incongruency are manifestations of the core belief that “we” want peace but the “enemy” does not (Oren 2019; Bar-Tal et al. 2008, 2012). They also reflect the absence of honest and direct communication channels between the parties and the impact of distorted depictions of the out-group as portrayed in the media (Kelman 2018; Oren 2019; Shaked 2018). As our study demonstrates, the prevalent tendency to underassess the out-group’s wish for peace (approximately 80 percent of all participants underestimated their rival’s wish for peace) has detrimental consequences on citizens’ own hope and their support for peace. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found much more accuracy and congruency between citizens (low) expectations for peace and their assessment of their rival’s (low) expectations. The relative consensus between the parties concerning the slim chances for peace reflects the overall absence of a core incentive essential for conflict resolution—the belief in the feasibility of peace.

As for agreement, controlling for covariates, it seems that Jewish Israelis and Palestinians have identical (and high) desires for a reciprocal peace. This finding should not be taken lightly. Regardless of the final form of the solution (e.g., one-state, two-state), the vast majority of Jewish Israelis and Palestinians not only support the idea of reciprocal peace that will address the basic needs of both groups but highly desire it. This is an excellent starting point for the two societies and all those working for peace in Palestine–Israel. Interestingly, Palestinians’ expectation for reciprocal peace is significantly higher than Jewish Israelis’. This finding may seem counterintuitive given the fact that, at least currently, Palestinians are living within harsher conditions of the conflict. If anything, the dire situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip should cause deep skepticism among Palestinians. A tentative explanation can be found in the research on the politics of hope and skepticism (Oakeshott 1996; Navot, Rubin, and Ghanem 2017) that suggests that optimism and pessimism are products of political strategies exercised by groups and leaders.
Palestinians practice the politics of hope because their struggle for self-determination requires the belief in the possibility of peace and its assumed result - independence and statehood. In contrast, Jewish Israelis, who are currently living in relatively benign conditions of conflict, can “afford” to be skeptical. The Israeli politics of skepticism is exemplified in Benjamin Netanyahu’s declaration that Israelis will have to learn to live on their swords forever (Haaretz, October 25, 2015). Further research is surely needed to understand how skepticism and optimism are used as political strategies during conflict.

Going beyond co-orientation models, we found that citizens’ appraisals of the wish for peace of their adversary predicted their own wishes for peace, possibly due to a normative-based competition, with each side believing they wish for peace more than their “enemy.” We also found that citizens’ appraisals of their adversary’s expectations for peace predict their own expectations for peace. This process may be driven by an epistemic-based process where citizens are relying on the adversary’s assessment of the likelihood of peace (or more correctly, citizens’ speculations about their adversary’s assessment of the likelihood of peace) to form their own assessments. Last, citizens’ expectations for peace were also predicted by their appraisals of the adversary’s wish for peace. Quite straightforwardly, if the rival does not wish for peace, peace is assumed to be unlikely.

What are the consequences of these findings to conflict resolution? In line with our hypothesis, results show that hope for peace is a robust predictor of support for peacebuilding, even after controlling for political ideology and other demographic variables. This finding is congruent with theoretical and empirical work that placed hope as a central component in any process for political change (Fromm 1968; Bloch 1959; Cohen-Chen, Crisp, and Halperin 2015; Greenaway et al. 2016; Leshem 2019). We add to this important work by providing novel conclusions about the contribution of each component of hope for peacebuilding. It seems that both the wish and expectations for peace significantly contribute to the promotion of peace, though, at least when it comes to support for peacebuilding, it is more impactful to want peace than to believe it is possible.

**Theoretical and Applied Contribution**

This study contributes to conflict resolution research in several ways. First, we draw the attention of conflict scholars and practitioners to the significance of hope and hopelessness for conflict analysis and resolution. We reveal a pathway by which hope for peace is constructed and offer theoretical and empirical backing for the premise that hope is an essential component in conflict transformation. Specifically, we show that hope is based on inaccurate appraisals of the adversary’s wish for peace and that the results of these inaccuracies are detrimental to the promotion of peacebuilding.

More generally, our study contributes to social science research by demonstrating the theoretical and methodological utility of distinguishing between the two
components of hope. Separately measuring wishes and expectations rectified the confusion on how hope should be conceptualized and operationalized and made it possible to understand the unique contribution of each component to conflict resolution. Separately gauging wishes and expectations can be useful in research of a variety of social and political contexts including the study of collective action, intrastate tensions, and international crises. We also contribute to co-orientation theory by suggesting that during intergroup conflict, citizens’ beliefs about what the out-group thinks influence their own beliefs. So far, work in international relations utilized co-orientation models as a tool to compare, not infer, attitudes and positions (e.g., Kim 2016; Verčič, Verčič, and Laco 2006). However, we believe that these models can provide additional insights for conflict analysis by going beyond mere comparison. Simply put, during intergroup conflict, what people think their “enemy” thinks has consequences on their own beliefs and perceptions (e.g., Kelman 2018; Oren 2019; Saguy and Halperin 2014). Empirically investigating these consequences was one of the aims of this study and should be explored in future research that utilizes co-orientation models to study prolonged intergroup disputes. Last, we believe our study contributes to conflict research by providing unique data collected simultaneously within two populations entrapped in a heated and live dispute. In particular, much effort was devoted to collect data in the PT, where research is few and far apart (for exceptions, see Canetti et al. 2017; Shelef and Zeira 2017). Interestingly, many of the features described in this article are shared by the two societies. Studies that are conducted simultaneously on two rival groups are thus valuable to understand the differences and similarities that drive conflict and facilitate resolution.

Our study also has an applicable contribution to conflict resolution practice by providing guidelines on how to use hope in conflict interventions. One applicable takeaway is that hope-inducing interventions can use the “enemy” as a source by which hope can be induced. Direct communications through channels of public diplomacy and peoples-to-peoples encounters can expose group members to their rival’s wishes for reciprocal peace and consequently increase their hopes and willingness to support peacebuilding. Conflict intervention through media campaigns can also be a channel by which citizens are exposed to the wish for peace of the rival party. Results from this study will directly contribute to improving hope-inducing interventions that were already found to have positive effects in the context of protracted conflicts (Cohen-Chen, Crisp, and Halperin 2015; Leshem 2019).

Limitations and Future Directions

One limitation of the study is the different sampling techniques used in each population. Online sampling is still not a possibility in the PT, and budget constraints prevented the use of random probability sampling among Israeli Jews. We were therefore compelled to use different sampling methods for each population. We believe, however, that the different steps implemented to correct for sampling biases and skews sufficiently address this limitation. Another drawback of the study is that
we focused only on support for peacebuilding as the peace-promoting outcome postulated to be affected by hope. It could be suggested, however, that other outcomes that facilitate resolution need to be explored in order to assess the broader consequences of hope. One suggestion of improvement is to test hope’s impact on public engagement with collective action and real-life peacebuilding efforts.

Conclusions

The importance of exploring how desires and expectations impact political outcomes has been highlighted by Jervis (1976). We took this challenge and explored wishes and expectations in the seemingly hopeless context of the protracted conflict in Palestine–Israel. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is an appropriate case to study hope for peace, even though, or maybe because it is considered a “hopeless” case. Studying hope where it is almost absent revealed hope’s central role as a facilitator of peacebuilding.

Indeed, hope’s leading role in conflict resolution should not be surprising. It is somewhat intuitive that public engagement in any peace-promoting effort will depend on peoples’ desires for peace and their assessment of its probability. Still, few research projects attempted to systematically explore hope and its function during conflicts. We believe that this study provides the first, but “hopefully” not the last, investigation of hope for peace that separately scrutinizes wishes and expectations. This approach yielded insights on the antecedences of hope for peace and its impact on peace-promoting efforts. Yet, these insights pose new questions about protracted conflict and the ways we can promote their resolution. Should we seek to increase citizens’ desires for peace, which are already high but can substantially impact public support for peacebuilding? Or should we focus on increasing the expectations for peace, which are disturbingly low but may have a smaller influence on peace-promoting outcomes? Regardless of the path taken, both avenues will advance our knowledge of protracted conflicts and the possible ways to transform them.

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Supplemental Material
The Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes
1. The original model introduced by McLeod and Chaffee (1973) included a fourth dimension labeled “understanding” that was not relevant to our data.
2. Unless stated otherwise, reliability of all scales was robust in the entire sample and in each national sample separately (all results are posted in the Online Appendix).
3. Additional variables were collected for exploratory purposes. Complete list available in the Online Appendix.
4. Looking at each sample, it seems that political ideology did not predict Palestinians’ wishes and appraised wish of adversary.
5. The alternative model also yielded poor fits in each national sample.
6. We thank the anonymous reviewer for pointing to the relevance of co-orientation theory to our article.

References


